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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis assesses the rationale behind the shifts, ruptures and paradigm 
changes within the scholarship on peace-building. In particular, the thesis is 
concerned with examining if, and how, these shifts have significantly altered the 
manner in which the foundational elements of thinking about peace-building 
have changed beyond the ‘liberal peace-building’ paradigm. To do so, the thesis 
engages with the logic of critique that has led to the emergence of different 
theoretical approaches to peace-building that culminate with the ‘local turn’. The 
thesis begins by tracing an initial shift towards more invasive forms of peace-
building in the late 1990s-early 2000s, before engaging with the emergence of 
the local turn. The research focuses on the case of Kosovo in order to understand 
how a lessons-learnt approach facilitated the shift towards more invasive and 
intrusive forms of peace-building, which can be understood less as a deep 
reconceptualisation of the manner of conducting peace-building operations and 
more as a refinement of methods of socio-political engineering from the outside. 
Furthermore, the case of Kosovo is also central to the local turn, as the rise of 
local ownership discourses is fundamentally tied to the critiques of the extensive 
international mission in the territory, and of its by-products, particularly 
resistance and marginalisation of local agency. Along with an assessment of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the shift towards post-liberal, relational and non-
linear approaches to bottom-up peace-building, the thesis examines the 
implications of the framing of the ‘everyday’ in order to assess the extent to 
which these bottom-up approaches have been able to by-pass the problems 
attributed to the liberal peace approach. By looking at its normative project of 
change, the thesis argues that despite its critical and radical intentions the local 
turn retains certain foundational epistemological and ontological elements of 
modernist and positivist approaches that have so far characterised the very 
mainstream approaches these critiques claim to transcend.  
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Introduction 
Researching the Emergence of the Local Turn:  
A Genealogy of Bottom-up Peace-Building in the Age 
of Non-Linearity 
1. Research Agenda, Aims and Focus 
‘Peace-building’ is one of the most recognisable tropes in the vocabulary of 
contemporary international relations. Its relevance extends to various different 
fields, including political theory, sociology, human geography, and philosophy. 
In its practice, it constitutes one of the most emblematic endeavours of our times, 
embodying the 20th century humanist call for halting widespread intra-state 
violence. In its conceptualisation it follows an analytical imperative to 
understand the basic mechanisms of political and social interactions that often 
express themselves in the form of violent confrontation. Peace-building remains 
a fundamentally contested subject, and not merely at the academic level, as 
international and policy circles continue to explain and re-frame the nature and 
scope of peace-building endeavours through important documents such as 
Agenda for Peace of 1992 and the Brahimi Report of 2000.1 Its wide reach has 
compelled extensive academic research into its nature and its application, which 
has contributed to a large body of work that includes seminal work on 
democratisation, consensus-building, institutionalisation, peace-making and 
peace-keeping. As building peace is not just a matter of theoretical explanatory 
importance but also a matter that deeply affects the manner in which societies 
are run, the plethora of material comprising the literature on peace-building and 
‘peace-thinking’ has given rise to one of the most lively debates in international 
relations, rife with conceptual fuzziness and continuous contestation. 
The research behind this thesis is motivated by the ambiguity that 
besieges the subject of peace-building. The history of contemporary peace-
building, since the inception of the trope in the early 1990s, is characterised by 
                                                             
1 For a more recent overview of the policy of the United Nations towards peace-building, 
including a comprehensive definition of its elements, see the United Nations Peace Building 
Support Office’s orientation document (United Nations Peace-building Support Office, 2010). 
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changes, shifts and lessons-learnt, as well as juxtapositions, paradoxes and loud 
critiques. The loudest of these is perhaps the most recent ‘post-liberal’ strand of 
critique, seeking to highlight the pitfalls inherent in the way peace-building has 
been conceptualised and practised thus far. Yet, surprisingly, despite the 
constant state of contestation that surrounds this field and despite the lack of 
clear definitions, discourses of peace-building have been characterised by the 
rise and consolidation of certain narratives as the orthodoxy on the subject. The 
development of both the theory and the practice of peace-building since the early 
1990s seems to rely prevalently on one singular narrative track, characterised by 
progressivist accounts of history and development. It is precisely this orthodoxy 
that the latest trend in peace-building’s conceptualisation has addressed 
critically. 
In the early stages of my research into the literature on peace-building 
since the early 1990s, it appeared clear that a reliance on lessons-learnt lay at the 
heart of much of the evolution of the subject. The need to adapt, to evolve and 
to change the manner in which we think about, or practice, peace-building is 
admittedly recognised in most of the literature, with the scholarship of the mid-
1990s, for instance, advocating a shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation 
to respond to growing concerns over the outcome of some of the most notable 
peace-building endeavours initiated in the early 1990s.2 Similarly, the later shift 
from institutionalisation and state-building towards local ownership of the mid-
to-late 2000s seemed to reflect a concern with the outcomes and by-products of 
previous attempts to build (or re-build) the conditions for peace from the top-
down. 3 These shifts and ruptures with the past, largely reflected the assumption 
that peace-building could bear substantially different outcomes if it were 
conceptualised so as to adapt to the growing complexity of post-conflict 
circumstances in order to alter, rethink and re-formulate the means, methods and 
technical aspects of approaching these contexts at various different levels. This 
logic of conceptual evolution is the subject of my research, as I seek to 
                                                             
2 For a comprehensive overview of the argument suggesting the need to move away from hasty 
liberalisations see Chesterman (2004) and Paris (2004). 
3 See seminal works on the shift towards local ownership by Richmond (2009a), Mac Ginty 
(2008), and Boege et al. (2009).  
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investigate the conditions within which these re-conceptualisations took place 
and to understand their implications. 
The principal aim of this research is to undertake a critical enquiry into 
the field of peace-building in order to interrogate the very shifts, ruptures and 
changes that have concurred in the emergence and alteration of the narratives of 
peace-building. This is primarily done by focusing on the content of the shift 
towards the ‘local’, as this shift directly seeks to challenge the orthodoxy and 
hegemonic position of what it identifies as the mainstream liberal paradigm. At 
this point, it is important to point out that, with this thesis, I do not seek to 
establish the feasibility of the liberal peace project nor necessarily to add to the 
existing critique that mainly associates peace-building with the liberal project. 
In fact, my thesis seeks to avoid the trap of dichotomous and limited pro/contra 
debates around ‘liberal’ peace-building. Indeed, critiquing the liberal peace is 
not the aim of this thesis.  
Because my research ultimately shifted its focus away from a debate on 
the feasibility of liberal peace-building, it became necessary to alter the manner 
in which field work was approached and utilised in the analytical phase. In the 
initial stages of my research, fieldwork interviews in Kosovo were designed to 
assess the international community’s awareness of the difficulties encountered 
in the state-building mission thus far. It soon became clear that the multi-lateral 
nature of the mission produced widely dissonant perceptions of responsibility 
and accountability for the current status of the mission as a whole, as for the 
development of the mission throughout its existence. At that point, I began to 
question the international actors’ views on local ownership, expecting, to a large 
extent, to witness the usual paternalistic tendency to dominate that is typically 
identified, in the literature, as a characteristic of foreign peace-building and state-
building missions (see, for instance, Richmond, 2008). Instead, I encountered 
wide support for the principle of local ownership, reflected in a particular vision 
of the mission as evolving and becoming more complex. This logic framed the 
rhetoric of local ownership as a necessary upgrade, to fundamentally change 
both the means and methods employed in the mission, but also to address the 
mind-set of intervening actors, international institutions and local agents, 
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regarding both the feasibility of the liberal project of democratic reconstruction, 
as well as the role that local agents should take. Interviewing local actors, 
belonging to NGOs, political opposition parties such as Vetevendosje, as well as 
governmental agencies such as the Ministry for European integration, opinions 
on the work of international actors vis-à-vis local ownership were also 
surprisingly not as widely negative or accusatory as initially expected (see 
chapter 5 for details of the interviews undertaken). 
As my theoretical framework changed throughout the research, I was 
lead to re-frame the significance of the field work in Kosovo in two ways. Firstly, 
as it concerned the historical narrative of evolution evidently supported by most 
actors on the ground, figuring Kosovo as an ever evolving work in progress, and 
peace-building as a necessarily ever shifting conceptual and practical field. I was 
also struck by the manner in which the fieldwork research and the theoretical 
research demonstrated a kinship between the rhetoric of local ownership utilised 
by practitioners of peace-building and that upheld by the scholars of the local 
turn, in particular as these two are mostly supposed to be on the opposite sides 
of the conceptual spectrum. I was then pushed to probe this further, particularly 
because this commonality is often dismissed, in recent post-liberal scholarship, 
as a mere rhetorical instrument to allow further interventionism.4 In relation to 
this, the interviews, particularly those coming from local actors in Kosovo (e.g. 
Albin Kurti and Celnaja NGO Director Zulfaj) enabled me to reflect upon the 
paradox of the portrayal of local agency. In particular, it encouraged scrutiny of 
a possible selection bias on the part of the local turn scholars, evident in the way 
in which local actors, whether or not positively inclined towards ‘liberal’ 
agendas and aims, were mostly interpreted as signalling the end of top-down and 
the fundamental unsustainability of the liberal paradigm. The interviews, 
therefore, enabled me to examine how the ‘local’ is constructed (and its aims 
and agendas interpreted and understood), by local turn scholars, to support and 
sustain their project of overturning the liberal peace. 
                                                             
4 On this subject, see Hammond (2009), Richmond (2005) and Bliesemann de Guevara 
(2009b). 
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Furthermore, through an examination of the literature, the timeframe of 
the foreign endeavour in Kosovo became visibly significant to this research as 
many of the shifts identified in the conceptualisation of peace-building are, in 
fact, both visible in the way in which Kosovo is analysed as well as assessed. 
Yet, the case of Kosovo is not a mere test to prove the validity, applicability or 
even the existence of certain shifts but is crucial to the analysis of lessons learnt 
considerations, as well as to see how it has been used to support the emergence, 
modification and rise of further ruptures, shifts and changes in the manner in 
which peace-building is conceptualised. For instance, chapter 4 suggests that this 
is evident by looking at how Kosovo was referred to as a seminal case to 
demonstrate the limits of a minimalist, hands-off form of peace-building, thus 
figuring predominantly in arguments in favour of extending further and more 
invasive forms of peace-building. Once again, Kosovo was then used as a 
launching pad for the rise of the new turn – the local turn - upon the critics’ 
assessment of some of the paradoxes of top-down governance, and the 
concomitant rise of resistance to the liberal peace agenda, actors, methods and 
policies.  
Whilst the thesis does, at least in part, discuss the liberal peace paradigm, 
and specifically, the way in which the paradigm has been relied on as a coherent 
and somewhat homogenous object of critique, it does so primarily to understand 
the critique of the liberal peace in its foundational claims. As such, the key 
research question seeks to assess the aims of the critical re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building operated by the local turn, by examining the conditions that led 
to its emergence, aided also by a reflection on the manner in which discourses 
of resistance in Kosovo sustained the emergence of the local turn. Furthermore, 
this thesis also seeks to understand the extent to which the logic that drives the 
critique is fundamentally dissimilar from that which is the subject of the critique 
itself, commonly associated with universalist, linear and causal frameworks of 
the liberal peace paradigm. 
2. Outline & Chapter Structure 
The thesis’ chapter structure largely reflects the evolution of the scholarship on 
the topic of contemporary peace-building since the early 1990s, beginning in 
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Chapter 1 with the emergence of critiques adhering to a neo-institutionalist and 
cosmopolitan focus. The chapter tracks the emergence of new, prescriptive and 
intrusive forms of peace-building by exploring how critiques emerging in the 
mid to late 1990s focused on the limited reach of previous approaches (identified 
as a coherent plan for the spread of the liberal system through economic 
liberalisation reforms). A particular exploration of the critique of liberalisation 
informs the analysis in order to assess the extent to which, and in what respects, 
the turn towards prescriptive forms of peace-building sought to cut with the past. 
Chapter 2 continues the exploration of the evolution of the scholarship in 
order to examine the rise of the local turn itself. The aim of the chapter is to 
highlight the logic behind the local turn’s emergence, starting with 
understanding the manner in which the critique positions itself against the liberal 
peace paradigm. In particular, the chapter discusses how the focus on the 
hierarchical and exclusionary nature of the so-called liberal peace-building 
paradigm brought to the attention the previously hidden agency of local agents 
as well as the paternalistic and dominating aspects of foreign-led interventions 
and projects of reconstruction. The ‘local turn’, it is argued, signals the end of 
the belief in top-down governance and relative solutions for engendering peace 
based on cause and effect calculations drawing attention to, instead, an emergent 
form of power, consistent with what Foucault called biopower.5 The emergence 
of this form of power, it is argued, not only seeks to break with disciplinary 
mechanisms employed in previous forms of top-down approaches to peace-
building, but ultimately seeks to open up the space for a new ontology of peace, 
that can reflect the agency of the local, beyond the stereotypes of the liberal 
                                                             
5 Foucault’s own definition of biopower is admittedly lax as, in his work, he seemed to rely upon 
the term biopower and biopolitics interchangeably; nonetheless, in Security, Territory, 
Population, he provided a working definition of the concept as: 
the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human 
species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, 
in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies 
took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species 
(2007, p. 16). 
It is this focus on the ‘naturalness’ of the social that the discussion on biopower seeks to draw 
out, to help in “decentering mainstream sovereign explanations of power” and authority 
(Coleman & Grove, 2009, p. 490). This is also particularly pertinent to framing the emergence 
of the critique of top-down approaches to peace-building.  
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peace. Accessing the ‘everyday’ whilst at the same time stressing the 
impossibility of controlling, determining and predicting the outcome of peace, 
becomes the central aim of the local turn. The practical relevance of the local 
turn in initiating a fundamental revolution in the manner in which peace-building 
is conceptualised is further supported with an analysis of the case study of 
Kosovo, mirrored in the second half of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 itself focuses on Kosovo as a fertile ground for the rise of post-
liberal, critical accounts of peace-building. As the chapter discusses, the 
ambiguous nature of the practical status of the mission in Kosovo has framed the 
case study as a perennial work-in-progress, thus arguably rendering it open to 
constant theoretical and practical experimentation. The chapter, thus, aims firstly 
at drawing out the significance of Kosovo for the shifting eras of peace-building 
conceptualisation; the first half of the chapter, in fact, examines the development 
of solutions advocating for the extensions of a more inclusive, comprehensive, 
and invasive project of peace-building through state-building. The second half 
of the chapter links the emergence of the local turn to the critique of state-
building, suggesting that rising discontent and local resistance to externally 
imposed solutions and to the paradoxes of protracted interventions have been 
drawn upon by the critical scholarship to normatively motivate the project of 
theoretical re-conceptualisation of the field and practice of peace-building. 
Where the practical shortcomings of liberal peace-building have been identified, 
in the case of Kosovo, these have been used to initiate the bottom-up 
revolutionising of the field, with primary attention given to the need to integrate 
the previously unheard agency of local actors in ways which are fundamentally 
different from the patronising and uneven relationship of ‘partnership’ set up and 
largely still controlled by external agents. Where local ownership has been 
supported in the current practice of peace-building, the critique has pointed to its 
essentially rhetorical function. As this critique mostly suggests the need of 
accessing a more ‘authentic’ form of local agency beyond the artifice of and 
manipulation by western liberal peace-building, the chapter begins to outline the 
key tenets of this supposedly new and more authentic manner of valorising 
agency in order to later assess the extent to which this shift has broken away 
10 
 
 
from the linear assumptions that underline the ‘liberal’ logic it rejects and 
condemns. 
In this regard, Chapter 4 represents the pivotal point of the thesis where, 
in particular, the very same non-linear logic that drove the shift towards the local, 
is used to turn the inquisitive gaze of critique against the local turn itself. If, 
according to the local turn, the shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation 
represented the extension of liberal control over non-liberal societies, then it is 
also possible to question the extent to which the re-conceptualisation operated 
by the critique might be free from such potential purely because of its benevolent 
project of emancipation. Therefore, Chapter 4 places the critical turn at the centre 
of the analysis in order to assess the extent to which its re-conceptualisation of 
the subjects, objects and practices of peace-building differ from that operated by 
the previous paradigm. By examining the project of emancipation of the local 
turn and comparing it to that of the modernist, linear approach to peace-building 
associated with liberalism, the chapter begins to draw attention to the 
epistemological and ontological similarities between the critical, post-liberal 
shift, and the linear logic it rejected. The chapter, in particular, focuses on the 
difficulties of ‘accessing’ the everyday realm of contingency without relying on 
causal, linear or totalising assumptions. 
The final chapter examines the impact of the project of the local turn by 
discussing the implications of the emergence of the ‘everyday’ as the natural 
quality of a contingent and complex reality. Accessing the everyday, it is argued, 
carries significant normative assumptions that enable the local turn to lay claim 
to the ability to recognise and tap a more ‘authentic’ form of agency, thus 
exercising a form of arbitrary selection that is as problematic as that exhibited 
by linear approaches. This bears important consequences on the project of 
fundamental re-conceptualisation of governance along the lines of the 
appreciation of complexity, through anti-foundational assumptions. Indeed, 
when the everyday is ‘accessed’, this results in the identification and legitimation 
of certain behaviours and the exclusion of others, in a process of normalisation 
that is akin to more traditional teleological approaches. Finally, this also has an 
impact on the way in which the subject of peace-building is conceptualised, as 
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the agent’s actions and behaviours are controlled and regulated through an 
emergent biopower, according to the normative standards established through 
what I refer to as the local turn’s own processes of normalisation. As I argue, the 
paradoxes exhibited by the local turn draw attention to an interesting and 
problematic contradiction, which may, in itself, limit the possibility of rethinking 
peace-building along non-linear lines; when the social is identified as complex 
and contingent without altering the epistemological foundations of the way in 
which we think about ‘peace’, then the critique’s pluralisation of peace may 
instead result in a more traditional form of instrumentalisation of the multitude 
opened up by the acknowledgment of complexity. This questions the very 
assumption of the possibility to peace-‘build’, within a context that recognises 
the ontological limits to governing complex social dynamics. 
3. Recognising Non-Linearity: Complexity & Peace-Building 
The local turn in peace-building, which is the object of this thesis, is endemically 
tied to non-linear approaches to peace and conflict studies and, as such, it is 
necessary to contextualise it within the emergence of said non-linear approaches 
to understand both its allure and its aims and objectives. 
Indeed, the urge to employ non-linear approaches to understand conflicts 
is echoed by many contemporary critical scholars who call for a fundamental re-
conceptualisation of the methods employed to study the conflicts we try to 
resolve. Non-linear perspectives often refer to approaches on complexity and 
systems theories, both originating in studies on computational and information 
systems. These non-linear methodologies, whose main function is to study the 
relationality of systems and networks, have been well received in social sciences 
and have been applied to the study of conflicts since before the boom of 
interventionism in the 1990s.6 More recently, these approaches have also been 
employed by post-conflict peace-building scholars to make sense of the manner 
in which responses to conflict have been framed so far and how best to 
                                                             
6 See, in particular Lederach’s extensive work on the need to acknowledge the ‘web-like’ 
relationships at the basis of the social context within which conflicts take place (1997, p. 78). 
Lederach’s later work elaborated on this by advocating for the employment of non-linear 
reasoning to analysis of conflicts and in the drafting of peace-building initiatives (2005). 
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encapsulate the reality of conflict territories without reducing said reality to the 
sum of its parts. 
Scholars that support non-linear approaches condemn previous 
paradigms that follow a linear causal methodology to study conflicts and draw 
solutions, by pointing to some of their most notable fallacies. Some scholars 
have pointed to the reductionist and generalising nature of approaches to conflict 
that merely seek to draw causal connections between actors, agendas and 
actions; Danny Burns, for instance suggests that a linear, causal understanding 
of conflict brings forward limited solutions and options for action:  
The notion that intervention A will lead to outcome B needs to be 
replaced by something more akin to: intervention A may open up a 
space for action in this location, which might have an effect on 
people and relationships elsewhere, which may open up spaces for 
further action (2011, p. 104). 
Other scholars point to the inevitable tendency, when employing linear, solution-
oriented methods to peace-building, to display western assumptions regarding 
identities, race and what would otherwise be culture-relative understandings of 
justice, peace and conflict (Körppen, 2013, pp. 86–93). In this regard Boege 
suggests that culture-specific forms of knowledge may be instrumental in 
proving that non-linear understandings exist and are as important as linear, 
western ones. The scholar suggests that “a different cultural understanding of 
time can have profound impacts on peace-building”, citing the instance of 
Bougainville’s burial and reconciliation rituals and their impact on the 
perception of the length of the conflict, concluding that “perhaps Melanesian 
time is not clock-time at all, that is: linear, measurable time” (2013, p. 39). Other 
perspectives focus on how linear approaches seem to often ‘miss the point’, 
suggesting that even research that is designed according to linear standards, 
when it tries to understand whether or not peace programmes are being 
successful, display severely limited understandings of the perspectivism that 
permeates the issue of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ (Woodrow & Chigas, 2013, pp. 
210–211). 
The allure of employing a non-linear approach rests on some of non-
linearity’s most notable qualities. Firstly, it is suggested that systemic (as 
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opposed to linear) approaches would focus less on locating the origins of the 
‘problem’ or ‘conflict’ and therefore, be less likely to generate cause-effect 
explanations that could engender simplistic solutions that would miss all the 
other elements and factors that weigh heavily on the constitution of the conflict 
itself (Bernshausen & Bonacker, 2013, p. 24). Indeed, it is suggested that the 
development of the conflict renders it impossible to trace the elements that 
initiated it and that this is an inherent aspect of the complex social interactions 
that shape conflicts themselves. “Because an intractable conflict is entrenched in 
a wide variety of cognitive, affective and social-structural mechanisms, it is 
effectively decoupled from the perceived incompatibilities that launched it” 
(Coleman et al., 2013, p. 42), thus, even when some incompatibilities and 
agonistic encounters can be identified and spatialised within complex conflicts, 
these should be considered as different from those that initiated the conflict in 
the first place, by virtue of the effect of multiple, complex interactions. 
Furthermore, since it is suggested that linear approaches have tended to 
rely on actor-based understandings of conflict which have often perpetrated 
binary and misrepresented understandings of agents and their roles in conflict 
resolution, it has also been suggested that reflecting this contingent reality 
requires looking beyond the “dualistic categories that many peace-building 
strategies are based on, such as inside/outside or global/local” (Körppen, 2013, 
p. 90). The resulting analysis would take, as its object, a socio-political reality 
that is “constructed by self-organizing and emerging networks of action and 
reaction” (ibid, p.90), a space whose main qualifying characteristic is its 
inherent, ‘messy’ hybridity. 
Non-linear approaches, espouse the localisation imperative, often 
underlying the importance of placing local epistemologies and actors at the 
centre of new understandings of peace, particularly to deflect the tendency to 
privilege local agency only when it is “in service of the liberal peace” 
(Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013, p. 136).  Non-linear approaches to peace-
building have, in particular, challenged the orthodoxy and prevalence of the 
liberal peace model, particularly by outlining how this model relies on causal 
mechanisms to understand conflicts and issue plans and projects. This is 
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attributed, largely, to the modernist philosophy that underpins the liberal 
paradigm, with scholars tracing the roots of the liberal call for Enlightenment 
and change to European rationalistic philosophy (Körppen, 2013, p. 82). Non-
linear critiques of liberal peace-building have also focused on another key issue 
typical of linear understandings of conflict, namely, the normative framework 
that underpins the claims to universal solutions:  
For liberal peace […] producing ‘lasting peace’ therefore entails 
moving the state in question further towards this ideal through a 
variety of transformative measures. This is also been seen as 
unquestioningly possible; no state or society is too far beyond the 
pale to be engaged and transformed into this ideal, the only question 
being how this is to be done (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013, pp. 
136–7 emphasis in original). 
These tautological assumptions, it is claimed, are blind to the evident partiality 
of the tools employed to understand conflict in non-liberal societies, and thus are 
also responsible for a vacuous engagement with the ‘other’ of peace studies. 
Körppen notes that “diversity in programming, meaningful local ownership, 
social justice and sustainable economic empowerment still do not belong to the 
guiding principles of many peace-building programmes” (2013, p. 83); this, the 
author suggests, markedly limits the potential for meaningful local engagement 
and results in the use of the rhetoric of local ownership only to substantiate and 
legitimate interventions and their liberal values (ibid, p.83). 
Non-linear approaches to peace-building are informed by constructivist 
(see, for instance, Wolleh, 2013), as well as more deconstructive approaches 
closer to post-structuralism (Popolo, 2011) and to neo-materialism (see: 
Chandler, 2013a; Wiuff Moe, 2013). Without exception, however, these 
approaches are highly sceptical of the possibility of drawing implementation 
plans for a different form of peace-building without falling into the trap of blue-
prints and maps that resemble earlier linear approaches, particularly when 
critiques only focus on altering the tools rather than the fundamental 
epistemological basis (de Coning, 2011). 
Nonetheless, many scholars have attempted to draw out the contours of 
implementation programmes for systemic conflict transformation, at different 
degrees, and relying on ‘process-oriented’ frameworks. Whilst these may not 
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immediately pose some of the more obvious issues with benchmarking, 
standard-setting and objectivity that linear approaches are condemned for 
(Ricigliano, 2013, p. 188), these approaches face a particular challenge, which I 
examine in Chapter 4, relative to their own normative assumptions inherent in 
projects that seek to reveal “hidden conflict dynamics, i.e. those which have so 
far gone unnoticed or have not been considered to adequate extent” (Splinter & 
Wüsterhube, 2013, p. 111). Indeed, it is precisely this attempt to reverse the 
marginalisation identified as an outcome of the liberal peace, that frames the 
contingent and the ‘everyday’ as a realm of agency that is more authentic than 
its misconstrued representations provided by the liberal peace. Furthermore, it is 
this project of drawing out the everyday, the complex and the contingent that the 
local turn essentially embodies, and it is this endeavour that my thesis seeks to 
understand and explore. 
4. Methodology: A Genealogy of the Local Turn 
The emergence of methods that reject the simple causal connections endorsed 
by linear perspectives is not surprising within the theoretical context of 
contemporary critical IR. Indeed, as mentioned above, several of the 
perspectives consistent with the local turn draw on anti-foundationalist premises, 
including insights from post-colonialism, post-structuralism and constructivism, 
to find appropriate frameworks for the appreciation of the complex social and 
political milieu.7 
This section outlines the methods employed in this thesis by suggesting 
that two main principles are followed. Firstly, as this is a qualitative research 
endeavour, the methodology reflects a concern for the discursive conditions that 
led to the emergence of certain narratives, the local turn in particular. To do so, 
                                                             
7  At this point, it is crucial to note that the scholarship engaged with in this thesis is 
predominantly western-based, if not western-born. Debates, particularly those pertaining to the 
recent local turn, are thus geographically limited and often UK-centric. This also exposes an 
interesting selection bias that is, however, unexplored in this thesis because of space 
constraints, regarding the sources of information and analysis employed by scholars of the 
local turn, found mostly in western literature and/or, in general, English-speaking local actors 
and sources. The reflection on the ‘local’ and the consequent debates on the value of the local 
turn are thus generally captured by this selection bias.  
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my thesis uses instruments consistent with those employed by the local turn 
itself, in particular a sensitivity for non-linear and complex approaches to the 
study of conflict, to turn the gaze of critique on the local turn itself. To 
operationalise this, a post-structuralist ‘sensitivity’ in particular is essential 
firstly to acknowledge the complex nature of systems of interaction, but also to 
reject the totalising effects of grand philosophies of the world, and to foster a 
desire to unfurl the discursive twists and turns that constitute and perform 
narrative knowledge. Ideally, such a sensitivity represents an awareness of the 
potential tendency of all narratives, including the most critical and benevolent, 
to operate discursive forms of marginalisation in order to surpass, replace or 
eliminate other forms of narratives. Such potential, as is discussed in Chapter 4, 
may also be within the realm of possibility for the critical local turn itself. 
Despite differences amongst post-modern theories and theorists, some 
fundamental methodological and epistemological considerations make post-
structuralist theories the most suitable to the analysis of narratives. One of these 
considerations regards the epistemological standpoint of post-structuralist 
approaches vis-à-vis complexity is that no meta-description is capable of 
“capturing the essence of complexity” (Cilliers, 1998, p. 3). It is because of this 
rejection of meta-narratives that post-structuralist approaches exhibit a richer 
awareness of the contingencies that shape the issues at hand, and it is also 
possibly because of this that critical approaches to peace-building such as Jabri 
(2007, 2010) and Richmond (2010a) have also largely drawn from them. 
Non-linear approaches critique scientific and positivist methodologies in 
the way in which these deal with the sheer quantity of information provided by 
complex systems by grouping, generalising and offering ‘correct’ methods to 
make sense of the relations between elements. Post-structuralist critiques suggest 
that the analyses provided within linear, modernist frameworks are social and 
political constructs, representations whose only use is as units to be 
deconstructed (Harris, 2001, p. 336). These discourses cannot, in fact, serve by 
themselves as explanatory or even analytical tools for the purpose of 
understanding the cognitive relationship between meanings, as they act – 
willingly or unwittingly as it may be – towards the reproduction of meanings and 
the construction of systems of beliefs. In other words, peace-building discourses 
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cannot, by themselves, claim to explain through cause and effect as the 
identification of the causes is neither neutral nor objective, nor are the effects 
identified naturally given or unproblematic. 
A post-structuralist approach, on the other hand, unpacks the discursive 
framework of peace-building by reflecting upon the processes that shape its 
manifold components (Harris, 2001, p. 340) and thus reflects upon the 
complexity of such discourses without necessarily employing explanatory 
approaches to make sense of such complexity. Deconstruction of the composing 
elements of the discourse can be carried out for any element that concurs to the 
creation of the meta-narrative. This is an analytical solution to uncritical 
assessment exhibited by positivist, linear approaches. 
Whilst modernist positivist approaches, in their analyses, conceptualise 
and rethink the world whilst still attempting the programming of the social 
towards efficiency and performance,8 non-linear approaches, in particular post-
structuralist ones, seek to avoid this tendency by rejecting synthesis, 
generalisations and binaries (Lyotard, 1984, p. 12). Post-structuralist approaches 
are not forced to choose the ‘correct’ method, but rather, as Cilliers would 
suggest, they can adopt a more ‘playful’ approach, allowing for different 
avenues, viewpoints, and understandings (1998, p. 23). The variety of post-
structuralist theories is not a disadvantage nor is it an expression of the 
‘confusion’ and lack of purpose that besiege critical theorists; in this sense it is, 
in itself, an expression of complexity and of the sensitivity and awareness that 
post-structuralist epistemologies have to offer. By supposing that all practices, 
discourses and actors are the result of interaction, circulation and production of 
meanings, post-structuralism understands that universalisation, generalisation, 
and the reproduction of practices and beliefs are operated mainly through 
modernist and positivist methodologies’ support of the reproduction of 
established and unquestioned, often uncritical systems of beliefs. This narrows 
                                                             
8 The notion of performance requires a meta-system, as performance must always be relatable, 
calculable and quantifiable. Contrary to much of the recent trend towards non-linear approaches, 
several linear approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building exist. For a contemporary 
example, see the empirical research undertaken in Zürcher et al. (2013) for the purpose of 
establishing why contemporary democracy promotion fails.  
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down the radical, theoretical scope and potential of research to the attainment of 
support for already established aims and goals (Cilliers, 1998, pp. 23–24). 
This post-structuralist sensitivity is also analytically helpful in that it 
helps to articulate aims which do not claim to have access to universal answers, 
but rather abandon truth claims by essentially shifting the focus of the approach 
to the question and the process of knowing rather than to the answer per se.  This 
is also why my work does not aspire to be a new theory for peace-building, nor 
does it seek to provide an emancipatory alternative to a hegemonic narrative. 
To operationalise this post-structuralist sensitivity, I rely mostly on 
Michel Foucault’s analyses on the emergence and development of narratives. 
Foucault, profoundly linked with the post-structuralist and anti-foundationalist 
tradition, turned his attention to the existence and the importance of over-
arching, generalising, meta-narratives, but did not stop at merely declaring the 
death of such grand philosophies of the world. Instead, his analyses explored the 
iterative processes through which certain narratives emerge and become widely 
accepted (see Foucault, 1991). Whilst there are no specific sets of steps provided 
by Foucault to carry out deconstruction of certain meta-systems of belief, the 
scholar suggests the use of analytical tools which are now mostly associated with 
‘genealogy’. Through analysing exclusion, Foucault suggests that it is possible 
to demonstrate the mechanisms of knowledge formation within grand narratives 
of the world, and particularly those that have a claim on the status of ‘science’ 
(Hook, 2005, pp. 5–6). The reader is invited to deconstruct the discursive fields 
that surround certain narratives in order to understand the conditions that led to 
the emergence of these narratives and to their attaining of hegemonic status. It 
is to this deconstructive endeavour that I now turn. 
5. Michel Foucault: Deconstructing the Local Turn Narrative 
My analytical approach finds its motivation, if not its methodological 
inspiration, in Foucault’s deconstructive analytical work. Generally, two of 
Foucault’s works can be associated with methodological approaches consistent 
with the deconstruction of meta-narratives: the Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1972) and Discipline and Punish (1991a). These volumes are the result of a 
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critical, deconstructive approach to the history, evolution and development of 
narratives. It is this concern for the evolution of narratives that renders 
Foucault’s work relevant to my examination of the peace-building narrative and, 
particularly, to the effects of the emergence of new trends such as the local turn 
itself. 
Admittedly, suggesting a reliance on Foucault’s methodology and 
implying the existence of a pure ‘Foucaldian methodology’ is not only difficult, 
but would be, most importantly, a paradoxical statement.9 Indeed, as Dean 
suggests, Foucault’s approach to the need of methodology is lax in the extreme, 
as he appears to offer some accounts of method in some of his work, only to 
reject or fundamentally alter some elements, concepts and methodological 
principles by taking a wholly different direction (1994). Foucault’s examinations 
of punishment and disciplinary technologies approaches the exploration of the 
development of a narrative without looking for a point of origin and end as linear 
approaches might, but is rather interested in the webs of meaning that construct 
certain truths and define the way in which knowledge is formed through 
processes of transformation, multiple temporalities and even the reversal of 
historical pathways (ibid, p. 4). Foucault’s research, in other words, relies almost 
entirely on ruptures, discontinuities and shifts to account for why certain truths 
become widely accepted narratives with a generally accepted notion of history, 
progress and change. Foucault’s work interrogates progressivism, and seeks to 
displace and problematise those theoretical mechanisms that enable the 
cementing of certain political and ideological viewpoints on history. 
Foucault’s genealogical work deals with a ‘history of the present’, thus 
its approach to history, to the succession of events is not so much concerned with 
the careful reproduction of a true sequence, or an exhaustive and holistic history 
                                                             
9 Whilst arguably Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ studies present structured patterns that more 
closely resemble those of a methodology, his ‘genealogical’ studies, later applied to the 
examination of discourses of discipline and punishment, is more adept at capturing the nuances 
of emergent narratives, to offer a reflection on “our changing historical sense” (Dean, 1994, p. 
14). Despite his concern for discourses regarding systemic aspects of governance (discipline, 
punishment, education, medicine), Foucault refused to cement his analysis in a fixed and 
unmovable method of historical inquiry precisely to reflect the sensitivity for contingent and 
unfixed meanings that I have previously indicated is the mark of post-structuralist and non-linear 
approaches. 
20 
 
 
of socio-political western thought, but rather it is concerned with history as the 
plurality of temporalities, with shifts and ruptures as those events which affect 
the manner in which the present day and its social and political expressions are 
created. It is a history of now, a study of the rationalities and the logic that have 
shaped the use of power, the organisation of societies, and the practice of 
politics. His work on discourses and narratives is thus not necessarily associated 
with a specific methodological standpoint, but with an ad hoc reflection on the 
specific processes (often, thus, not necessarily relying on the identification of 
hegemonic or structural forces) that shape a specific turn in the way a discourse 
produces knowledge. 
As such, the relevance of employing such a post-structuralist sensitivity 
is manifold. In particular, however, the focus on discourses has not only a 
deconstructive function, but also a ‘constitutive’ one, in that discourses are 
fundamental to how power-relations are formed and change over time, and to 
how subjectivities are constituted. In this sense, whilst many non-linear 
approaches to peace-building have ‘deconstructed’ the liberal peace, not many 
have been concerned with the way in which it is ‘constructed’, or the manner in 
which even deconstructive work could contribute to its construction, in the way 
in which critiques often qualify, pinpoint and identify what the liberal peace is, 
before they are able to critique it. At this point, it is also important to clarify that 
this research project does not seek to represent the application of a post-
structuralist method to the study of peace-building per se, but rather, to invite 
the reader to embrace a post-structuralist sensitivity in the exploration of the 
discourses that make up the field of peace-building, and in so doing, to reflect 
upon those conditions that have allowed the discourse to evolve in a certain 
direction. What this also means is that the local turn itself, and its non-linear 
assumptions, should be put to the test, as much as any other linear approach 
might be. 
To do so, this thesis follows an approach informed and inspired by 
Foucault’s genealogy, by working on the basis of identifying patterns of meaning 
by looking at the way in which peace-building has been conceptualised. This 
does not mean, however, that the thesis focuses only on elements of 
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commonality, but rather, that it looks at how ruptures, shifts and changes, are 
constitutive of specific discourses themselves (how ‘change’ and ‘shifts’ are 
typical, for instance, of emancipatory discourses). By looking at the way in 
which the discourse is ripe with critiques, ruptures and shifts, the focus is on the 
creation of new paradigms and ideas and on the means for their dissemination. 
The local turn, for instance, is understood as having its roots in the critiques of 
the liberal peace. My thesis explores the conditions that lead a particularly 
situated critique of liberal peace to generate the local turn. This helps 
problematise the local turn as being neither a natural evolution of an outdated 
approach, nor a neutral response to it, but rather as being embedded within a 
specific web of meaning and power-knowledge relations. The value of pointing 
this out, however, should not be equated with an aspiration to ‘uncovering’ the 
uncomfortable ‘truth’ about the critique of the liberal peace paradigm, nor should 
it be equated with an attempt to replace the critical shift with an ‘even more 
critical’ one, but rather, to turn the inquisitive gaze of post-modern sensitivity 
back on post-modern approaches themselves, in order to warn against the very 
real danger of falling back into the meta-narrative trap, whether it may be an 
existing one (i.e., re-producing modernity) or whether it may simply mean 
replacing an overarching philosophy of the world with another, just as totalising. 
Foucault’s own research aspirations, too, had little to do with countering 
one narrative with another, to replace it or even to ascertain the primacy of his 
own critical vision of history over the others. Neither was his primary aim that 
of necessarily bringing the marginalised voices and narratives into the bigger, 
mainstream one. As Dean suggested, Foucault’s work was not so much geared 
towards bringing into the discourse what has been unsaid, but rather to look at 
what has been said, examining the reality of affirmation, of discursive formation, 
in a manner which avoids the interpretative spiral of hermeneutics (1994, p. 16). 
Similarly, my objective is not necessarily to ‘include’ those marginalised 
narratives into the orthodoxy, nor to necessarily make visible what has so far 
been hidden, but rather, to explore those mechanisms that have made it possible 
for certain discourses to acquire visibility and in so doing, to understand how 
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any discourse, no matter how critical of the ‘orthodox’ view, may itself aspire to 
becoming the new ‘orthodoxy’. 10 
It is precisely this issue of making the hidden visible that draws attention 
to what seems to be at stake in the local turn and where, once again, Foucault’s 
work can be useful. The emergence of the population as a contingent, complex 
ensemble of untraceable qualities, unplannable events and shifting identities 
appears more and more visible, in the literature on peace-building, as missions 
become larger and last longer. Rethinking peace-building, thus, involves 
rethinking methods of governance of the post-conflict milieu in more 
comprehensive ways, in less and less predictable and governable contexts. As 
seen in Chapter 2, where the tension between the complex milieu and the issue 
of governance reaches its apex, in the local turn’s affirmation of the impossibility 
to govern the post-modern from the top-down, then the local turn seems to imply 
the impossibility to grasp and manage complexity, affirming, instead, the need 
to embrace it. 
Critical approaches to peace-building have, in fact identified previous 
attempts to grasp and manage the complex nature of social interaction as 
congruent with forms of liberal ‘governmentality’.11 These critical approaches 
largely draw on Foucault’s analytics of power to understand the effects that 
regimes of truth, societal normalisation and control of collective and individual 
conduct had on those modes of being that did not subscribe to the ideal of the 
hegemonic discourse. It was Foucault’s discussion of the effects of the 
normalisation of society12 on different expressions of agency and subjectivity 
                                                             
10 Existing post-structuralist informed approaches to peace-building, outlined in Chapter 2, seem, 
however, to be mostly interested in the object of exclusionary discursive practices. So, the 
analysis of how certain discourses and elements are excluded is framed within the aim of filling 
in the gaps by rendering visible what has been so far hidden.  
11 Governmentality is defined by Foucault as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, 
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target” (2007, p. 144). Foucauldian 
scholars suggest that governmentality has fundamentally to do with “management and 
regulation, […] ensuring and maintaining the ‘right disposition of things’ being governed and 
ruled” (Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 14). For comprehensive accounts that identify traces of 
governmentality at the global level, particularly in forms of liberal interventionism, through 
analyses of liberal peace-building and state-building missions see Campbell (2011), Gabay and 
Death (2012), Jabri (2010) and Reid (2010). 
12 These are most thoroughly discussed, in relation to the problematic of the population, in 
Foucault’s overview of the relationship between population and sovereign power through the 
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that influenced heavily the post-liberal turn in peace-building, where these 
different expressions of agency, identified as the ‘Other’ subjected to domination 
and exclusion (Richmond, 2009a, p. 577 n.91), were now believed to be the key 
to unlocking a different way of thinking about post-conflict transformation. The 
identification of forms of societal control congruent with liberal governmentality 
has had the primary self-established attempt to bring forward the marginalised 
voices of alternative narratives that are excluded in the process of normalisation. 
Drawing on Foucault’s work on the marginalising effects of mainstream 
narrative’s normalisation of regimes of truth established by the meta-narrative, 
post-structuralist scholarship seeks to give space to the ‘unassimilated 
otherness’, in other words, to promote the tolerance of differences (Hillyard and 
Watson in Harris, 2001, p. 345). 
This is, admittedly, a powerful way to create space for the effective 
interplay of subjectivities in a post-conflict space, as opposed to traditional top-
down approaches. However, whilst Foucault’s own analysis into hegemonic 
narratives around the structures of justice and punishment did not seek to 
necessarily include or make discursively visible the hidden narratives (Dean, 
1994, p. 16), but rather, to shed light upon the processes of knowledge 
production that lead to the hiding of these narratives (and therefore, the including 
of these narratives became almost secondary if not a chance result of 
deconstructive analysis), the recent turn’s concern for hidden narratives 
demonstrates a different approach altogether in its normative project of opposing 
the liberal peace and its marginalising tendency through everyday agency. 
Therefore, by implying that the production of truth can be separated – and clearly 
identified – from the effects of power on the subjects, (for instance, the hierarchy 
of liberal peace and the exclusion of local agency), the paradigm’s main concern 
became the inversion of the hierarchical power structure (top-down with bottom-
up) rather than a more fundamental displacement of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. 
                                                             
establishment of a security regime (2007, p. 27), and in Foucault’s work on normalisation as 
process of non-formal control of societies – which will be fleshed out more in detail in Chapter 
5  (1991a). At the individual level, the effects of normalisation are more specifically outlined in 
Foucault’s discussion on norm diffusion, individual freedom, and the shaping of subjectivities 
through the politics of life (biopolitics) (1982).  
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Finally, with the rise of the local turn in peace-building and the 
declaration of the end of top-down governance, it seemed that the strategies and 
technologies of governing employed under the liberal peace paradigm were 
swept away by the critique, with these techniques and the desire to govern 
severely limited by the celebrated, unstoppable forces of contingency and 
complexity. Indeed, whilst it is relatively easy to identify elements of 
governmentality in concepts, norms and ideas that are largely accepted as part 
of the orthodoxy of ‘liberal’ approaches (for instance ‘good governance’ in terms 
of state behaviour), it is also possible, and analytically necessary, firstly to 
question the value of constructing the label ‘liberal peace’ as an objectively 
existing reality (see Chapter 1), and also to raise another question regarding the 
possibility of the persistence of forms of power beyond the so called ‘liberal 
paradigm’. 
Indeed, this brings up a crucial question regarding the types of power 
employed by the most recent shift, one which Foucault himself raised in regards 
to the shifts in discourses of punishment, healthcare and education: to what 
extent do forms of power consistent with governmentality disappear when norms 
are more contested or more ambiguous? (see Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava, 
& Veron, 2005, p. 16). And is such contestation operated by the local turn 
sufficient to relegate the dangers and marginalising tendencies to the ‘old’ liberal 
paradigm? It is be suggested, in fact, throughout Chapters 4 and 5, that bringing 
attention to the contested nature of peace-thinking as the critical local shift does, 
whilst laudable as a critical endeavour, should not be taken as sufficient evidence 
to accept the absence of forms of biopower, resulting in techniques of 
government that seek to control the conduct of populations. On the contrary, it 
is be argued – by relying on Foucault’s studies on narrative shifts and the 
emergence of power – that this diffused form of power – biopower – thrives in 
the local turn’s declaration of the end of top-down governance facilitated by the 
critique of the hegemony of the liberal peace. The embracing of contingency, 
complexity and non-linearity has enabled the local turn to exhibit a degree of 
denial towards its own potential to manipulate and use the power of the everyday 
(biopower) to direct and regulate the conduct of societies and individuals 
towards their own normative goals. 
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Whilst my research then pursues the above mentioned issue in order to 
identify some of the potential limits of the local turn, an issue becomes 
methodological salient: how can a post-structuralist sensitivity be employed to 
undertake this research endeavour and what guarantees its analytical success 
where other post-structuralist, post-liberal approaches to rethinking peace-
building seem to have fallen short?  Indeed, as my analysis brings forward a 
particular critique of the rationale behind this latest shift, it could run the risk of 
making any critique – mine included - problematic insofar as such critique would 
be taken to be the exercise of presenting one’s own diagnosis of the present as 
the result of a calculation based on universal, objective conditions for the use of 
reason. Indeed, the post-structuralist sensitivity advocated in this chapter, cannot 
accept a critique that seeks to ‘shed light’, ‘uncover’ or ‘expose’ the truth about 
certain discourses, as this would inherently suggest the critical perspective’s 
perception of its aims and analytical tools as existing in a position of analytical 
privilege, a vantage point which would allow (Dean, 1994) a particular approach 
to assume to be able to expose the real or ideal conditions of existence. If this 
were to be taken to be the spirit of critique undertaken in this research, then it 
would paradoxically place the thesis in a presumed position of analytical 
advantage and thus expect the content of the critique to be a priori better than 
the object of its critique, thus biasing the research itself, and also merely 
representing a replacement of one meta-narrative with yet another. Moreover, if 
critique were to be taken as a binary position of being for or against something 
(being for or against liberal peace-building or even being for or against the local 
turn), then the logical outcome would be an imposition of a different, limited and 
black-and-white account. 
On the contrary, the critical stance that I seek to adopt is more attuned to 
what Dean calls ‘criticism’ (1994, p. 54), as a form of analytical enquiry that 
does not seek to replace its object with another vision of a self-established 
perspective born out of universal grounds or pre-given conceptions on the 
existing social order, but rather a reflexive form of engagement which itself 
enters the space of contestation and constant evaluation, without standing 
outside the paradigm or outside the epistemological and ontological premises of 
modernity, necessarily. Criticism then avoids the normative need to be for or 
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against something, that is, for or against modernism, liberalism or even the local 
turn, in favour of an approach which would work with the fluid, complex ‘criss-
crossing’ of the “limits of our forms of rationality” (ibid, p. 54). 
What this means is that by embracing the post-modern assumption that 
meta-narratives are already ‘dead’, critique can only work with the limits of what 
modernity has defined as being a way of acting, thinking and practising politics 
(i.e. what is normal and what is not). This, as Dean also suggests, does not 
require an emancipatory drive to change the course of history to fit a vision of 
what society should be, and neither does it necessarily mean surrendering to the 
inevitability of the status quo or the orthodoxy, but is, instead a more 
‘experimental’ attitude that uses knowledge and its limits to push the boundaries 
of what has already been entrenched as a mode of being or thinking about the 
world, without prescribing solutions (1994, p. 54). This form of criticism, 
therefore, would not reject the liberal peace or even the local turn, per se, based 
on a pre-given understanding of what the social order should be, but rather seeks 
to contest the limits of what has so far been entrenched in the ways in which we 
think about the world, whether this entrenchment has taken place within 
modernity or outside it (in the realm of the post-liberal, non-linear critiques). 
The result is a constant exposure to the unsettling of assumptions so that even 
critique itself, even the latest critique (mine included), could never be left 
untouched long enough for its core assumptions to congeal into a normatively 
totalising telos. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the research agenda that motivates this thesis. As 
the research seeks to understand the rationale behind the conceptualisation of 
peace-building operated by the local turn, I have sought to place this shift in 
context by explaining the non-linear methodology that pervades these 
perspectives and enables them to assert claims regarding the need to step beyond 
positivist approaches to conflict studies. Indeed, I have also suggested that a 
post-structuralist sensitivity is more adept at celebrating the complex nature of 
the relationalities that make up the social and political interaction at the core of 
the issues addressed by peace-building theory and practice. Such relationality 
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cannot be ‘explained’, and attempts to guide it towards a pre-established 
normative goal has only demonstrated the rigidity of certain paradigms’ political 
vision and analytical reach. 
The local turn is, thus, profoundly linked to non-linearity. Its emergence, 
I have suggested, not only points to the fragmentation of governance dictated by 
the increasing realisation of the limits of top-down solutions, but is also 
consistent with the appreciation for forms of agency ‘from below’ that seek to 
represent the unstoppable, unplannable, contingent forces of the ‘everyday’. The 
‘problem’ of what to do with this complexity is a problem that post-conflict 
peace-building specialists grapple with constantly, all the more so for the ‘local 
turn’ scholarship that has long been declaring the end of meta-narratives and 
grand philosophies of the world, and the consequential end of off-the-shelf- 
solutions and top-down, imposed techniques for the exercise of monodirectional 
power. This ‘problem of the population’ is also one that Foucault employed to 
centre his discussion on governance and the way in which it has evolved at the 
domestic level in liberal states. I have sought to take this discussion further, 
albeit not to suggest that the local turn may operate in a similar fashion to liberal 
governmentality. Instead, I have sought to focus on the processes of shifting and 
changing that enabled the new paradigm to emerge, thus focusing more on the 
ruptures rather than on the continuities (which is what the critiques of liberal 
hegemony have tended to do). As critiques emerged from the late 1990s 
onwards, I have sought to understand how these dealt with the ‘problem’ of the 
complex post-conflict milieu, identifying, much like Foucault did, several forms 
of power at play (from discipline to biopower)13 in service of the attempt to 
govern over the complexity of the reality of the everyday. 
                                                             
13 Foucault’s work on the art of governing charts the genealogy of governance from the early 
stages of modern statehood, with emphasis on how the fragile link between the prince and the 
principality – the object of the art of government - is supplanted by a different understanding of 
government. This comes from anti-Machiavellian literature that seeks to find the answers to the 
question of the quality of government not so much in the forms of discontinuities between the 
power of the prince and any other form of power, but rather in the continuities between these 
different realms of power, for instance, between the government of the state, the running of the 
family and the government of personal behaviour. The art of government, Foucault indicates, 
cannot merely reduce the question of government to that of the transcendental relationship 
between the sovereign and the land, just as the government of a family unit, Foucault notes, is 
not merely the securitisation of the family property, but is the larger matter of the management 
of other issues like births, deaths, alliances with other families, unexpected events, wealth, etc. 
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I have also suggested that a post-structuralist sensitivity towards the non-
linear and the complex is indeed relevant, though, not just to make visible 
narratives that have been dominated or exploited, but also to examine those 
specific conditions of materiality that enable a particular vision of the world, or 
philosophy of the world, to become dominant or widely accepted, whatever it 
may be and regardless of its benevolent intentions. The local turn has definitely 
done so in regards to what it perceives as the liberal grand-philosophy of the 
world underlying peace-building discourses, and I seek to turn the same 
inquisitive eye on the local turn itself, in order not to dismiss some of the local 
turn’s own potential for becoming a hegemonic and exclusionary paradigm. 
The operating aim of the thesis is, thus, neither to ‘save’ peace-building 
or ‘liberal’ peace-building, nor to subvert or invert the domination of the liberal 
peace with the critical turn, nor to replace the local turn, but rather to map out 
the emergence of the new orthodoxy in peace-building from its specific context 
of critiquing the liberal peace paradigm. In so doing, I seek to understand what 
type of subjectivity is being produced (as can be seen in Chapter 5), through 
specific discourses and webs of meaning.  Indeed, following Foucault’s footstep 
does not mean arguing exclusively against the liberal peace (or liberal 
governmentality), as mentioned above, but rather to understand how the 
emergence of new paradigm, even when driven by principles of non-linearity, 
may still be operating through technologies and strategies that function through 
the population to normalise the conduct of societies. 
                                                             
(1991b, p. 94). Social contract theory, Foucault explains, then enabled a further attempt to bring 
together the rigid framework of sovereignty (as government over things) with the more abstract 
and thin notion of the government of the family, although the result was the use of contract 
theory’s reflections on the relationship between the ruler and subjects as a theoretical matrix for 
the formulation of principles of public law. The economic wellbeing and the demographic boom 
of the eighteenth century raised the problem of the organisation of the population and allowed 
for the discussion of government to go beyond the management of the family; the family was 
thus no longer considered to be the model for the organisation of the population, but a tool 
through which information can be discerned regarding the population for the management of the 
same. The population is now the end of government, as opposed to the land or the exercise of 
the art of government itself. (ibid, p. 100). The shift from governance as ‘stateness’, (understood 
as the transcendental, top-down relationship between the ruler and the land) to that of 
government of society and space outlined here is useful to enriching our understanding of the 
ways in which the art of governing (at the domestic, but also international level) has developed 
to reflect the increasingly widening space of interface of subjects and things, in the complex 
social milieu. 
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The project is, then, an essentially explorative one, informed by 
Foucault’s genealogical work on narratives and power, which supports my 
research in identifying three aspects, related mainly to the rise of ‘new’ 
paradigms through shifts and ruptures, and particularly relevant to the rise of the 
latest critical local turn: firstly, it helps understand how a certain notion of the 
subject enables the formation of a telos to drive a new paradigm, supporting the 
truth-making exercise of the discourse upon which all other technologies and 
strategies draw on to normalise the conduct of society. Secondly, it supports an 
exploration of how a certain notion of rationality enables the paradigm to place 
itself outside the narrative in order to establish its own position of vantage to 
critique the liberal peace paradigm from. This vantage point implies the 
critiques’ belief in its own ability to verify that the social and political actions of 
the subject and of the collective subscribe and abide by the self-established 
principles of what is valid, legitimate, right and appropriate. Finally, it ensures 
that the research does not limit itself to identifying how the local turn is still 
‘liberal’, but to suggest that the rationale behind the local turn does not eschew 
that of modernity, that is, the ability to “attach meaning to behaviour and pursue 
specified ends by a calculation of means” (Dean, 1994, p. 69); this, it is argued, 
has ultimately limited the extent to which a re-conceptualisation of peace-
building’s foundations along more contingent and pluralist line might occur.  
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Chapter 1 
From Liberalisation to Institutionalisation: 
The Birth of the Critical Turn in Peace-Building 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to introduce the key debates on peace-building through an 
initial discussion on the nature of liberal peace-building as an object of critique. 
The concept of ‘liberal peace’ has been central to debates on peace-building, but 
has been even more instrumental in the emergence of recent critical trends in 
peace-building theory. 
In a recent article published in Security Dialogue in 2013, however, 
critical realist scholar Jan Selby discussed a largely ignored, albeit rather 
widespread tendency within the scholarship on peace-building to accept the 
existence of ‘liberal peace-building’ as a coherent strategy (2013). Drawing from 
Selby’s argument, the chapter suggests that this tendency to construct the liberal 
peace as a coherent paradigm was employed both to explain and critique 
contemporary peace-building. This construction, it is suggested, begun not only 
with those scholars supportive of the liberal peace paradigm and its normative 
project, but also, more controversially, with critical perspectives that sought to 
cast some doubt on the motives, methods and outcomes of international 
involvement with conflict and post-conflict territories. 
In the first section, I outline the emergence of a consensus around the 
liberal nature of peace-building by looking mainly at the literature of the late 
1990s. The section explores both supporters of the liberal peace who, not only 
cohere around common features of the liberal peace of the 21st century, but also 
support it as a normative project to reform war-torn countries. Secondly, it 
focuses on the emergence of a consensus around the liberal nature of peace-
building coming from the critics of peace-building. 
In the second section, I focus on critiques of liberalisation. The critiques, 
I suggest, draw the contours of the liberal peace by associating the perceived 
goals of peace-building with the practical outcomes of projects of liberalisation. 
This, it is suggested, shifts the attention of the debate on the mechanism for the 
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delivery of peace and on the sequencing of the elements of the liberal peace, 
setting the basis for what I argue to be a purely procedural and technical re-
conceptualisation of peace-building. 
In the third section I unpack the shared premises that found the largely 
accepted perception of the existence of a coherent liberal peace paradigm. I focus 
mostly on drawing out some of the paradoxes of this construction, namely the 
grouping of actors, aims and methods under the label ‘liberal peace’, and the 
‘liberalness’ of certain missions and methods. I suggest that this coherent 
framework does not sufficiently pay attention to the pragmatic differences 
between these elements, and the interpretations of liberal theory, by attributing 
a homogeneity to the liberalness of missions, a congruence of aims and a 
coherent plan by the actors, and a whole host of methods and outcomes that are 
– at one time or another – all considered to be congruent with the ‘liberal peace’. 
In the fourth section I focus mainly on two sets of scholarship of the early 
2000s, namely cosmopolitanism and neo-institutionalism, to suggest that the 
alternatives resulting from the critiques of liberalisation, despite coming from 
notably different theoretical grounds, concur in producing similarly invasive 
solutions. This is due to the fact that the critiques of liberalisation do not question 
the tenability or need of interventionism, but rather keep that assumption 
untouched, and focus mostly on how to best refine peace-building’s techniques, 
shifting the debate from the issue of the problematisation of conflict to issues 
concerning how best to control it and address it. In particular, solutions are 
shown to be focusing on the need to employ a more comprehensive method to 
grasp the complex nature of the post-conflict context, in lieu of what is perceived 
to have been a limited approach concerned mainly with the extension of top-
down macro-economic solutions. Not only is the previous approach 
continuously understood in singular and unitary terms as a coherent project that 
unifies all actors, methods and aims around a common theme, but it is also, 
crucially, identified as the source of limited governance, in need of further 
inclusiveness. 
Finally, it is suggested in the last section, that the shift away from 
liberalisation focused on building more multi-layered, comprehensive, and 
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invasive, forms of governance, rather than representing a more fundamental 
change in the way in which we think about the ontological and epistemological 
premises that lead to the problematisation of certain events in need of 
intervention (i.e. why is political conflict problematised? How is it 
problematised?). Where these foundations are ignored in favour of a focus on 
how to peace-build more efficiently, the resulting shift is akin to a search for a 
technology of power that can govern populations better than the previous 
approach. The discarding of the latter as a limited and insufficient technology of 
governing produces a procedural critique that aims at amending the mechanisms 
and the techniques for peace-building rather than the core assumptions to lead to 
framing peace-building as a necessity. 
1. ‘Liberal’ Peace-Building 
In the literature on conflict management it is largely accepted that one aspect 
that characterises foreign engagement with conflict and post-conflict contexts in 
the post-Cold War era is the liberal tradition that drove and determined the 
manner in which such engagements took place. What has come to be referred to 
as ‘liberal peace-building’ in the literature on conflict and post-conflict 
management is identified as a largely coherent paradigm characterised by a 
fundamental ‘problem solving’ attitude apt at resolving the symptoms of war, 
conflict and underdevelopment through a re-engineering of the foundation of the 
warring society (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 146). It is widely believed, as Roland Paris 
put it, that “a single paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the 
work of most international agencies engaged in peace-building” (1997, p. 56). 
Identifying what I suggest to be a large consensual view of the coherent 
and somewhat homogenous nature of liberal peace-building can be facilitated by 
following either of two analytical routes. The first approach would involve 
identifying the supporters of the liberal peace paradigm who, not only believe in 
the overall congruent and homogenous aim of spreading the reach of the liberal 
peace, but also normatively support it as a viable method of conflict resolution 
(Carothers, 1999; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Kang, 2006). The second approach, 
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on the other hand, relies on the analysis provided by critics of the liberal peace. 
This section will begin by initially discussing the first approach.  
At the end of the Cold War, the project of the promotion of liberal 
democracy as a conflict resolution technique gained ground thanks to scholars 
such as Michael Doyle (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Doyle, 1986a, 1986b), Bruce 
Russett (Oneal & Russett, 2001; Russett, 1993) and Jack Levy (1988), who 
supported a connection between liberalism and democracy by examining the 
peaceful tendencies of democracies.  Doyle, for example, drawing on Immanuel 
Kant’s To Perpetual Peace suggested that “liberal states are different. They are 
indeed peaceful, […]. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant 
argued they would” (1986b, pp. 1151–1152), thereby reviving the tenets of the 
centuries old liberal peace thesis, with a specific focus on democracy.1 The 
pacifying effect of the liberal peace, it is argued, is not only “as close as anything 
we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1988, p. 622), or 
a “heuristic device with which to interpret history” (Doyle, 1986b, p. 1159), but 
is also a fitting method to alter the domestic conditions that lead to the formation 
of civil wars as well as international wars. This normative function is espoused 
by supporters of liberal internationalism such as Fukuyama (1997), Oneal (1997) 
and Green (1999) who coalesced around the belief in the universal validity of 
liberalism, its fundamental connection to democracy, and in the value of 
democratisation as the tool to spread liberalism and its pacifying effects across 
the globe (Snyder, 2000). The existence of the liberal peace is understood as a 
factual reality brought about by the nature of the world system following the end 
of WWII and the Cold War – a ‘liberal moment’ (Green, 1999) – exemplified 
not only by the primacy of the liberal form of governance in theoretical terms, 
as Fukuyama famously proclaimed with his ‘End of History’ argument (1992), 
but also visible in the nature of the democratic interventions of the 1990s. These 
were, in fact, believed to be motivated by “bursts of liberal internationalism, 
                                                             
1 Doyle, in particular, makes the specific argument to identify Kantian Liberal Peace ‘republics’ 
as in the form of democracy, rejecting other governance models such as Machiavelli’s autocratic 
republics and Schumpeter’s capitalist democracies. Doyle’s liberal democratic republics are 
domestically peaceful as they are governed by freely elected officials, and internationally 
peaceful amongst each other, whilst exercising the moral duty to expand the zone of the liberal 
peace, by force, if necessary (1986b, p. 1162).  
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renewed assertions of liberal principles such as the right to national self-
determination, widespread democratization, and expansions of political 
freedoms” (Green, 1999, pp. 3–4). 
It is important to specify, at this stage, that this chapter is not aimed at 
countering the construction of the liberal peace by suggesting what ‘it actually 
is’. Rather, this chapter seeks to focus on the consequences of the emergence of 
such consensus, particularly as it pertains to approaches critical of peace-
building. Where, in fact, the support for the existence of the liberal peace is not 
surprising within the context of the scholarship that embraced the viability of its 
normative project, the same belief in the existence of the liberal peace as a 
coherent strategy is puzzling when looking at perspectives that sought to 
problematise the endeavour of peace-building. Thus, while looking at the 
construction of peace-building through the prism of liberal theory itself is one 
way of approaching the subject, for the purpose of this research into the 
emergence of critical approaches to peace-building, a second analytical route 
will now be taken to identify the elements that are considered to construct the 
effort known as liberal peace, by looking at the critical scholarship on peace-
building. 
This scholarship, of which Roland Paris is undoubtedly one of the most 
influential representatives, has expressed a strongly suspicious attitude towards, 
and critical assessment of, the results of peace-building. This has primarily been 
operated through an engagement with the practical by-products, paradoxes and 
problems of peace-building missions of the early-to-mid 1990s. This required 
the identification of and engagement with peace-building’s driving logic, carried 
out mainly by examining the foreign policy trends of western liberal democracies 
towards mainly the global south. The nature of the world order was thus also 
largely identified with a liberal moment; after the end of the Cold War, it was 
suggested, “international power has been centred in the hands of a restricted 
directoire of industrial countries under the hegemony of the ‘global sovereignty’ 
of the American superpower” (Zolo, 2002, p. 170). The impact of this, it is 
suggested, is a protracted era characterised by the primacy of liberalism and its 
agenda in re-shaping the order of international relations (ibid, p. 170). This 
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attempt to reshape the international order has also often been used as an 
analytical tool to understand the motivations behind foreign policy decisions 
towards certain areas of the world. This has allowed some scholars to identify 
and label a whole set of disparate missions under the label liberal peace as the 
driving principle behind peace-building endeavours. Willet, for instance, 
suggests: 
The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent expanded reach of 
global institutions brought to the fore the possibility of achieving a 
Kantian peace. This encouraged a growing consent among donor 
nations, multilateral institutions, military establishments and NGOs, 
that conflict resolution in the South could be achieved through a 
number of interconnected processes involving the economic, 
political and social transformation of chaotic or collapsed states. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Africa, which has become a 
laboratory for the liberal peace project’ (2005, p. 571 my emphasis) 
Overall, the critical scholarship began to trace and delineate the contours of ethos 
behind the liberal peace. This coherent vision of the teleological project of the 
liberal peace is also shared by critical approaches of the early 2000s whose work 
tends more towards the deconstructive, critical and anti-foundationalist side of 
the theoretical spectrum. For these, the liberal peace can be defined as or 
characterised by: 
…a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such 
things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social 
networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, 
promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context 
of a functioning market economy (Duffield, 2001, p. 11). 
In these critical accounts a connection between the liberal order and peace-
building is then made through the pattern of foreign policy interventions of the 
1990s. Dillon and Reid similarly identify elements of a common purpose in the 
pursuit of the liberal peace, by exploring the manner in which development has 
been promoted: 
Much of the disorder that borders the domain of liberal peace is 
clearly also a function […] of its very own normative, political, 
economic, and military agendas, dynamics, and practices, and of 
the reverberations these excite throughout the world. It seems 
increasingly to be a function, specifically, of the way in which 
development is now ideologically embraced by all of the diverse 
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institutions of liberal peace as an unrelenting project of 
modernization (2000, p. 118 my emphasis). 
Critical, anti-foundationalist scholars, thus, also concur in the identification of 
the liberal peace by providing a sense of intentionality driving the project. Where 
they identify ‘liberal’ strategies and practices, they suggest these be pursued as 
a “deliberate policy of comprehensive social transformation, and of power 
projection” (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 119). 
The consensus around the nature of the liberal peace also revolves around 
the common tracing of the relationship between liberalism and peace-building 
in the historical legacy of western liberal foreign policy dating back to before the 
Cold War (Fox, 2008). The connection made between western liberal powers 
and conflict territories subject to peace-building in the 1990s is, as a result, not 
just considered to be a consequence of the end of the Cold War per se, or of the 
rise of humanitarian advocacy, but is often tied to the project of post-WWII 
reconstruction through ‘embedded liberalism’ as the post-war strategy employed 
mainly by the United States to “create an open and non-discriminatory 
international economic order” (Ruggie, 1996, p. 107). 
Furthermore, scholars of different theoretical provenance have agreed on 
the identification of a degree of consistency and coherence between the work of 
development agencies and international financial organisations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF. Paris for instance argues that “now more than ever, 
many international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations seem to share the 
desire to transform war-shattered states into stable societies that resemble the 
industrialized market democracies of the West as closely as possible” (1997, p. 
62). This seemingly coherent effort to transform war-torn states into liberal 
democracies is identified both in the strategies promoting economic 
liberalisation (Chopra, 1997, p. 201), as well as in the promotion of democracy 
by agencies that had not traditionally been interested in the content of 
governance, such as the case of NATO, publicly demonstrating concern for the 
need to promote democracy, liberty and the rule of law in post-conflict contexts 
such as Bosnia (Paris, 1997, p. 62). 
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These perspectives thus conflated theoretical debates, actors, aims and 
policy objectives around a coherent strategy primarily identifiable through the 
preference for neo-liberal reform. Common ‘liberal’ methods were thus 
identified in the practices employed by international organisations and state 
actors alike. In particular, critics focusing on practices consistent with neo-liberal 
reforms, particularly prominent in the Cold War period and in the immediate 
post-Cold War period (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86), widely adopted by donor countries, 
foreign investors, international financial organisations and liberal democratic 
western countries. Amongst these practices much emphasis was given to the 
repeated reliance on strategies to lower deficits, manage monetary policies, 
liberalise foreign trade rules, reduce inflation and establish a thriving private 
sector (Del Castillo, 2008, p. 29). 
The predominance of liberalism as the primary method of peace-building 
was believed to be visible in the manner in which neo-liberal macro-economic 
strategies were inserted into peace settlements, reform projects and 
reconstruction projects (Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2004; Paris cited in Richmond, 
2004a, p. 141; Shah, 2009). Despite the fact that no common manifesto was 
called upon by actors to inspire their developmental and peace-building plans, 
Paris suggests that it is still possible to see that “in practice most of them have 
worked towards a common goal: peace through political and economic 
liberalization” (1997, p. 63). As a consequence it was suggested that the 
mainstream approach of peace-building in the late 1980s-early 1990s held the 
general view that “the future internal peace in former civil-war societies hinges 
on how fast their economies will recover from civil war and transform it into 
economic development” (Kang, 2006, p. 220), suggesting a prioritisation of the 
development-security nexus (Duffield, 2001). This entailed that progress, as 
Jarat Chopra suggested in looking at the prevalent approach to development after 
the end of the Cold War, “relies on liberal style, capitalist democracies as a global 
standard of measurement” (1997, p. 186). 
The perspectives that addressed peace-building in the late 1990s-early 
2000s sought to re-conceptualise peace-building by examining the practical 
outcomes of some of the missions initiated a few years earlier on the basis of a 
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lessons-learnt approach. Scholars attempted to make sense of the outcomes of 
conflict and post-conflict missions by identifying certain ‘reverberations’ caused 
by the liberal peace (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 118).  These critical assessments of 
peace-building, all starting with elements of empirical considerations for the 
outcomes of peace-building missions on the ground, thus began pointing out the 
problems that were besieging the missions of the early 1990s. These issues were 
then attributed to the previously identified coherent strategy of ‘liberal peace-
building’, ascertained as driving the logic and the practice of peace-building, 
and, thus, also recognised as the primary culprit. It is to the emergence of this 
critique of liberalisation that we now turn. 
2. Critiques of Liberalisation 
Several of the most thorough examinations of case studies of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s focus on the failures of peace-building missions and on their causes.  
Through an array of peace-building case studies ranging from newly decolonised 
territories in Africa to post-Soviet Republics in Asia, the suggestion was 
gradually put forward that liberalisation as the primary policy strategy of the 
1990s was responsible for the resurgence of fighting, the recreation of conditions 
that lead to the war, and the creation of new problematic and conflict-inducing 
conditions. In his seminal work At War's End, Roland Paris points to evidence 
from Mozambique, Bosnia and Liberia as demonstrating the recurrence of 
violence and conflict in territories undergoing different levels of liberalisations 
(2004, p. 153). 
Roland Paris’s critical assessment of the limits of the liberal approach of 
the 1990s is not an exception to scholarly trends. The second half of the 1990s 
was characterised by a large body of scholarship pointing to instances where the 
‘liberal’ approach prioritised thus far was falling short of its aims. Citing as 
examples Haiti, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and several instances of Central 
American countries faced with continued social unrest, institutional deficits, and 
continued economic problems even after exponential economic liberalisation, 
these critics began to dismantle what they believed to have been an earlier 
misplaced if widespread support for trickle-down economics. For instance, 
Castañeda suggested that evidence from Sierra Leone proved that peace did not 
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necessarily follow economic logic (2009, pp. 236–7) Boijcic-Dzelilovic 
suggested that hasty liberalisations had created polarised growth instead of 
broad-based development (2009, p. 202), and Salih pointed to the resulting 
failure to address developmental issues such as poverty, and to resolve the 
tension between economic and political liberalisation (2009, p. 134). Widespread 
scepticism was also evidenced towards simple aid and poverty relief strategies 
(Calderisi, 2006; Von Einsiedel, 2005, p. 26). Liberalisation, it was also argued 
had “increased the level of unemployment, resource depletion and disparities in 
income”, providing the basis for “an environment for growing criminalization 
and the creation of networks of corruption, black marketers, arms and drug 
traffickers” (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86). 
The unforeseen consequences of liberalisation projects of the 1990s, 
from reversed transitions, to a heightened gap between rich and poor, to rising 
deficits, to unfinished reforms and incomplete peace-making settlements were 
critiqued as being essentially issues of implementation, by numerous scholars. 
Donais’ critique of the peace-building record in Bosnia, suggests that the 
strategy demonstrated the tendency of economic reform and privatisation to run 
on different tracks and therefore to follow different logics according to the 
discordant desires of the donors (2002, p. 4). De Soto and Del Castillo, also on 
this subject, concur in pointing out, through the record of peace-building as 
liberalisation in El Salvador, the dangers of and the strains placed on the mission 
by the presence of different actors and donors whose operational paths are set on 
a ‘collision course’ (1995, p. 70). 
In other accounts liberalisation is associated with a minimalist approach 
to peace-building, limited to insufficient aid relief strategies, which, in the case 
of missions initiated in the early 2000s, is deemed as a nearly negligent approach 
to conflict resolution. This line of critique is particularly pertinent to approaches 
of the neo-institutionalist type, calling for a more structural reconstruction effort. 
Goodhand (2002) and Chesterman (2004), for instance, suggest that the liberal 
peace-building strategy of pre-2002 engagement with Afghanistan is evidence 
of said limited approach to conflict resolution. The focus on economic reform 
and liberalisation highlighted, in some cases, a preference for ‘speedy’ projects, 
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particularly concerning privatisation, resulting in neglect for other important 
aspects of peace-building such as policy planning. Evidence from the case of El 
Salvador, Smoljan argues, has also evidenced how such preference for 
liberalisation neglected to prioritise conflict reducing strategies, to the extent that 
despite the mission being one of the most extensive and challenging peace-
building endeavours on paper, the primary tool employed consisted of the 
extension of macro-economic reforms without much emphasis on the particular 
circumstances dictated by the conflict. The international agencies involved, the 
author suggests, “still pursued the same macroeconomic stabilisation and 
structural-adjustment policies they would have followed had the country not 
been at war” (Smoljan, 2003, p. 245). Liberalisation is also critiqued because of 
the prioritisation of profit over the resolution of the conflict. For instance, 
examining the case of private sector reform in Africa, Gerson outlines the 
tendency of foreign investors to agree to work with corrupt leaders particularly 
when faced with competitive pressures to expand markets in unchartered areas 
(2001, p. 107). In other instances, strategies revolving around economic matters 
primarily do not seem extend sufficiently enticing ‘carrots’ vis-à-vis the 
behaviour to correct. In the case of Angola, for instance, Boyce suggests that the 
local elite’s willingness to ‘accommodate’ the donors wavered in front of the 
possibility of “easy oil money” (2004, pp. 12–13). 
The neo-institutionalist scholarship was not, however, alone in 
contributing to the emerging critique of the peace-building endeavour of the 
early 1990s. Cosmopolitan thinkers in particular, also contributed to the critical 
scholarship of the early 2000s by contextualising the critique of the practice of 
peace-building with a critique of strictly Westphalian understandings of 
territorial community (Archibugi, 2008; Falk, 1995; Habermas, 1999; Jones, 
1999; Kaldor, 2006; Murithi, 2009; Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005). The 
state-centrism evidenced in previous approaches to peace-building is particularly 
problematised in relation to the negative outcomes of liberalisation. Kaldor has, 
in fact, noted that “in societies where the state controlled large parts of the 
economy and where self-organized market institutions do not exist, policies of 
‘structural adjustment’ or ‘transition’ effectively mean the absence of any kind 
of regulation” (2012, p. 86). The short-sighted nature of the changes 
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implemented through liberalisations of the 1980s and 1990s, the author argues, 
are not only responsible for incomplete ‘transitions’, but are also “the main 
source of the new identity politics”, where shadow groups use the language of 
identity politics to legitimise their illegal activities, leading to the polarisation of 
society and often a reliance on the war economy particularly in areas that do not 
reap the benefits of economic globalisation (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86). 
The above mentioned failures of liberalisation ascertained in the 
empirical analyses of case-studies began to be associated not necessarily with 
the logic of liberal internationalism itself (and the whole question of whether it 
was at all possible to intervene from the outside by engineering and imposing a 
peaceful solution to conflict through liberalism), nor necessarily with the internal 
contradictions of capitalism or of liberalism. Instead, the practical problems 
identified were attributed to the mechanism employed for the operationalisation 
of peace-building measures, and thus came to conflate a whole stock of issues 
that began to pile up on the record of peace-building under the liberal rubric.  
Much of the critique outlined above focused on the visible effects of the missions 
initiated in the early 1990s, sequenced primarily following a logic of economic 
reform and an insufficiently inclusive engagement. The problem with that 
approach came to be attributed primarily with the mechanisms of governance 
through which the recipient territory was meant to recover from extreme poverty 
and avoid a recurrence of war. It appeared clear, from the record of foreign 
interventions, that the project of conflict management through the extension of 
economic reforms practised in the early 1990s did not seem to reach the societies 
affected by conflict as easily as originally thought (Chesterman, 2004, p. 195; 
Cullen & Mendelson Forman, 1998, p. 6; Richmond, 2004b). It was then 
suggested that the type of societal change, deep and structural, required to build 
the type of community envisioned in the classical liberal peace project was not 
materialising because of a fault in the mechanism that regulated the extension of 
said rights and the functioning of political representation (see, for instance, 
Scholte, 2004), as it was increasingly unable to understand and grasp the 
complex nature of the post-conflict, and the global context. I now turn to 
examining the content of the shift away from liberalisation in order to discuss 
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the problematisation of the previous approach framed as unable to grasp the 
complex nature of the conflict milieu. 
3. Constructing ‘Liberal’ Peace-Building 
In his 2013 article, Jan Selby suggested the existence of a problematic tendency 
to identify the ‘liberal peace’ as a coherent project. Selby mostly focused on the 
latter work by critics of the liberal peace to suggest that the construction of the 
liberal peace as an object of critique is problematic as it overstates how liberal 
certain missions actually were. Selby’s argument suggests that this is not a 
fruitful method to create the foundations for a reassessment of peace-building as 
the critique is based on a myth. Where Selby suggests that this tendency to 
overplay the liberalness of peace-building has taken attention away from issues 
of strategy and geopolitics, I suggest that the consensus around the liberal peace 
has had an analytically relevant productive function. The consensus is, arguably, 
at the basis of a shift to more intrusive forms of peace-building, one which 
invited a form of re-conceptualisation through critique that focuses mostly on 
procedural debates on how to govern more efficiently. Before discussing how 
this shift towards more interventionist practices is operationalised, it is necessary 
to problematise the consensus around the liberal peace. This is important as, once 
the coherence of the ‘liberal peace paradigm’ is problematised, it can also be 
argued that critiques and alternatives that are built around it are revealed as 
engaging with less substantive issues. 
Jan Selby is certainly not alone in questioning the ‘liberalness’ of peace-
building in recent times. Jose Alvarez (2001), for instance, suggested that the 
liberal nature of state behaviour is also overplayed, disputing not only the extent 
to which certain foreign policy moves might be inspired by liberal 
internationalist goals, or expressed through liberal methods of cooperation, but 
also more interestingly, rejecting the notion of coherent intentionality that is 
often attributed by scholars supportive of the internationalisation of liberalism. 
Where Selby focuses on critics, Alvarez focuses on supporters of the ‘liberal 
peace’ to point out that such arbitrary descriptions of coherent liberal foreign 
policy objectives leads to problematic practical prescriptions regarding the need 
to espouse and promote the liberal peace. Alvarez’s arguments lead him to be 
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suspicious of supporters of liberal internationalism not necessarily only because 
of the limited analytical depth responsible for the arbitrary identification of a 
coherent ‘liberal’ ethos, but because the author is concerned with the tendency 
to then put this arbitrary coherent paradigm to work in practice through norm-
making, interventionism and the fundamental attempt to re-write the world order 
according to it. The liberal blueprint, Alvarez suggests, is largely analytically 
accepted amongst both scholars and practitioners, particularly in the United 
States, as a vehicle for the implementation of the Washington Consensus. 
Because of this normative primacy of the ‘liberal peace’ and the consequential 
primacy of the debate on the ‘liberalness’ of missions, critiques that have 
emerged against it, the author continues, have “largely failed to engage its 
substantive assumptions concerning how liberal states purportedly behave” 
(Alvarez, 2001, p. 193). Admittedly, the aim of Alvarez’s work was to 
empirically disprove the liberalness of certain states’ foreign policy as identified 
by supporters of liberal internationalism. Indeed, this may be problematic in that 
it may still place too much emphasis on assessing foreign policy and peace 
operations on the basis of how liberal these are, thus also potentially assessing 
the successes or failures of the missions on the basis of a gap between liberal 
aims and actual outcomes. 
This is also, arguably, a tendency found in critiques of the liberal peace, 
and in particular in Oliver Richmond’s work. As the scholar points to the 
existence of a ‘virtual peace’ as the outcome of a mismatch between the 
interveners’ intentions and the outcomes on the ground, he is also associating a 
vast variety of practical problems – accountability mechanisms, legitimacy of 
governance, authority – to the liberal peace itself. The issue of how forceful 
imposition undermines autonomous governance is understood, by Richmond, 
only within the framework of a liberal peace that is unaware of its unbecoming 
methods and means, and as such, focuses only on the ‘virtuous’ aims (2004b, p. 
96), resulting in what he perceives to be a ‘virtual peace’ with no real purchase 
to the initial plan or the local realities on the ground. The author suggests: “the 
peace that is constructed through the medium of UN peace operations, such as 
in Bosnia or Kosovo, certainly is a virtual peace when compared to the objectives 
stated in their mandates” (Richmond, 2004b, p. 96). Similarly, Eriksen also 
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suggests, looking at the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), that “when the results are assessed in relation 
to the liberal peace agenda in general and the aim of state-building in particular, 
one cannot avoid the conclusion that the mission has failed” (2009, p. 659). The 
issue is then centred around the gap between the aims of the interveners and what 
is achieved on the ground, implying that issues to do with legitimate governance 
can be reduced to the simple problem of an inability to deliver what is initially 
intended in the initial vision. 
Furthermore, the consensus on the ‘liberal’ nature of peace-building is 
also problematic because of the homogenising effect of a vague label – ‘liberal’ 
– on a variety of different theoretical and methodological approaches. This 
watered down label, while containing identifiably ‘liberal’ elements, tends to 
develop as a blanket title for a variety of different strands of thought that take a 
similarly large variety of practical forms. Paradoxically, the conflation of 
different strands of liberal theory is acknowledged far more by the supporters of 
liberalism than by its critics. Doyle’s modern rendering of Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace has, recently, been problematised by several scholars who have critiqued 
the conflation of Kant’s ideal liberal polity solely with the democratic form of 
governance. Danilovic and Clare, for instance, suggest that this now 
consensually accepted understanding of Kantian ‘republicanism’ has largely 
ignored other possible forms of liberalism at the centre of Kant’s normative 
vision, including, mostly, constitutional liberalism (2007). The debates on the 
nature of the liberal peace coming from studies on liberalism show consistent 
disagreement over how the liberal peace is adapted in modern times, particularly 
in relation to the tension between Kant’s call for self-determination and modern 
Wilsonian understandings of collective defence (Parish & Peceny, 2002). These 
studies also demonstrate a more subtle understanding of the tensions behind 
democracy promotion between pluralism and fragmentation (Diamond, 1995), 
of the split between liberal internationalists and non-interventionists 
(Friedmann, 1968), and an acknowledgment of the inability to identify one 
singular expression of liberalism, and consequently, different types of possible 
world orders (Ikenberry, 2009). 
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Remarkably, however, these debates have not transpired in the critical 
scholarship on peace-building which has, by and large, embraced a consensus 
around the existence of the liberal peace, a consensus which, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, has been cemented and naturalised in the most recent re-
conceptualisation of peace-building. Admittedly, the constructed nature of the 
‘liberal peace’ is at times acknowledged in the critique, although only insofar as 
it can be used as a tool to critique the liberal peace’s hegemonic project. 
Paradoxically however, what is critiqued is how the construction informed 
foreign policy, rather than its existence in the first place. Critical scholars such 
as Duffield, Dillon and Reid, have pointed to the construction of the ‘liberal 
peace’, although mostly focusing on how this is operated, mainly, by its 
supporters. These acknowledgments, however, arguably do not cover enough 
ground to unsettle the consensus and discuss the way in which even critiques 
rely on the construction of the liberal peace. For instance, Mark Duffield’s 
understanding of the liberal peace, whilst acknowledging the uncritical 
conflation of ‘liberal’ and ‘peace’ on the one hand (2001, p. 11), still holds this 
paradigm (constructed by its supporters) to have driven, somewhat coherently, 
the interventions of the mid-1990s (ibid, p. 11). 
The intentionality implied in Duffield’s critique is also shared by Dillon 
and Reid, whose assessment of the liberal peace conflates both the intents and 
agendas of different actors, as well as the level of instrumentality in pursuing the 
project of extending liberal power (2000). The liberal peace, the authors suggest, 
relies on neglecting the relevance of social, economic and political interactions 
at the root of complex political emergencies, for which they claim the liberal 
peace itself is responsible (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 117). Where, like Duffield, 
Dillon and Reid also identify a conflation, under the label liberal peace, they 
however suggest this conflation to have been operated by the liberal peace itself 
for its own instrumental purposes, and to be responsible for a great deal of 
confusion, both analytically and in practice. 
Retaining the liberal peace as a coherent object of critique is arguably 
central to framing solutions in opposition to it, as well as to be able to shed light 
on the practices of domination that are said to cause exclusion. In fact, amongst 
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critics, whilst it is acknowledged that “unless one is trying to construct a new 
liberal theory, any attempt to identify the core themes or phenomena of this 
tradition is likely to appear narrow or even intellectually naïve” (Latham, 1996, 
p. 79), it is also acknowledged that the complexity of the myriad expressions of 
the liberal tradition should be cut through by designating “a broad basis of 
inclusion” (ibid, p. 79). This undoubtedly allows for the setting up of boundaries 
to guide the critique, albeit inevitably reducing the complexity of liberal thought 
to a handful of chosen elements which, whilst offering interesting insights, may 
at times lead later critiques to naturalise a particular view regarding the 
‘liberalness’ of certain actors and of their ideological position as coherent, 
disregarding the subtle differences, paradoxes and contradictions presented both 
by liberal theory and by the singular actors themselves. Where, for instance, 
Latham suggests that “no one could say that the United Nations is intrinsically 
or exclusively a liberal institution”, he also goes on to say that “however, given 
its role in the propagation of universal human rights, democratic governance, 
and even markets, it would be difficult to ignore its strong imbrication with both 
the domestic and international dimensions of liberalism” (ibid, p. 80). Indeed in 
equating such association with liberalism with a coherent and intentional project 
of hegemonic expansion, the analytical nuance may be lost in the effort to 
provide a descriptive and functional inclusive basis for the label ‘liberal’. As will 
be seen in the next chapter, whilst these earlier critiques begin to draw the 
contours of the liberal peace paradigm, the liberalness of peace-building and the 
coherence of the plan is almost virtually undiscussed in the critiques of the late 
2000s and are fundamental to the whole endeavour of rethinking peace-building. 
Crucially, it can be argued, where this conflation is not unpacked but merely 
attacked as an instrument of liberal power projection, it is not possible for these 
critiques to make sense of the paradoxes that ‘the liberal peace’ allegedly elicits, 
nor to engage in a more meaningful debate on the nature of peace-thinking and 
peace interventions. 
Several aspects are grouped under the label of the liberal peace, 
particularly with the purpose of attacking its hegemonic intentions. For instance, 
Dillon and Reid suggest that as the liberal peace has conflated distinctions 
between civil and military, humanitarianism and geopolitics, causing peace-
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builders to become “politicized, geopolitically ambitious, and sometimes 
warlike in pursuit of liberal peace” (2000, p. 120). Likewise, the different 
expression of foreign interventions in the 1990s are grouped, by Oliver 
Richmond, under the label of the liberal peace as they are perceived as being 
commonly based a “liberal-institutionalist collusion with strategic thinking on 
constructing a peace which has been beneficial to liberal states post- World War 
I and World War II” (2004b, p. 84 my emphasis). 
However, one could argue that the acknowledgment of the ‘liberalness’ 
of peace-building cannot make sense of the diversity of expression of peace-
building agents, agendas and methods, and thus merely reduces multiple 
expressions of peace-building as either an intentional multiplication of methods 
to expand liberalism more efficiently or as a crack in the veneer of the liberal 
peace revealing the more sinister, hegemonic intents (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 
123) inside the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the liberal peace (Franks, 2009, p. 270). 
Likewise, such conflation does little to open up spaces to understand the reliance 
of peace-building on the use of force, which is then solely explained as the 
expression of denial, on the part of the liberal peace, of its own aims, goals and 
methods (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 123), again implying a level of coherent 
intentionality that is simply misleading considering the variety of actors, 
interests, events and overall factors that may arise and evolve independently of 
attempts by the ‘liberal peace’ to control them. 
Where this acknowledgment of the existence of a ‘liberal peace’ focuses 
on the unfolding of its strategic and coherent plan, the analysis seems 
unreflective of the diversity within liberal theory, as well as of the diverse actors, 
intentions, agendas, aims and methods that may be employed, all elements which 
may not be, necessarily, liberal or primarily about liberalisation. Selby, for 
instance, suggests that a close look at the missions examined by critics of the 
liberal peace might show that these are not as ‘liberal’ in intentions and means 
as initially thought (2013, p. 69). Furthermore, it is also possible to suggest that 
the methods employed as part of peace-building might also not be necessarily 
‘liberal’, and that not all issues at stake revolve around questions of political and 
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economic liberalisation.2 For instance, Selby suggests that in many cases the 
diplomatic settlements of peace-building missions had little to do with 
liberalisation and more to do with the need to establish a claim of legitimate 
authority (ibid, p. 76). In other cases, it is evident that certain missions 
demonstrated a level of doctrinal disagreement, as, for instance, Ruggie points 
out in the case of Somalia, where the mission statement exhibited a prevalence 
of American military doctrine before humanitarianism (1996, p. 96). 
Furthermore, where the alterations in methods, means and expressions of 
peace-building are merely explained as different sides of the same grand strategy 
(i.e. liberalism), this may cause considerable analytical damage to the endeavour 
of understanding the methods and aims of peace-building. This is evident when 
looking at the argument proposed by Bellamy and Williams. Despite suggesting 
the need to realise that peace-building’s theory and practice is largely dependent 
on the way in which the problem of conflict is constructed, the authors still 
identify a determining zone of ‘liberalness’ within which actors are driven to 
act– as well as initiate change. As the authors suggest “the dominance of liberal 
ideas also contributes to the material context in which peacekeepers operate and 
the intellectual tools they use to understand and address the problems they 
confront” (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p. 8). The problem of the construction of 
peace-building is therefore hinted at, but this is still framed within the perceived 
overall coherent dominance of the liberal narrative. 
As a whole, then, the perceived fallacies of the liberal peace (i.e. the 
sinister intents, the inability to own up to its own goals, its hegemonic intents, 
its dominating tendencies) are then naturalised as inherently part of the liberal 
peace paradigm, enabling the critique to trace patterns of intentionality to justify 
the failure of ‘liberal’ peace building, rather than enabling a more substantial 
                                                             
2 Jarat Chopra in an 1996 article hints at the importance of debates that touch upon issues of 
political legitimacy that may not necessarily have to do with liberalism or liberalisation, for 
instance questions regarding the disproportionate response of the US to Iraq’s aggression in 
Kuwait, or debates around the issue of military, diplomatic and civilian capability lacunae related 
to Security Council mechanisms (1996, p. 350). These elements that produce marked differences 
between missions, within missions, and actors, are, unfortunately, largely dismissed when 
accounts of the ‘liberal’ peace conflate different missions together (see, for instance Paris, 2004; 
Richmond, 2004), and are also largely missing in Chopra’s own later work which focuses mostly 
on identifying negative patterns, trends and outcomes of liberal peace-building missions in the 
1990s, such as its hegemonic traits, and its quasi-imperialist qualities (see: 2000, 2007). 
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engagement with the multiple expressions, strategies and outcomes of peace-
building, some of which might not be predetermined as part of a master plan, but 
might be caused by unforeseen consequences and developments on the ground. 
It is then possible to argue that the critique of liberal peace constructs an 
object of critique whose contours are vague, blurred and ever changing, and 
under which label many practical outcomes, tendencies and empirical 
‘reverberations’, and consequences of peace-building are included. The 
identification of liberal peace-building as a coherent paradigm provided the 
critique with a starting point to identify its key mechanism (liberalisation), which 
will be at the basis of the critique and the solutions offered. This, as will be seen 
below, has primarily led the re-conceptualisation of peace-building in the early 
2000s to follow a merely technical and superficial engagement with peace-
building (and with liberalism) based on the catch-all category of the ‘liberal 
peace’. 
4. The Emergence of the Shift 
The following section outlines the emergence of a critical shift towards the end 
of the 1990s-early 2000s. This chapter does not deal with other, more anti-
foundationalist critiques of the liberal peace paradigm, as that is investigated in 
more detail in Chapter 2. Instead, the emergence of a critical trend in the 
conceptualisation of peace-building is analysed by looking at two approaches of 
the early 2000s, one coming from the advocates of institution-building, and the 
other coming from cosmopolitanism3. It is suggested that the identification of 
liberalisation as a coherent strategy employed in the 1990s is instrumental in the 
creation of critiques that problematise the lack of inclusiveness and the need for 
further engagement with the complex nature of the post-conflict. The 
                                                             
3 The literature engaged with in this chapter, predominantly cosmopolitan perspectives and 
neo-institutionalist ones, are identified as part of a ‘critical’ shift as a functional analytical tool 
to draw out those elements of the scholarship’s critique that congruently and commonly find a 
fault with the previous liberalisation approach. Thus, the chapter does not seek to either 
discount or reject the differences between these perspectives, nor to indicate that the shift is a 
factual and empirical ‘truth’ but rather that several points of common interest in the critique of 
liberalisation are instrumental in introducing a call to re-think the parameters of peace-
building.  
50 
 
 
identification of the limits of the previous approach, it will later be argued, is 
also central to the emergence of solutions that do not question interventionism 
but rather mostly focus on improving the practical mechanism to grasp and 
manage such complexity thus eliciting more invasive forms of social 
engineering. 
As the legacy of peace-building in the 1990s did not seem to have 
heralded the expected fruits of stability and peace (and certainly not in the 
timeframe desired), solutions were framed to address what began to be perceived 
as a structural issue regarding the correct mechanism to ensure the transmission 
of rights and the transformation of conflict and instability. Where the 
prioritisation of neo-liberal economic reform was framed as an issue, the 
sequencing of peace-building became the problem – and the source of the 
solution- for neo-institutionalists such as Roland Paris. As the focus of the debate 
moved towards building functioning infrastructures to withstand a long-term, 
durable peace, institution-building became the catchphrase of the time. 
Perceived structural weakness was deemed to be the leading cause of the 
inability to sustain the population’s rights, security and development (Carment, 
2004; see also Kasfir, 2004; Rotberg, 2004), especially in cases where peace-
building had so far privileged a focus on macro-economic reforms. In 
Afghanistan, for instance, a call for a “strong legitimate state with the monopoly 
of violence” is called for as “the basic precondition for lasting peace” 
(Goodhand, 2002, p. 854). Weak statehood, when left unaddressed, is often 
considered to be a cause for further grievances and worsening conditions, as 
Donais suggests in the case of Bosnia. Furthermore, Donais also adds that the 
weak Bosnian state is a direct consequence of the Dayton Agreements and of the 
inability to ground the liberalisation and privatisation projects on “solid 
institutional foundations” (2002, p. 4). This assessment is also supported by 
Cox’s suggestion that building constitutional order was initially not the highest 
priority in Bosnia (2001). Lack of attention to institution-building, Donais finally 
suggests, is responsible for the further fractionalisation of the body politic along 
ethnic lines in Bosnia (2002, p. 3). This was not, however, treated as a question 
of whether peace-building required institutionalism, but rather a question of 
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‘when’ (i.e. at what point of the sequencing) was it required. In fact, the focus 
on the state reflected a concern, not so much with the contents and the shape of 
individual and collective rights, nor necessarily of the manner in which the state 
can guarantee those rights domestically, but rather with institutions as the most 
suitable vehicle and regulatory mechanism, that could guarantee political and 
economic rights of the subjects and address the complex causes of instability 
(see: Chesterman, 2004; Cox, 2001; Evans, 1992; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani, Lockhart, & Carnahan, 2005; Krasner, 2004; 
Sandbrook, 1993). In institutionalisation accounts, however, the nature of these 
political and economic rights is largely unexplored and vaguely associated with 
a mix of human rights, civil rights and economic rights.4 
The focus of neo-institutionalism on state-building pointed to the need to 
address the root causes of war, instability and failure, beyond the strictly 
institutional set-up. Such approaches, in fact, recognising a plethora of evolving 
and changing issues in the post-Cold War era, suggested the need to complement 
infrastructural reform with the integration of emerging actors such as global civil 
society and to take into account the role of other informal and non-state actors 
(Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2004, 2009, p. 102; Reno, 2007). It is argued, in fact, 
that the complex nature of emergency situations such as war-zones and failed 
states, requires a multi-pronged approach which aims at targeting the political 
and social roots of the grievances, through the rebuilding of the apparatuses, 
institutions and agencies responsible for guaranteeing political and social change 
(Adelman, 2004, p. 303). A strict focus on the state alone, however, it was 
largely admitted, would be insufficient to grasp the complexity of these contexts, 
thus requiring engagement with issues such as relationship-building in ethnically 
divided contexts in the formal decision-making arena as well as at the informal 
(civil society and grassroots) level (Maynard, 1999). The purpose of neo-
institutional critiques was thus to employ a multi-pronged approach that could 
                                                             
4 Poulingy, Chesterman and Schnabel’s volume After Mass Crime provides a good example of 
this. The contributions to the volume are largely concerned with conceptualising the institutional 
mechanisms that can better enforce a set of rights usually associated with physical, mental and 
economic security. Where they discuss a conceptual shift, it is mostly focused on the visibility 
that these rights can gain (or have gained) through addressing domestic and international 
institutional capabilities (2007, p. 46). 
52 
 
 
deepen the understanding and reach of the post-conflict endeavour, without 
relying on linear or causal assumptions (Pouligny, Chesterman, & Schnabel, 
2007, p. 15). The rejection of linearity is necessary to avoid “facile binary 
thinking” (ibid, p. 21). Thus, it is suggested “it is essential to reintroduce 
complexity when observing and intervening in such situations” (ibid, p. 21), 
although it is also specified that complexity should not mean indifference to 
violence as a natural expression of humanity, but rather as “something one 
should simply deal with in the best way possible” (ibid, p. 22). 
Similarly, critiques of peace-building coming from cosmopolitanism are 
also concerned with altering the practices and mechanisms to promote more 
effectively the extension of solutions to conflicts. For the cosmopolitans, these 
mechanisms should reflect a larger concern for those societal elements that go 
beyond territory and which could muster truly comprehensive and multifaceted 
political solutions (Kaldor, 2006). Thus, the cosmopolitan camp also associates 
with the previous approach a limited understanding of the constitutive elements 
of the conflicts that have so far been responsible for the narrow focus of peace-
building and the notable emergence of lateral issues such as global networks of 
terrorism and organised crime. In this line of critique, Archibugi, for instance, 
suggests the interventionism of the 1990s was erroneously framed within a 
framework with a preference for individual state solutions, neglecting the need 
to widen the basis for understanding issues of consensus and legitimacy that lie 
at the root of the problems affecting these territories. Archibugi’s solutions are 
still framed within the existing legal framework insofar as they accept the UN as 
being the most useful vehicle for implementing a cosmopolitan project of 
intervention, although he advocates a shift in the deepening of the mechanisms 
through which foreign engagements are rendered more publicly accountable 
(2008, p. 196). 
The drive towards a post-territorial understanding of representation leads 
the cosmopolitan critique of the early 2000s towards an assessment of the 
complex nature of the relationship between local and international actors, as well 
as amongst individuals in the vastly different and ever evolving contexts of the 
conflict zones of the 21st century. Complex problems, it is agreed, require holistic 
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and comprehensive solutions (Howells, 1999, p. 85; Kitson & Michie, 1999, p. 
178; Kluth & Andersen, 1999, p. 122; Pavitt & Patel, 1999, p. 114),5 which 
operate on different levels to tackle all aspects of the warring society with the 
purpose of initiating, supporting, and often directly driving the transition from 
peace to war, from command economy to liberal economy, from autocracy to 
democracy. Such solutions are then no longer satisfactorily attained through 
what is agreed to have been a limited focus on, and preference for, economic 
liberalisation, but are framed to require a comprehensive, systematic and 
inclusive approach. The polity itself is no longer the only element in need of 
tackling, but the political subject himself, within and without his territorial 
confines, individually as a citizen as well as collectively across boundaries, 
necessitates a radical transformation acquired only through a process of 
internationalisation and transnationalisation. The global subject is connected, 
affected by and affecting change everywhere at the same time; it is the agent for 
change and the recipient of change. It is for this reason that the traditional top-
down, vertical structures of representation (Rosenau, 2003) allegedly fail to 
grasp the complexity of the subject’s need to articulate its needs individually and 
operate in an ethically bound collective (Murithi, 2009). 
Thus, both approaches display an interesting affinity; where they critique 
a somewhat naïve understanding of conflicts displayed by previous approaches, 
both advocate the need to more deeply explore the complex and multi-faceted 
roots of the conflicts themselves, discounting one-track, linear explanations that 
seek a direct cause of a conflict in favour of a more locally attuned understanding 
of cultural, historical and political contexts. Relatedly, despite the seemingly 
fundamental disagreement over the reliance on the traditional structures of the 
sovereign state, both approaches suggest the solution lies in the deepening of 
social and political engineering, in order to integrate institutional reform with 
                                                             
5 Policy agencies including international governmental and non-governmental organisations also 
refer to the language of complexity, defining emergencies as a “complex combination of natural 
and man-made causes”; these include events such as natural disasters, biological hazards such 
as epidemics, as well as political issues of governance largely defined as breakdown of authority 
due to conflict and mass movements of population. For a more detailed exploration of the policy 
framing of complex emergencies see the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (n.d.) as well as the WHO's guide to  emergency response conducted in difficult 
political and security environments (2002). 
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international and transnational elements of concern that are believed to work 
towards resolving the conflict on informal but significant levels (Armstrong & 
Gilson, 2011; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995). Cosmopolitanism, 
too, in fact, whilst on the one hand often condemning a strict reading of the role 
of the sovereign state as the sole guarantor of rights, also frequently recognises 
the importance both of working on strong internal structures (McGrew, 1997; 
Scholte, 2004) and of the establishment of stable domestic apparatuses (Risse-
Kappen, 1995). It can thus be suggested, that both Cosmopolitans and neo-
institutionalist scholars, despite notable theoretical differences, identify the 
fallacies of the previous approach to peace-building as having to do mainly with 
a simplistic approach that did not sufficiently target the complex nature of the 
conflicts. Both schools have, in fact, converged on the need to extend, stratify 
and deepen the engagement with conflict territories in order to manage and 
control the conditions that lead to conflict more efficiently. 
The common logic that can explain the affinity between these two 
perspectives lies, arguably, in the call to engage with complexity and non-
linearity. The acknowledgment of the need to manage the complexity of conflict 
and the post-conflict milieu is reiterated often in the critical literature on peace-
building, particularly to highlight on the one hand the limits (and inability) of 
the previous approach in that respect,6 as well as to indicate the solution to lie in 
the extension of more inclusive forms of policy-planning and theoretical re-
conceptualisation of peace-building. William Zartman, for instance, focusing on 
negotiations, coalitions and consensus-building in the early 2000s, argues that 
the complex nature of the conflict “involves multiple parties, multiple roles, and 
multiple issues, its management concerns not just one of these multiplicities but 
the entire party-issue space” (2003, p. 179). Zartman goes on to suggest the need 
to “simplify, structure and orient these elements into a process that produces an 
outcome” (ibid, p.179). Complexity is then taken to represent the natural 
interconnectedness of the social and political realities of conflicts, which not 
                                                             
6 Simon Chesterman, for instance, points to the tendency in the post-Cold War era to rely on 
“false assumptions of simplicity at the local level. In East Timor, for example, it was taken for 
granted by the expatriate expert community that the territory in late 1999 was a political and 
economic vacuum” (2004, p. 58). Chesterman thus also points to the limited understanding of 
the realities on the ground exhibited by the previous liberalisation approach (ibid, p. 58). 
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only reduces the possibility to accept linear approaches to conflict management, 
but also presents complexity itself as a natural limit to top-down governance. 
Such complexity is said to have evolved partly because of globalisation 
(Habermas, 1999, p. 267; Held, 1993), and to be expressly visible in the 
changing nature of conflicts (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999; Kaldor, 2006). 
In this respect, analysing the conflict milieu, Goodhand and Hulme point 
to a shift from ‘classic wars’ to ‘complex political emergencies’. The 
significance of the shift towards complex political emergencies lies partly in the 
acknowledgments of the practical differences between old and new conflicts, as 
it is in the analytical acknowledgment that “every conflict is unique, with its own 
configuration of power, structures, actors and beliefs or grievances” (Goodhand 
& Hulme, 1999, p. 17). This widespread acknowledgment, the authors suggest, 
has also led to a more fundamental shift away from analyses focusing on military 
capacities and international political economy towards “social and cultural 
analyses that recognise complexity and contingency and that question the 
feasibility of prediction” (ibid, p. 14). Complex emergencies, Goodhand and 
Hulme suggest, are thus taken to be:  
...not specific problems with identifiable causes that can be fully 
understood and for which ‘solutions’ can be generated. At best, 
understanding will always be partial, contingencies will play havoc 
with linear notions of cause and effect and predictability will be at 
low levels (ibid, p. 24).  
The re-conceptualisation of peace-building, according to this acknowledgment 
of complexity was thus, at least rhetorically, framed to be a mainly analytical 
engagement with peace-building whose primary aim was that of avoiding quick 
causal connections, linear understandings and predicted ‘solutions’. Roland 
Paris, for instance, also suggested that the broadening of the study of peace 
operations should be kept separately from the world of policy recommendations: 
“the academic’s mandate is not primarily, or necessarily, to contribute to policy 
discussions; it is to analyse and explain complex phenomena, even if doing so 
yields no specific policy recommendations” (2000, p. 33).7 
                                                             
7 Roland Paris’s warning, however, can also extended to his own later work, which, not only 
rendered itself well to policy interpretations, but explicitly made policy recommendations 
regarding what strategies to avoid and what path to peace-building is more conducive to success. 
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The acknowledgment of complexity does not, however, result in 
jettisoning interventionism, but rather in designing more inclusive, 
comprehensive, and often invasive forms of controlling, managing and 
normalising what are perceived to be substantially ‘defective’ societies. Where 
complexity is evidenced, this is mostly in support of a framework of action that 
invests in extensive engineering rather than substantial reconsideration of the 
basis for intervention. Willett, for instance, has suggested that so far: 
…strategic actors pursuing the liberal peace find themselves ill-
equipped to respond to the so-called crises […]. Simplistic 
explanations that reduce wars to breakdown, fail to capture or 
respond to the complex emerging structures which represent an 
alternative and antagonistic system to that proposed by the liberal 
peace (2005, p. 575). 
Willett’s assessment of the limits of the previous approach focuses mostly on 
complexity as an alternative to the liberal peace paradigm, and sees the attempt 
to grasp such complexity as antagonistic to it. Arguably, however, the scholar 
mainly sees capturing complexity as a response to improving management, 
without looking at how it may in itself be a discursive condition within which 
further interventionism can be framed (arguably, in this case, were the liberal 
peace to be taken as an actually existing reality, it would not necessarily be 
antagonistic to the notion of capturing complexity). The result of Willet’s 
arguments, in fact, is not to jettison the foundations of peace-building or the logic 
of development, but rather to understand this inability to grasp complexity as a 
limitation of the previous approach, exemplified, once again, in the mismatch 
between the aims and the goals of the liberal peace. “International or regional 
attempts at building sustainable peace will only be viable if constructed upon a 
subtler analysis of war economies and failing states and when the inequities of 
the global economic and political system are redressed” (ibid, p. 587), the author 
suggests, thus also implying the need for further inclusiveness rather than retreat. 
                                                             
Paris’s own At War’s End, a seminal book on peace-building operations, proposes several 
recommendations, including the nature and sequencing of the pillars of the ‘Institutionalisation 
Before Liberalisation’ approach, and an assessment of why partition solutions to ethnic conflicts 
are fundamentally untenable and should be discarded (2004, p. 181-185). In recent times, Roland 
Paris’ own engagement with peace-building directly blurred the previously separated fields of 
scholarship and practice, as he was appointed by the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization to an international panel of experts to advise on the future of NATO.  
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Furthermore, where critiques point to the need of targeting the issue of 
excessive authority, for instance in the form of the quasi-despotism of peace-
builders, solutions tend to focus mostly on planning better to avoid the potential 
for such impositions in the pre-deployment phase of the mission (Beauvais, 
2001, p. 1170; Stromseth, Wippman, & Brooks, 2006). Here, the comprehensive 
knowledge of the case helps in the planning phase, with the advice given dealing 
with the problem of despotism or of its perception as a potentiality to foresee 
and plan for, thus focusing on including pre-deployment in policy-planning to 
prevent the problem of despotism from arising. The re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building then tackles the complex milieu by expanding horizontally (e.g. 
through addressing the pre-deployment phase) to cover as much ground as 
possible in the operationalisation of peace-building. The vertical nature of 
interventionism is only identified briefly (e.g. despotism), and only insofar as it 
is a problem of strategy that can be prevented by further including local 
stakeholders in designing the structure of the mission (Carment, 2004, p. 145; 
Chesterman, 2004, p. 9; Keating & Knight, 2004, p. 247; Leenders & Alexander, 
2005, p. 87) (without, however, entering into deeper discussion regarding 
whether the mission should exist at all). Likewise, we can see that critiques 
which point to the complexity of state failure, whilst stressing the importance of 
avoiding big bureaucracies, autocratic systems or anachronistic understanding 
of international legal sovereignty, still result in approaches to peace-building 
which reduce the complexity of the post-conflict to a problem that requires 
casting the net further, and thus, further invasive methods of social engineering, 
rather than a more radical form of power diffusion to manage the opposing and 
at times contrasting forces within the milieu. For instance, Langford suggests: 
state failure is a highly complex and an essentially political problem 
both domestically and internationally. Therefore solutions to the 
problem cannot be confined atomistically to settling war, building 
governing institutions, revitalizing the economy, or instituting social 
welfare programs. Nor can theories that promote the disconnection 
between domestic and international factors serve to help us 
understand the catalysts of state failure. Solutions and theories must 
encompass all of these factors and more (1999, p. 65 my emphasis). 
The shift towards complexity is not only acknowledged as being prevalently one 
that no longer accepts linear narratives of security and development, but is also 
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one that is encouraged by the authors as a path towards understanding conflicts 
and increasing the chances of peace in that “must capture the micro-level 
dynamics of conflict and peace” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 23) for it to be 
effective. This acknowledgment of complexity does indeed imply a shift towards 
the abandonment of linear and causal narratives that offered off-the-shelf macro-
economic solutions adopted by the liberal peace. Yet, if one were to also extend 
an analysis that does not depend on the identification of the ‘liberal’ nature of 
peace-building, it could be possible to see the acknowledgment of complexity as 
a sign of a deeper shift towards a different way to manage societies. This would 
reject linear understandings and rigid top-down universal models (e.g. macro-
economic reform), in favour of a more diffuse, albeit more effective form of 
power that acknowledges the complex and often messy, unpredictable nature of 
the milieu upon which one is to govern. This approach does not rely on simply 
handing down solutions, edicts and rules, but rather employs methods of control 
that are less coercive although no less invasive. 
Since the acknowledgment of complexity operated by some of the 
critiques of the early 2000s does not entirely question interventionism and the 
need to peace-build, the resulting re-conceptualisation of peace-building does 
not represent an analytical approach that seeks to disperse power radically and 
completely in the face of such inability to employ linear and causal thinking. 
Rather, as the fundamental assumption regarding the need to peace-build is left 
untouched, the critiques focus mostly on amending the technology through 
which problem areas are addressed, instead of the knowledge structure through 
which they are identified as problems in the first place. The result, as can be seen 
in the next section, is a purely mechanical shift that affects the manner in which 
problematic societies are managed. 
5. Disciplinary Peace-Building 
The acknowledgment of the complexity of post-conflict contexts has important 
consequences for the evolution of peace-building’s conceptualisation.  This 
section suggests that the nod to the complex nature of the post-conflict frames 
the body politic as something that cannot be grasped singularly by the structures 
of one particular apparatus (i.e. the ‘economy’ of the state, or the security 
59 
 
 
apparatus) but rather something that requires a form of governance that takes 
multiform shapes and is understood in terms of movement, instrumentation, 
‘strategy’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 26). In short, understanding the social and the 
political as complex enables a shift towards methods of governance that are also 
fluid, driven by a form of power that is also constantly in movement. This form 
of power is not ‘owned’ by someone over someone else as a material thing but 
is framed within a view of the body politic itself as a set of complex networks. 
Within this framing the exercise of power requires apparatuses, techniques and 
material elements that serve as means of communication of power and 
knowledge, features “that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning 
them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 28). 
Thus, a further element of significance can be identified in the shift 
operated by critics of liberalisation from what appeared to be a minimalist 
approach to peace-building towards a more involved, intrusive approach. More 
significantly, in fact, what is at stake in the shift is an even more fundamental 
change in the strategy of governance, one which necessitates, indeed relies on 
identifying the previous approach to governance as limited, for the establishment 
of a technique to govern. Where Foucault suggested, for instance, that modern 
states moved from top-down sovereign power to a more diffuse form of power 
to govern populations, a parallel can also be drawn with 21st century peace-
building as the governance of the complex milieu of the post-conflict. Foucault’s 
analysis suggested that governing more efficiently required acknowledging the 
limitedness of the previous approach’s understanding of the complex milieu of 
the population (2007, p. 65). 
Despite the fact that Foucault did not discuss peace-building or state-
building, his studies identified an important process that is relevant to 
contemporary discourses of peace-building, too. In particular, where peace-
building is a process that seeks to alter the conditions that lead to war and to 
fashion a settlement for the establishment and rooting of long lasting peace, this 
project contains several aspects of governance and social engineering that have 
relied on the same modern instruments and techniques of governance that 
Foucault focused on in his research into the evolution of discourses on criminal, 
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education and healthcare systems. Foucault’s work is mostly interested in the 
ways in which the acknowledgment of certain limitations to orthodox ways of 
governing gave birth to new ways of governing more efficiently and can thus be 
employed to examine how identifying the limits of orthodox forms of peace-
building may give rise to different technologies of power. 
For instance, Foucault discusses the emergence of ‘discipline’ as a move 
to replace the monotonous, monodirectional exercise of power typical of 
absolutist sovereign power.8 The ‘old’ type of power, Foucault suggests, was 
characterised by a reliance on executive, inflexible orders that regulated and 
facilitated the rule of territories by outlawing behaviour not consistent with the 
edicts of the sovereign (2007, p. 83). In applying his insights on the subject of 
peace-building, a similar shift can be observed. The intransigence of top-down 
attempts to govern is often identified with the stubborn imposition of neo-liberal 
reform onto non-liberal and conflict territories, what Mac Ginty calls a “peace 
from IKEA; a flat-pack peace made from standardized components. […] there is 
a danger that peace support interventions become non-reflexive and uniform” 
(2008, p. 145). What are identified as essentially inflexible orders (see, for 
instance: Muggah, 2008, p. 1; Pronk, 2004, p. 15; Richmond, 2009a, p. 568) – 
be it regarding macro-economic reforms, SAPs, or political liberalisation – 
become essential to the identification of the inability of the previous approach to 
accept, and accommodate the complexity of the post-conflict. 
The results are then framed in terms of fragmenting the power employed 
to govern, horizontally, such as it is implied in the focus on civil society typical 
of cosmopolitan perspectives. Such focus is, in fact, welcomed as a 
fragmentation of power operationalised by the “proliferation of mosaics of 
                                                             
8 In Foucauldian approaches, discipline is the key to understanding the relation between subjects 
and space and across subjects in society. Discipline, however, is not a form of power that works 
upon subjects but through subjects (Allen, 2003), and as such, it is relevant to non-linear 
approaches in that it operates through constitutive relations, discourses, techniques and practices, 
as opposed to being an externalised tool that can be manipulated by actors, isolated by the 
conditions of formation of the network itself and with causal impact on the outcome of the 
network. Discipline, as a form of power is fluid and operates in the intersections of localities, 
whether they are micro, as the case of the prison in Foucault’s research (1991a) or macro, as in 
the case of the exploration of the wider structures of governance inside liberal nation-states in 
Rose and Miller (1992), and Dean (1999); as such discipline rejects monodirectional accounts 
of power in that it flows horizontally and depends on multiple instruments and technologies 
beyond the mere imposition of a sovereign, vertical power source. 
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differently sized public spheres” (Keane, 1998, p. 188), which, it is argued, 
should be welcomed as a means to “ensure that nobody ‘owns’ power and 
increase the likelihood that its exercise everywhere is rendered more accountable 
to those whom it directly or indirectly affects” (ibid, p. 188). This argument 
proposed by Keane is the exemplification of the attempt to blend the distinction 
between public and private, state and non-state, into a system of overlapping 
networks “defined by the lack of differentiation among spheres” (ibid, p. 187). 
Peace-building is then reconceptualised on the basis of the need to put a 
stop to such monotonous exercise of power9 by breaking down what needs to be 
governed into its constituent parts. This is consistent with the attempt to grasp 
‘complex’ emergencies through more inclusive methods. In Foucault’s studies a 
similar diffusion of power is identified with the emergence of what he calls 
disciplinary power, the extension of more inclusive techniques through which a 
whole host of mechanisms and apparatuses are employed to make sense of, 
contain and prevent certain types of complex issues (including unwanted, 
criminal behaviour, the spread of diseases, etc.) 
These complex issues are, however, always framed within an unfazed 
will to govern, which is, in itself, driven by a process that Foucault calls 
‘normalisation’ (2007, p. 85), according to which the legitimate expression of 
                                                             
9 Both neo-institutionalists and cosmopolitans, for instance, reject the intransigence of top-down 
economic reforms, as well as the rigidity of traditional forms of sovereign authority, accepting, 
in both cases, the need to create multiple networks and layers of governance to include NGOs, 
supra-national organisations, international institutions as well as state apparatuses. David Held’s 
vision of democracy, for instance, does not advocate the outright abandonment of domestic 
institutional structures but a functional overlapping of “local, regional and global processes and 
structures” (1993, p. 39). Held’s vision recasts the territorial aspect of statehood in a manner 
which does not reject statehood itself but is rather a reflection of the sensitivity to the limits of 
governance understood as the exercise of a ‘unilateral right’ to policy-make, in favour of a form 
of governance that embeds the process of governing into “boundary transcending organisations” 
(ibid, p. 228). Whilst the rejection of boundaries seems to be the antithesis of the work 
undertaken by neo-institutionalist, one could argue that the latter school would find itself in 
agreement with cosmopolitan perspectives on the need not to rely only on strong state structures 
understood as unilaterally exercising sovereign power. Neo-institutionalist perspectives that 
focus on state-building indeed warn against relying on an outdated understanding of the all-
powerful vertical sovereign state model, in favour of re-building institutions as inherently deeply 
entrenched in transnational and international webs to tackle issues such as international terrorism 
and crime (Reilly & Wainwright, 2005, p. 139). These perspectives also promote a move away 
from seeing the state as a ‘singular entity’, focusing on the multiple layers of governance 
structures therein (Skendaj, 2014, p. 3). The acknowledgment of the limits to top-down 
governance has been instrumental in framing the beginning of the debates on the importance of 
the local, already present in the work of both cosmopolitan debates on grassroots and NGOs, as 
well as neo-institutionalist calls to devolve power to local stakeholders.  
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governance is identified. This is the process through which the ‘normal’ standard 
is established, and through which behaviour is judged as normal or abnormal, 
and hence in need of modification and treatment. Setting up the ‘normal’ and 
problematising the abnormal is a prescriptive endeavour through which an 
analysis of the atomic level of the milieu “breaks down individuals, places, time, 
movements, actions and operations […] into components such that they can be 
seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other” (ibid, p. 84). Peace-building 
in itself contains such element of normalisation, mostly visible in the discourses 
around failed states, but also more largely acknowledged in the general 
assessment of problematic areas that require some sort of intervention. 
Because normalisation indicates the need to address the abnormal by 
breaking down the complex into its atomic components, a similar process can be 
seen at play in the critiques and alternatives explored in this chapter. It is, in fact, 
through their attempt to ‘complexify’ the milieu by making the components 
more visible that these are also exposed more directly to the prescriptive nature 
of normalisation and thus made more modifiable. It is thus no surprise that such 
breakdown of the whole into components did not result in a lesser form of 
engagement, but rather evolved into a multi-layered, invasive form of social 
engineering, whilst at the same time relying on power being diffused and 
exercised at all levels of governance, including the local, the international, the 
grassroots, and the state. Power being fragmented should not, in fact, be taken 
necessarily as a sign of the end of the will to regulate the conduct of society as 
much as evidence of the acknowledgment of the need to regulate it better. This 
is arguably also Foucault’s conclusion on the shift towards disciplinary forms of 
punishment and disciplinary power used to contain and respond to public 
problems such as food scarcity or pandemics (2007). It is also my conclusion 
with regards the nature of the emergence of the critiques and the shift away from 
liberalisation. Since the fragmentation of peace-building along horizontal, non-
linear lines was not met with a deeper examination of why conflicts are 
problematised and how solutions are consequently produced, but rather focused 
around a mainly technical discussion regarding the techniques and methods of 
externally led peace-building, this  re-conceptualisation of peace-building 
resulted in a mere technical refinement of techniques and apparatuses. These 
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disciplinary techniques are visible in the promotion of more ‘monitoring’ 
instruments that can facilitate setting up “specific limits on the arbitrary exercise 
of power by leaders and political institutions” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 37), as in calls 
to wait until conditions are ripe for elections and to control hate speech (Paris, 
2004), to monitor elections (Zartman, 2005, p. 283) and to establish “at the very 
least, a monitoring mechanism to track aid flows” to more efficiently regulate 
the budget for post-conflict reconstruction (Chesterman, 2005, p. 347) 
The construction of the liberal peace paradigm as a problematic ensemble 
of actions, tendencies, negative outcomes and problematic elements, did 
facilitate a significant shift, albeit one based on questioning the methodology of 
peace-building, rather than the fundamental plausibility of ‘building’ peace. This 
shift, it can be argued, is consistent with the emergence of a disciplinary form of 
peace-building in that, firstly, the identification of failure, the problematisation 
of conflict and the general affirmation of the need to peace-build is reflective of 
such forms of normalisation that seek, as Foucault suggested, to establish the 
normal as well as the abnormal to correct. Secondly, the actions taken on the 
basis of such normalisation, that is the correcting, ‘fixing’ and ‘managing’ of 
conflicts, requires accessing the social milieu “at the level of the group and at 
the level of each individual” (Foucault, 2007, p. 89), using rational calculations 
that not only identify the abnormal after it emerges, but also seek to address the 
potential for its emergence. 
Foucault discusses the treatment of smallpox in modern European states 
as being an example of disciplinary power used to understand the cases at 
individual and group level, for the purpose of identifying the risk of catching the 
disease.  Likewise, the potential for failure is framed as a central part of peace-
building in the form of insecurity (whether it is economic insecurity, political 
instability, and a general ‘fear’ of failure), which frames the need to ‘understand’ 
the problem as a simultaneous and implicit desire to ‘fix’ it and ‘prevent it’. 
Here, Foucault marks an interesting difference between sovereign power and 
disciplinary power that can be helpful in understanding the shift towards what I 
call more invasive forms of disciplinary peace-building. Whereas, Foucault 
suggests, sovereign power operated through imagining the negative – 
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formulating edicts on the basis of what must not be done – discipline works in 
“a sphere complementary to reality” (2007, p. 69), and as such is dependent on 
acknowledging the constraints and limits imposed by the fact that “the nature of 
reality is tenacious and difficult to overcome” (2007, p. 69). Discipline relies, 
fundamentally, on an acknowledgment of the limits of imagining direct power; 
it is the beginning of the end of non-reflexive, inflexible, top-down governance. 
Similarly, the multi-layered and multi-level forms of governance implied 
by the emergent critics from the neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan 
perspectives, present a whole host of solutions which diffuse power by 
pluralising governance through multilateral efforts (Reilly & Wainwright, 2005, 
p. 139), promoting communication internationally and across boundaries at the 
grassroots level, and contributing to signalling the end of inflexible governance, 
whether it was attributed to economic reforms (Barbara, 2008, p. 110) or rigid 
territorial interpretations of governance (Scholte, 2004, p. 230). At the same 
time, however, the projecting of the ‘normal’ standard through all these multiple 
levels, actors and tools does not cease to operate, providing direction to the 
techniques of discipline. The result is a form of power that does not rule over its 
subjects but disciplines more subtly through them at the individual and collective 
level, at the institutional as well as at the informal level. 
The fundamental inability to recalculate the nature of the normalisation 
that decides what is normal or not, what is an appropriate expression of conflict 
or not, continues to perpetrate a core prescriptiveness that does not result in the 
total fragmentation of power, but in the instrumental acknowledgment of the 
contingent and of the multiple only insofar as it makes governing easier and more 
efficient. Thus when peace-building scholars discuss the need for more inclusive 
methods, for a deeper understanding of the problem, for a more nuanced form of 
intervention, or for an appreciation of the inability to impose macro reforms, this 
is done, arguably, not with a view to understand and disprove the link between 
the liberal peace and peace-building (as I have discussed in the previous section, 
this is largely accepted as a natural connection), nor to question ‘what is to 
govern the post-conflict’. Just as the function of critiquing sovereign power was 
not necessarily to fundamentally question the legitimacy of governance, so the 
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function of the critique of liberal peace-building is not, thus, to question whether 
or not to peace-build, nor was it to jettison peace-building in lieu of its notable 
mistakes, nor to question the nature of peace and the problematisation of conflict, 
to understand the emergence and construction of collectives or the relational 
aspects of governance. 
Instead, the function of the critique was rather to ‘peace-build’ better, to 
build the social body itself, to more directly access the complexities of the body 
politic in order not to necessarily celebrate its plurality, but to manage it and its 
irregularities and their expressions such as conflict, instability and 
underdevelopment. The shift, one can argue, represents not necessarily the 
outcome of a deep discussion over the justification for the right to ‘govern’ over 
the complexities of the post-conflict (i.e. the right to ‘peace-build’ in the first 
place) but was rather an exercise in the establishment of a new way to govern, 
to peace-build more, and to do it better. 
Conclusion 
The concept of the ‘liberal peace’ is fundamental to the debates on peace-
building, particularly, as will be seen in the next chapter, to the most recent re-
conceptualisation efforts which have, by and large, sought to construct a 
different paradigm directly against what they perceived to be a coherent liberal 
peace strategy. This chapter, however, has suggested that the foundations for the 
identification of the liberal peace as a coherent strategy have been laid by the 
critics of peace-building of the late 1990s-early 2000s, who collected the bulk of 
western foreign policy, the post-Cold War international order, a disparate set of 
liberal theories, along with a whole host of actors and methods, under the label 
‘liberal peace’. Furthermore, it has been suggested, this association led to the 
perception that peace-building was being driven by a coherent plan, and by a 
largely consistent and harmonious group of actors, commonly joined in the 
pursuit of ‘liberal’ aims, through largely common liberal ‘methods’. Where this 
logic was identified, the contours of the liberal paradigm were drawn – although 
these would later be much more solidly cemented by the local turn, as I will 
discuss below. This project was then associated with what was perceived to be 
the primary mechanisms of the liberal peace in the 1990s (liberalisation), and the 
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outcomes of conflict management missions across the globe, most of which 
presented various implementation issues. 
The consensus around the existence of the liberal peace, however, is 
problematic for two main reasons. Firstly because, as seen in section 3, this does 
not allow for a nuanced account of the differences within liberal theory itself, or 
between the actors, their aims, and the practical details of the missions 
themselves. These are largely reduced and selectively chosen to be added to the 
‘liberal label’ discounting the significant fact that many practical issues with 
peace-building may not necessarily revolve primarily around the ‘liberalness’ of 
the missions, the aims or the actors. Therefore, it has been suggested, the focus 
on the liberal peace on the side of the critics has not enabled what could have 
been a more fruitful engagement with substantial issues concerning autonomy, 
legitimacy and authority, which are reduced mostly to an assessment of the gap 
between the intentions of the liberal and the ‘virtual peace’ created on the 
ground. Finally, the focus on the ‘liberal’ nature of peace-building has also had 
the consequence, which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, to 
naturalise the liberal peace as an objectively existing object of critique. 
Contradictions and paradoxes visible with the liberal peace, where they are 
acknowledged, are consistently still attributed to intentionally ‘sinister’ intents 
of the liberal peace. Thus, the construction of the ‘liberal peace’ is acknowledged 
only insofar as it can be used to critique it, rather than to question its existence 
in the first place. 
Because of the focus on the mechanisms for the implementation of peace-
building (i.e. the critique of liberalisation) and because of an essentially 
unchanged and undisturbed assumption regarding the need of interventionism 
and conflict management, the solutions that have emerged in the early 2000s – 
and in particular those coming from neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan 
perspectives – do not consider the possibility of jettisoning peace-building, nor 
do they question the very foundations of the so called ‘liberal peace’. Instead, 
the critiques, whilst on the one hand acknowledging the complex nature of the 
post-conflict milieu, do so only insofar as this acknowledgment can be used to 
flag up the limited nature of the previous approach. This purely procedural 
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critique, it has been argued, treats complexity as the natural limitation of 
inflexible top-down solutions, a multiplicity which, however, can and indeed 
needs to be grasped if peace-building is to succeed. 
Solutions that promote more inclusionary approaches – the 
fragmentation of governance and the diffusion of power, such as neo-
institutionalist approaches that focus on state-building, or cosmopolitan 
approaches on transnationalism – are responsible not only for the superficial shift 
from liberalisation to institutionalisation, or from peace-building to state-
building. They are, crucially, responsible for a more fundamental – and purely 
mechanical and procedural – shift in the techniques of governance of the post-
conflict milieu; one which, by necessity, recognises complexity, decomposes the 
milieu into its ‘atomic’ levels, calls for the end of absolute top-down power, but 
does not proclaim the end of governance or the end of peace-building. Rather, 
by eschewing substantial debates over the nature of reconstruction, intervention, 
authority, autonomy, liberalism, democracy, they do not question whether or not 
to peace-build, but rather prescribe the need to peace-build more, and to do it 
better. The next chapter will engage with the emergence of a strand of critique 
that evaluates the impact and implication of the shift towards more extensive, 
and more involved, forms of peace-building outlined above. As will be seen in 
the next chapter, whilst this critique fundamentally challenges the feasibility and 
desirability of long-drawn missions, they agree with the identification of the 
common ethos and driving logic behind this extended engagement, namely the 
liberal peace paradigm. This becomes central to the framing of new ways of 
thinking about peace-building and takes centre stage in the emergence of bottom-
up approaches.
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Chapter 2 
The Local Turn:  
The Problematisation of the ‘Liberal Peace’ and the 
End of Top-Down Peace-Building 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the discussion on the re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building by focusing on the emergence of the local turn. The chapter 
outlines the fundamental claims of the scholarship advocating for a substantial 
shift in the way in which peace-building is theoretically framed. This shift, 
starting from existing critiques of the liberal peace (outlined in Chapter 1, section 
2) and complementing these with lessons-learnt considerations from the 
missions initiated in the late-1990s-early 2000s, consolidates the image of liberal 
peace-building as the object of critique, by adding to the pool of problematic 
tendencies and outcomes. The tendency of liberal peace-building to rely on top-
down solutions in the form of institution-building to obtain its aims, is added to 
the host of characteristics that exist under the label ‘liberal peace-building’. This 
is explained as being a function of the universalising and totalising tendencies of 
the liberal paradigm. The solution, bottom-up, is then framed in opposition to 
these totalising and universalising tendencies. The chapter seeks, therefore, to 
outline the nature of this shift from top-down to bottom-up and to argue that this 
shift reflects the emergence of a form of biopower grounded in the 
acknowledgment of the inability to govern through imposing coercive solutions 
such as state-building. The emergence of this form of power is a consequence of 
the call to diffuse power and the opening up of contingencies and pluralities. 
The first section furthers the discussion on the liberal peace by outlining 
the critiques coming from the local turn. This is central in that these critiques 
cement the consensus around the nature of the liberal peace, by adding to its 
description a number of negative outcomes and tendencies ascertained in the 
peace-building missions of the late 1990s- early 2000s. In particular this section 
focuses on the main point of critique against the liberal peace, namely its 
hegemonic nature and its consequential tendency to marginalise alternative 
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narratives. The second section, then, examines the emergence of solutions 
known as the ‘local turn’. 
The critiques of the liberal peace, after ascertaining the hegemonic and 
exclusionary tendency of the liberal peace, call for an alternative to the liberal 
peace, by advocating the need of a shift in focus towards the local recipients of 
peace-building. This change in focus, it is advocated by the critics, is necessary 
to combat the ill effects of an increasingly out-of-touch liberal peace. What is 
called for is an appreciation for the multiplicity and plurality of the complex 
post-conflict milieu beyond what is identified as a still primarily rhetorical 
commitment of the liberal peace whose main aim is to perpetuate and expand 
the liberal project. The previous approach, the liberal peace, is now 
fundamentally rejected as unable to come to terms with the complex post-
conflict milieu beyond the imposition of top-down solutions that perpetuate its 
hegemonic plans. These, it is suggested, are consistent with forms of governance 
that can no longer deal with the emergent agency of the local and the realities of 
the everyday without eliciting resistance and essentially non-organic forms of 
peace. The end of top-down governance, as is examined in the third section, is 
consistent with a shift in focus away from disciplinary forms of power towards 
a more fragmented understanding of power akin to what Foucault – in his own 
context of study – called biopower, emerging through the framing of the social 
milieu as essentially complex and contingent, and not governable, manageable 
and predictable from the top. 
In the fourth section, the significance of this shift is explored. 
Particularly, it is suggested that the fragmentation of governance to allow for the 
emergence of a more ‘authentic’ plane of everyday agency beyond the rigidity 
of the liberal peace form of governance, is symptomatic not of a total retreat of 
governance and the subsequent jettisoning or calling into question of 
interventionism, but with a further refinement of the techniques employed for 
the exercise of power. This, far from being an outcome exclusive to the 
technologies of governing employed in the liberal peace’s project of expansion, 
is also evident in the local turn’s construction of the ‘everyday’ as a contingent 
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and complex plane of action which, whilst representing the end of top-down 
governance, is still framed as a reality to grasp, include and, ultimately, govern.  
Ultimately, it is argued, the fragmentation of governance does not 
epitomise the ending of the aspiration to govern, as much as it represents the 
refinement of the mechanisms of governance to target the individual and the 
collective as a complex whole whose mechanisms may not really be identified 
and explained but whose potential failure is always present and in need of being 
addressed.  
1. Introducing the ‘Local Turn’: The Critiques of Liberal Peace-Building 
The controversial decisions to initiate military campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq were pitted against the backdrop of over a decade of less than fruitful foreign 
engagements with failing, failed, post-war and conflict territories. If, as the 
previous chapter suggested, the call for ‘better’ engagement translated into 
‘more’ engagement, this is particularly visible in the muscular engagement, first 
with Kosovo, and later Afghanistan and Iraq. By the mid-2000s, however, it was 
quickly becoming clear that these muscular interventions presented many 
problematic features, most of which manifested in the form of resistance. The 
difficulties in successfully ‘securing’ the north of Kosovo (Bieber, 2011), the 
limited post-Taliban peace obtained in Afghanistan (Mac Ginty, 2010), and the 
persistent local hostility encountered in Iraq (Edelstein, 2009, p. 93), are only 
some of the issues haunting the record of foreign engagement in the mid-2000s. 
It is not surprising, once again, that calls for rethinking the parameters of peace-
building should start from a practical assessment of the record on the ground. 
The critical scholarship emerging towards the end of the first decade of 
the 2000s soon began to express urgent concern over the impact of what were 
increasingly perceived as heavy-handed interventions. Calls for the emergence 
of a new “critical agenda for peace” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 766) 
came to be grounded in the imperative of taking stock of what the record of 
peace-building seemed to be indicating as a crisis of what had been identified as 
the project of liberal peace-building (Richmond, 2009a). Critical approaches to 
liberal peace-building vary, to an extent, in focus and range of methodologies 
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employed, as well as in theoretical provenance. Yet, it is possible to identify a 
common effort to draw out evidence to prove top-down approaches employed 
by liberal peace-builders as problematic and limited (amongst many, see: 
Campbell, 2011; Felix da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012; Hameiri, 2010; Lemay-
Hébert & Mathieu, 2014; Tschirgi, 2010; Wolff, 2011). 
The problems identified in the critique range from unstable political 
settlements such as that achieved in Bosnia (Donais, 2012, p. 95), local 
resistance such as that witnessed in Cambodia and Afghanistan (Richmond, 
2010b), local elite co-option of the liberal peace-building agenda as in Kosovo 
(Visoka, 2012b), increasing legitimacy issues besieging international 
administrations (Lemay- Hébert, 2011) and the recurrence of violence or 
increasing volatility of the ‘negative peace’ obtained in places like Kosovo and 
Iraq, accompanied by the polarisation of certain factions of society excluded 
from politics by external actors (Newman, 2011, p. 1745). Furthermore, 
worsening security and economic conditions are also evidenced, particularly in 
cases where the apparatuses had to be rebuilt from scratch as in the cases of 
Kosovo and East Timor. Some notable critiques, in fact, focus on outlining the 
inability of the liberal peace-building project to come to terms with unsustainable 
economic growth, economic polarisation (Smoljan, 2003, p. 245), the 
breakdown of the welfare state (Pugh, 2010), further retreat into anti-western 
feeling (Van der Linden, 2001) and continued marginalisation of non-liberal 
polities (Jahn, 2007). These accounts often suggest that the project of expanding 
the reach of liberalism has operated at the expenses of a more nuanced 
understanding of conflicts. 
Other scholars identify substantial issues of accountability and 
legitimacy, mostly evident in the nature of transitional administrations of post-
conflict territories, by pointing particularly to the need to review the process to 
include substantial ‘local input’ (Caplan, 2005; Chopra, 2000, p. 29). These 
critiques draw on case study analyses of a wide array of missions, from state-
building in Kosovo, to peace-maintenance in Sierra Leone, to democracy 
promotion in Iraq. Despite the notable social, historical and political differences 
between these cases, the critical accounts provide a common critique pointing to 
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the lack of norm incorporation, attributing this to the nature of projects and 
reforms as not attuned to local realities. This gap, then, is linked to low 
legitimacy (Roberts, 2013, p. 83) and to blurring lines of responsibility 
(Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010, p. 121). The local/international gap is also 
attributed to the inability of external liberal agents to acknowledge the local 
counterparts as anything other than a “homogenous and disorderly Other” 
(Richmond, 2009b, p. 325), and attributed to the tendency of liberal peace-
building, to rely on technical exercises in state-building (Brown & Gusmao, 
2012; Richmond, 2010b) based on one-size-fits-all blueprints and “off-the-shelf 
packages” (Boege, 2012, p. 104), and finally also attributed to the hypocrisy of 
a liberal project which is considered to be “self-interested and ineffective” 
(Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 799). 
Other scholars suggest that the gap between liberal plans and local 
realities is particularly manifested in the form of resistance; “a wave of popular 
opposition to the international administration” is noted by Lemay-Hébert in his 
research into UNTAET and UNMIK in East Timor and Kosovo respectively 
(2012, p. 467). In particular, Lemay- Hébert suggests, this is evidence that the 
legitimacy of international peace-building authorities are questioned and that 
nowhere is a legitimacy gap more visible than in the case of the transitional 
administration in Kosovo. Here, the emergence of Vetevendosje and general 
local discontent with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) may 
reflect a concern not necessarily with the internationals per se, but rather with 
the “idea of absolute control” (2013, p. 98). The gap, however, extends beyond 
local despondency to externally imposed policy packages or to the international 
presence. Indeed, critics suggest that the gap is visible in the outcome of the 
projects of institution-building in themselves, which are claimed to have had 
“little impact, other than in basic security and rhetorical, rights-oriented terms, 
on the everyday life of populations” (Richmond, 2009b, p. 325). The impact on 
the recipient societies is often limited to formal structures, and is suggested to 
be at best insubstantial, particularly on the security apparatuses of post-conflict 
territories (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010, p. 114). 
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In the identification of trends and patterns, outcomes and tendencies, of 
the missions of the 1990s and 2000s, perspectives critical of peace-building 
arguably also concur in cementing a coherent picture of the liberal peace project. 
The project of promoting the liberal peace is said to be characterised by 
restrictive, blueprint-like projects, not attuned to local conditions, imposed from 
the above, and displaying little concern for pre-existing forms of governance, 
traditional and customary institutions, cultural sensitivities, and/or a complex 
combination of all of these factors (Caplan, 2007; Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty & 
Richmond, 2013; Wilde, 2007).  Here it is worth noting that in the emergence of 
the new critical paradigm, the maintenance of the liberal/non liberal semantic 
categories is instrumental to portraying the solutions as radical, reflexive and 
pluralist, opposed to the ‘dogmatic’ nature of the liberal framework (Lidén, 
2009, p. 630; Richmond, 2011a, p. 2). The following section focuses particularly 
on one element of the critiques of the liberal peace, one which is commonly 
identified by critical perspectives regardless of their theoretical provenance, 
namely the hegemonic nature of the liberal peace. This is important in that the 
negative outcomes of the liberal peace are given meaning by framing them 
within a coherent plan of hegemonic intent, which is said to drive the linear logic 
behind the liberal peace-building paradigm. Against this perceived hegemony 
the local turn offers an opposite and radical project of empowerment that starts 
by displacing top-down governance through locally sourced forms of agency. 
2. The Problem of Liberal Hegemony 
The hegemonic nature of the liberal peace is the character that is most frequently 
and most vehemently attacked by the recent critiques of peace-building. The 
perceived hegemony of the liberal peace, it will be seen, is the starting points of 
these critiques to address the issue of peace-building and attempt an ontological 
reconfiguration of the subjects of peace-thinking and peace-building. 
The problem of hegemony is handled, in the critiques, not just as a 
discursive reality born out of the absence of any other competing ‘project’ to that 
of the liberal peace (Hopgood, 2000, p. 2), but it is also framed as an inherent 
aspect of the liberal theoretical underpinnings of the paradigm itself. Beate Jahn, 
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for instance, suggests that liberalism in itself is bound to produce inequality, and 
attributes this to the promotion of private property, and in particular with the role 
of government as guarantor and protector. Internationally, Jahn notes, from the 
time of John Locke onwards, territories and societies not seen as protecting the 
right to private property were then considered to be legitimately open to the 
denial of political sovereignty and the removal of property rights (land) (2007). 
Whilst having nominally rejected such unequal assessment of the 
appropriateness of property and political rights, it is suggested that a similar logic 
continues to be applied by liberal state-builders towards non-liberal territories; 
where local government and society is not seen as able to understand or support 
the role of government as guarantor and protector of liberal rights, the territories 
are stripped of political sovereignty temporarily (e.g. Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq) 
and to a different extent (e.g. through the monitoring of elections such as the UN 
mission in Congo). Hegemony, is also visible in the inability of the liberal 
episteme to recognise its potential for producing “not just affluence but also 
poverty, not just progress but also moral regression” (Jahn, 2012a, p. 154). 
Hegemony, then, resulting from external imposition and local subordination, is 
identified as the outcome of practices of international governance such as 
development, peace-building and state-building, but it is also indicated as a 
precondition of liberal internationalism (Jahn, 2005, 2007, 2012b; Joseph, 2006, 
2012). 
Liberal peace-building’s project of spreading the liberal system is not, 
however, only attained through coercion and imposition, but is also dependent 
on processes of consent. Several contributions employ what Chandler identifies 
as ‘power based critiques’ (Chandler, 2011) to identify how such hegemonic 
tendencies are exercised with both methods of consent and coercion. Many of 
these contributions are influenced by critical theories, by post-colonial and post-
structuralist perspectives, and some draw particularly on the work of Michel 
Foucault.1 Foucault’s analysis of power and of the physical manifestations of 
                                                             
1 Comprehensive analysis of peace-building through Foucauldian lenses include Lipschultz’s 
critique of liberal governmentality (2005), Richmond’s analysis of peace as everyday versus 
peace as top-down governance (2010a), and Debrix’s analysis of the techniques of surveillance 
and social control exercised by the United Nations through peacekeeping and peace-building 
missions (1999). These perspectives share a concern for the global and international dimensions 
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relations of power has been used, in fact, in relation to the post-conflict territory 
as a site where disciplinary power can be evidenced, as in relation to 
interventionism as an expression of international forms of governmentality that 
rely on panoptic-like forms of surveillance.2 Foucauldian accounts do not focus 
solely on surveillance to control societies, but also on non-coercive, subtler 
techniques that are deeply entrenched in the life of the subjects to operate, giving 
rise to accounts that are concerned with the regulation of the body politic through 
its biological qualities. These accounts identify, in particular, western 
apparatuses that produce and spread a particular set of normative assumptions 
regarding the conduct of society which are then imposed, through a variety of 
means and at various levels, on the basis of an assumption of universal validity 
of the liberal system and its norms (Duffield, 2010; Jabri, 2006; Reid, 2010). 
These techniques are consistent with what is called governmentality, as an 
ensemble of techniques for the control of the conduct of societies according to 
pre-given liberal standards.3 These techniques operated at different levels, and 
involve different aspects of governance from security apparatuses, to healthcare, 
education and development (see for instance: Campbell, 1998; McConnachie & 
Morison, 2008; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005; Richmond, 2010a). 
Indeed, the mechanisms employed to regulate the conduct of society do 
not necessarily need to be coercive. On the contrary, they can be more efficient 
if they are framed as adaptable and reflective. Governmentality is usually 
attributed such an adaptable quality, as a diverse range of institutional 
manipulations and ideological representations are employed to make up the 
                                                             
and reach of liberal governmentality through instruments, institutions and actors that operate to 
spread liberal norms and behaviours in non-liberal areas.  
2 The type of global governance exemplified by the emergence of UN supported missions in the 
mid-1990s is, for instance, indicated to be the embodiment of what Debrix calls Panopticism, 
taking inspiration form Foucauldian analyses of discipline through surveillance: “panopticism in 
contemporary international affairs is the dream, formulated by sovereign states, of having 
international organizations peacefully control and dominate the entire spectrum of international 
activities, at any time and in any place, by multiplying global surveillance mechanisms” (1999, 
p. 84). 
3 For comprehensive accounts of liberal governmentality as it pertains to international 
governance structures involved in discourses of development and capacity-building see Joseph 
(2006) and Larner & Walters (2004). These perspectives are particularly concerned with how 
the domestic technologies of power involved to control societies and spread liberal 
governmentality are also visible at the international and global level in the liberal system’s 
attempt to govern over global spaces.  
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practices through which power relations are continuously reasserted as they are 
modified (Porter, 1993, p. 152)⁠, thus removing the need for forceful imposition. 
For this reason, critical approaches are not blind to the efforts coming from the 
policy world to reflect upon the need to include the local in the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building. Critical approaches then explore how the 
local has been included/listened to, suggesting that efforts to localise coming 
from international organisations, donor countries and/or transnational agents can 
be understood primarily as rhetorical instruments of discipline (amongst many 
others, see Richmond, 2009b) for the deepening of governmentality and of 
western/northern modes of existence (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 774–
5). The different methods employed to manage societies, including for instance 
the shift from a more direct form of ruling to a partnership based engagement, 
ripe with rhetoric of ‘local ownership’, is explained as the ability of liberal 
governmentality to change and adapt in order to become more efficient in its 
grasp of the subject’s conduct (Rose & Miller, 1992). Indeed, it is argued that 
such projects of consent rely on rhetorical framings of ‘partnership’ and support 
that seem to hide more sinister plans (Barbara, 2008, p. 316) and that do not 
represent ‘genuine’ partnership (Baskin, 2006, p. 88; Boege, Brown, Clements, 
& Nolan, 2009, p. 612) but that continue to be used in order to foster the 
cooperation (or lack of resistance) of the local population for the continued 
exercise of liberal power and influence. Jabri refers to this as a ‘post-colonial’ 
rationality, through which the local is not entirely negated or openly opposed, 
but rather, where the local is incorporated through a rationality that requires 
listening to the subjects of governing for efficiency’s sake (2013). Because of 
the scepticism towards the intentions of the liberal peace and its agents, attempts 
to localise peace are seen as problematic as, at their worst, these frameworks can 
use labels such as ‘peace-making’, ‘securitisation’, and the “benign language of 
humanitarian intervention” to “airbrush-out the casualties in opposing armies 
and civilian populations” occurring as a consequence of aggressively militarised 
missions (Francis, 2010, p. 77). 
Just as the policy world’s employment of the local rhetoric is considered 
insufficient at best as well as potentially manipulated by the liberal peace for the 
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advancement of its hegemonic plan, theoretical approaches to reconceptualising 
peace-building also do not escape the criticism exercised by the local turn. Some 
attempts to conceive of peace-building in a more inclusive manner, are framed 
as being an extension of the regulatory and managerial governmentality of liberal 
modernity. In other words, the critique suggests that previous approaches, 
including for instance the critical perspectives advanced in the early 2000s (see 
Chapter 1) represent attempts to include the local in a manner which remains 
insufficient, merely rhetorical in nature. It is suggested, for instance, that these 
perspectives, despite conceding to the existence of problems with previous 
liberal approaches, continue to represent “more of the same” (Roberts, 2013, p. 
67),4 given their unshed reliance on Weberian understandings of statehood 
(Lemay-Hébert, 2014). Furthermore, the rhetorical engagement with the local is 
also problematised by scholars of the local turn who focus on the relationship 
between state and society. Robins, for instance, critiques neo-institutionalist 
approaches – such as those coming from Call and Cousens (2008), Clapham 
(2003) and Milliken & Krause (2002) – suggesting that these perspectives’ 
consideration of the local rely on employing standards (to gauge whether 
governance is sufficiently including the local) that originate in metropolitan, 
international and cosmopolitan ideas, rather than originating from the very 
priorities of the populations affected. Thus, Robins suggests that the resulting 
“liberal peace that perceives legitimacy as constructed in metropolitan 
institutions rather than in the communities where people live can be irrelevant to 
such local priorities and thus struggle to be perceived as legitimate” (2013, p. 
47). It is also suggested that certain institutionalist approaches continue to prefer 
solutions that seem to be more impactful in the short term because they are more 
muscular, and thus they tend to diminish the impact of local needs, and at times 
consider them a hindrance to the goals of the liberal peace that can bog down the 
processes of consultation essential to the liberal peace-builders. These views are 
critiqued by Oliver Richmond as essentially tied a liberal governmentality, that 
does not engage with local realities (2009a, p. 575). 
                                                             
4 The author is referring, in particular to the work of Chesterman (2004b) and Call (C. Call, 2008) 
on institution-building as a peace-building tool.  
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Despite the differences between the missions and the actors involved 
(much as it was argued in the previous chapter), the consensus on the liberal 
nature of peace-building and on its foundational qualities (hegemony, 
universalism, exclusion) have never been as strong as with the critiques of the 
mid-2000s. Indeed, these come to cement the idea of the liberal peace paradigm 
not only by concurring in the identification of what are perceived to be primarily 
liberal reforms, actors and aims (see Chapter 1, sections 1 and 2), but also, by 
reinforcing a link between the outcomes of peace-building and the inherent 
qualities of the liberal paradigm. The ethos of promoting liberalism abroad is 
then tied to the inherently negative exclusionary and hegemonic tendencies of 
liberal actors and liberal theory alike, and these are then not only critiqued as 
having caused problems with the peace-building missions, but potentially also 
indicate the a priori fallibility of the liberal peace project itself, grounded in the 
liberal paradigm’s innate tendency to exclude and marginalise in order to attain 
its vision. As such, the identification of a clear ‘liberal’ paradigm is instrumental 
in the emergence of the most contemporary approach to peace-building as 
different and radically opposed to the principles (and also the outcomes) of what 
is painted as an insufficient and flawed paradigm. 
Such fundamental critical agreement on what not to do (i.e. the critique 
of the liberal peace), has in fact placed the roots for calls to re-envision a ‘post-
liberal’ way of conceptualising and practising peace-building. “Does this mean 
the end of liberal institutional governance?” Oliver Richmond asked 
perceptively in 2009. He replies by suggesting that scholarship should be 
enabled to develop theoretical approaches, 
…without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed 
world orthodoxies and interests. In other words, to gain an 
understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors for the 
overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media 
needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the 
orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about 
peace (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571 my emphasis). 
The notion of ‘everyday’ then emerges as an analytical category, representing 
both an alternative to the liberal peace, as well as an acknowledgment of the 
already existing hybrid nature of post-conflict settings. Critical approaches have 
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then formulated solutions that are firstly pitted against the liberal peace, its 
perceived ethos and the whole host of its adduced by-products, as discussed 
above, and are also projected into what are framed as yet unexplored and 
unattained objectives of pluralism, celebration of everyday agency, dialectical 
articulation of subjectivities, complexity and non-linearity. Having discussed the 
point of departure for the emergence of the local turn, namely the critique of the 
liberal peace’s ‘unbecoming’ project of hegemony, the chapter now turns to 
exploring the solutions offered in order to discuss the effect of the critique on 
the newly emergent conceptualisation of peace-building beyond the perceived 
liberal orthodoxy. 
3. The Solutions: The Everyday and the End of Top-Down Governance 
In the previous chapter, I acknowledged that in the early 2000s, some 
perspectives consistent with neo-institutionalist as well as cosmopolitan 
perspectives, embraced the need to create a more inclusionary form of peace-
building by acknowledging the complexity of the post-conflict (see Chapter 1, 
section 4). This, I suggested, generated more intrusive forms of peace-building; 
it also represented a shift in the form of power employed to address dysfunctional 
and problematic conflict situations, akin to a shift towards disciplinary forms of 
peace-building. These perspectives also suggested that peace-building could no 
longer promulgate solutions without acknowledging the realities on the ground 
(for instance, through remotely extended macro-economic reforms typical of 
liberalisation techniques).  I suggested that the solutions provided still called for 
the need of some form of top-down governance (i.e. the reliance on strong state 
institutions for the delivery of services for the supporters of neo-institutionalism, 
and supra-national and trans-national mechanisms of governance for the 
cosmopolitans), resulting in a shift that handled the complexity of the post-
conflict as a problem to be understood, catered for and managed. Where others 
have suggested this is part of liberal governmentality,5 I have suggested that the 
                                                             
5 Indeed critics have also concurred in the identification of disciplinary elements of interventions 
in the 2000s. Peace-building itself is, Jabri argues, “a project of governmentality, or the 
government of populations. It is designed in bio-political terms as a project of institution-
building, or more specifically of ‘state- building’, and its agents are at once both local and 
international, military and civilian.” (2013, p. 14) Elements of governmentality are noted in post-
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type of power employed is indeed of a disciplinary nature, although I have 
refrained from concurring in the identification of a coherent ‘liberal’ strategy of 
hegemonic expansion. 
What happens with the local turn, however, is crucial in that the shift 
away from top-down implies the emergence of an even more radical trend in 
governance, one which acknowledges the impossibility of ‘controlling’ the 
complexity of the social, accepting the ‘naturalness’ of the contingencies of the 
post-conflict milieu, condemning any top-down attempt as inherently hegemonic 
and fundamentally bound to fail. The local turn, Mac Ginty and Richmond 
suggest, has in fact indicated that “in the context of peace making power 
circulates rather than is unidirectional and top-down (meaning structural power 
and governmentality effectively fragment when applied to the subaltern or 
local)” (2013, p. 775), whilst also simultaneously offering a possible solution. 
“It may not be far-fetched to assume that liberal peace building’s oversight of 
the local may in some senses be designed to avoid this postcolonial realisation 
of subaltern agency” (ibid, p.775). The desire to rethink peace-building from the 
bottom up is in fact premised on an acknowledgment of the end of top-down 
governance through its framing and rejection of liberal peace-building’s 
teleological assumptions regarding the possibility to know the causes of conflict 
and artificially alter them towards a desired end.6 This is identified and then 
condemned as an outdated and inflexible linear paradigm by critiques that offer 
solutions which advocate a fundamental re-assessment and re-working of the 
very endeavour of peace-building beyond the liberal peace (Sörensen, 2006, p. 
318). 
                                                             
conflict reconstruction efforts such as Cambodia and Yugoslavia; Hughes and Pupavac, for 
instance, note the “policing of collective action and perceptions of the need to discipline damaged 
and culturally mal-programmed citizens into appropriate behavioural norms” which has 
generated a “a disciplined politics, regulated by international norms” (2005, p. 883). 
6 Hopgood suggests that these typically linear, teleological assumptions form the backbone of 
Euro-centric arguments regarding what the vision of the ‘good life’ looks like, which are then 
used to classify certain forms of social interactions, conflicts, behaviours as ‘backward’ 
(Hopgood, 2000, p. 20). 
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As critiques of the liberal peace focus primarily on the hegemony of the 
liberal peace, solutions are framed beyond the universal and linear logic7 that are 
said to pose undeniable limits to traditional peace-building theory and practice 
(Richmond, 2008b, p. 444; Robins, 2013b, p. 51). In practice, a shift is 
advocated, to unsettle the dominating tendencies of the liberal paradigm and its 
alienating effect on the local recipients of peace. Since the problems identified 
in the previous paragraph are essentially tied to the top-down nature of peace-
building, a bottom-up solution is often mentioned as a required response. What 
is suggested is a multi-layered effort to place the local firmly at the centre of the 
practice of peace-building. Several scholars, such as Felix da Costa and 
Karlsrud, point to the need of bottom-up approaches to counter previous top-
down strategies responsible for mere replications of macro level decisions 
(2012). In this direction, Roger Mac Ginty too, has pointed to the need to add 
‘trickle-up’ to the ‘trickle-down’ development (2012b, pp. 210–211). More 
attention to local agency is proposed as necessary in order to successfully 
enhance the local ownership of and input in the peace-building agendas 
(Autesserre, 2010). Such input may reveal the possibility to open up to multiple 
and different understandings of peace. Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, for instance, 
suggest that external actors need to be ready to accept that the social contract of 
these territories might possibly take different forms from the accepted western 
liberal one (2012a, p. 91). 
The focus on the local subjects of peace is understood as emerging “as a 
result of the fact that their presence exemplifies the impact of conflict and plays 
an important role in perceptions of legitimacy and in community attitudes to the 
post-conflict dispensation” (Robins, 2013, p. 47). In this case, then, bottom-up 
is understood as affecting the legitimacy gap identified in the previous sections. 
The solution offered to unsettle the primacy of western forms of knowledge rests 
in identifying those forms of agency, knowledge and expertise that are said to 
have been alienated and marginalised (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575). In particular, 
                                                             
7 For a comprehensive overview of the debate between linear and non-linear knowledge 
production informing research in peace-building, see Verkoren (2008). In particular, Verkoren’s 
analysis explores literature on the link between research and policy, examining a shift towards 
“a more complex view that emphasises a two-way process between research and policy” (2008, 
p. 92). 
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the everyday needs of these marginalised agents are the focus of bottom-up 
approaches that replace the rigid, institutional top-down logic, focusing on the 
local to rethink the parameters of peace-building (Mitchell, 2011). The ‘local’ is 
spatialised and identified with both the geographical location of the recipient 
population of peace-building (that which is opposed to the ‘international’), as 
well as being embedded in forms of agency that are identified according to their 
resistant qualities, and to their non-mainstream, informal (see, for instance, 
Kraushaar & Lambach, 2009, p. 1) and often non-liberal nature. 
Critiques suggest that moving away from liberal hegemony is not merely 
a question of a practical change of strategy, but requires a far deeper and more 
fundamental de-centring of the foundational ontology of orthodox peace, along 
with the unsettling of the epistemological primacy of certain overarching meta-
narratives. What is called for is a fundamental rethinking beyond the ‘structural’ 
liberal framework (Shinko, 2008, p. 474), a conceptual and theoretical re-
assessment of the key assumptions behind the project (Lemke, 2002; Richmond, 
2010a) ⁠. This requires a different ontological framing of actors, which can be 
more reflective of the variety of agency as well as facilitate mutual 
accommodation and the rise of political communities (Bliesemann de Guevara, 
2010, p. 121; Boege, 2012) ⁠, and a basic re-conceptualisation of the relationship 
between the international and the local, not on the basis of a “dichotomous 
binary” (Sabaratnam, 2011b, p. 260), but on a dialectical understanding of the 
relationship between formal and informal (Richmond, 2011a)⁠. 
Here, the bottom-up, localised solution is offered as a stark opposition 
against the ‘fictional’ representation of the local provided by liberal peace-
building. Oliver Richmond’s work is essential to the local turn’s claims 
regarding the possibility to frame peace-building beyond the fictional 
representations of the liberal peace. Richmond, in fact, suggests in particular the 
need to reconceptualise peace-building in theory, beyond positivist approaches 
that are claimed to have done little to interrogate the subject of peace-building 
and state-building (2008b, p. 450). Richmond’s concern for the epistemological 
faults of liberal understandings of peace-building is evident in his denouncement 
of the liberal belief that all knowledge is replicable, confirmable and 
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implementable, which he suggests is no longer adequate to the provision of a 
broad and comprehensive understanding of peace (ibid, p. 450). 
He also indicates problems with the ontological assumptions of the 
liberal meta-narrative, essentially tied to an endless replication of narrow truth 
or ‘mimetic’ representations of an imagined reality, without paying sufficient 
attention to breadth and depth of subjectivities (ibid, p. 450). These 
epistemological and ontological orthodox assumptions are claimed to be 
responsible for the creation of a fictional peace, based on western myths 
regarding the local recipients of peace, as on liberal ‘idealised’ understandings 
of democratisation, statehood (Shah, 2009, p. 31) and the rule of law (Peterson, 
2010, p. s34). The everyday, thus, is presented as a realm that not only exposes 
but also opposes the fictional and arbitrary constructions operated by the liberal 
peace. The everyday is qualified as a more authentic field of agency, vis-à-vis 
forms of knowledge that have been biased towards the west, and that do not 
necessarily prioritise the needs of the locals beyond what are perceived to be 
western liberal understandings (Robins, 2013). The liberal peace, it has been 
suggested, has been driven by a global discourse of rights wherein the only 
understanding of ‘local’ is dictated by elites and other groups speaking on behalf 
of victims of conflict. What this suggests, Robins claims, is that the rights that 
post-conflict peace-building tries to establish, even when they are geared 
towards the local, are modelled on a perception of what the victims of conflict 
need, rather than coming from the victims themselves (Robins, 2013, p. 48). 
Furthermore, speaking in regard to liberal peace-building in Sierra Leone, East 
Timor and the Ivory Coast, Newman notes that an “apolitical model of peace 
building can miss the reality on the ground and fail to create conditions 
conducive to durable stability” (2011, p. 1741). These accounts thus imply that 
the liberal project is responsible for establishing a virtual image of peace based 
on misleading and western-centric views, and crucially, that there are non-
hierarchical, locally sourced behaviours and actions that do represent the 
‘reality’ of the local, in its most authentic and least imaginary form. This reality 
on the ground, it is then suggested, is accessible through the focus on the local, 
allowing, as Tadjbakhsh suggests, “a new conception of peace-building that is 
more locally authentic, resonant, and agential, to emerge” (2011, p. 7). Moving 
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beyond the framework that dominates orthodox approaches to the study of peace 
is necessary, according to Richmond, in order to open up radical avenues of 
research and offering “multiple ontologies of peace” (2008b, p. 454). 
The need to access the everyday in order to counter and replace top-down 
with bottom-up represents the belief that an ‘organic’ peace requires the 
emergence of a perception of ‘real’ as opposed to ‘virtual’ politics (Hughes, 
2009, p. 240), closer to the populations affected by the interventions. This is not 
simply a matter of consultation, but a much more fundamental re-scripting of the 
roles of the actors involved, a diverse ontology of peace. Here, the notion of 
‘organic’ peace takes centre stage; since the critiques of the liberal peace 
associate the previous approach with fictional and ‘virtual’ outcomes, this 
implies the existence of a truer, more ‘organic’8 realm from which a better form 
of peace can be attained, and one which can be accessed through bottom-up 
processes with the purpose of unsettling the dominating predispositions of the 
liberal paradigm, which has so far failed to help “alleviate local grievances and 
supporting organic, indigenous structures” (Oksamytna, 2011, p. 106). 
The realm of the everyday is attributed several qualities, as will be seen 
below, although it is usually coherently identified primarily by its stance vis-à-
vis the liberal peace. Despite the different terms employed to qualify the 
everyday (e.g. the ‘mundane’, the ‘hidden’, the ‘marginalised’, the ‘local-local’, 
the ‘authentic’), what local turn perspectives have in common is the portrayal of 
a social plane of agency and meaning that can be accessed, and indeed should be 
accessed, to engage with local realities and concerns beyond the mere realm of 
‘high’ politics and institutional set-ups (Pouligny, 2006; Pugh, 2009; Richmond, 
2009b, 2010b; Scott, 1985) and beyond the intransigence demonstrated by the 
liberal peace (Shinko, 2008, pp. 487–9). The everyday realities on the ground, 
Richmond claims, have one crucial critical function in that they expose the, 
…liberal peace project [and] its general tendency to harvest power 
and resources for politicians, officials, experts, and institutions. This 
forms a liberal discourse that removes individual and societal agency 
                                                             
8 For specific references to the use of ‘organic’ in relation to indigenous and local processes of 
peace and state formation, see for instance Krause & Jütersonke (2005, p. 451) and Mac Ginty 
(2008, p. 145). 
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at the expense of empathy and care, and therefore of a sustainable 
peace. […] The net effect is the displacing of community, culture, 
identity, and welfare in favour of external discourses of expert 
knowledge. These are tinged by their own ideology, culture, and 
interests. The everyday, empathy, and care therefore unsettle liberal 
institutions rather than merely confirming them, but add additional 
dimensions and sensitivities and the ontological dimension that they 
imply (2009a, p. 575). 
Accessing this more ‘authentic’ realm of everyday agency is thus espoused as 
the best method to obtain the non-linear approach necessary to appreciate the 
contingency and complexity of different forms of agency. This is opposed to the 
inflexible ‘fictional’ understandings of the liberal peace that have so far handled 
the difference of the conflict milieu by relying on practices of 
inclusion/exclusion, dealing with the local mostly, as Richmond notes, in binary 
terms of assimilation or resistance. Richmond in fact suggests that liberal peace-
building as a dominant order then attempts to deal with everyday needs and 
actions by strategically ‘domesticating’ these (2009a, p. 572) in order to make 
them fit into the binaries provided. A different, non-linear appreciation of 
everyday actions and behaviours would, however, understand ‘the everyday’ as 
a realm of malleable and ‘tactical’ forms of agency that would normally be 
encumbered by ‘hegemonic institutions’ representing the order, but whose 
material reality remains plural in nature, full of potential and an effective and 
undeniable reality. Indeed, this reality may be quite open to engagement (even 
by the liberal order and its agents) precisely because of its malleability and 
accessibility, although this would not really be a problem, as it would be the 
expression of a more genuine form of hybrid interaction that would be, in any 
case, closer to ‘locally imagined’ realities (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 572–3), free 
from the forcefulness of the teleological drive of a purely liberal-driven peace. 
The notion of the everyday then enables a shift away from linearity and 
universality in that it is presented as a starting point to overturn the hegemonic 
tendencies of orthodox understandings of peace. Oliver Richmond’s use of the 
‘everyday’ stems from an adaptation of Michel De Certeau’s notion of the 
everyday,9 used specifically to move peace-building away from a focus on the 
                                                             
9 Richmond uses De Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactics to discuss everyday 
agency. In De Certeau’s writings ‘strategy’ is the type of manipulation exercised by agents of 
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institutional trappings of power, to a more fluid understanding of micro-level 
behaviours and actions through which populations take ownership of and affect 
the processes of governance to which they are subjected. “This re-appropriation 
through the everyday then becomes a site of politics and represents a move from 
subjects to active citizens, from de-politicisation to self-government and self-
determination” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571). Meera Sabaratnam underlines the 
importance of everyday practices by suggesting the need to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue with the subjects of the peace-building; Sabaratnam, whilst 
outlining how orthodox IR approaches have been unable to go beyond the strict 
and often stereotypical roles of the actors involved, pushes for a deeper analysis 
of what has otherwise been called “the realm of the ‘mundane’”. This, she 
explains in the context of a study of Mozambique, could shed light on the impact 
and outcome of international practices on the local realities (Sabaratnam, 2011a, 
p. 799). Similarly, Alison Watson invites her readers to look beyond traditional 
political expressions and to explore the agency of the ‘everyday activist’ even in 
its smallest act of resistance that may, otherwise, go unnoticed; she points to 
examples such as fibre arts and mothering as important social elements of 
expression, resistance and agency that have important roles in the transformation 
of certain divided societies (2012, p. 50) on an everyday life basis. In these 
accounts the everyday is ‘accessed’ by looking beyond the formal and 
institutionalised into the fluid exercise of power through ordinary actions. 
Ultimately, meaningful engagement with the ‘everyday’ is said to require 
a fundamental ‘paradigm shift’ (Pugh, 2009, p. 79) that would also open debates 
on a post-hegemonic world order (Cox cited by Pugh, 2009, p. 79). The 
everyday, in these accounts, is valued as a realm of complex interconnectedness 
beyond the rigidness of the categories applied by linear perspectives such as the 
liberal peace, and their binary identification of actors and their agendas. The 
complexity of the everyday is usually identified in already existing hybrid 
relations (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012, p. 4), forming everyday political and social 
                                                             
modernity in order to identify and isolate the subject of power and to exercise scientific and 
strategic rationalisation to create clearly identifiable identities, fields, and knowledges to 
exercise power over subjects. Tactics, on the other hand, are juxtaposed as actions that counter 
the rigid borders and boundaries imposed through an external rationality and thus results in fluid 
and malleable expressions of agency (De Certeau, Jameson, & Lovitt, 1980, pp. 5–6).  
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local realities. Indeed, it is suggested that the everyday is, in itself, a terrain of 
shifting loyalties and identities (Scott, 1985, p. 22), a space of interplay between 
hybrid identities that allows for the agency of local actors to take shape and 
operate; nowhere, it is argued, is the political life of the subject more evident and 
lively than in ‘everyday’ struggles and modes of life of the local actors. In peace-
building the everyday becomes a point of contact to engage local actors (from 
disenfranchised groups to elites, from subaltern to what Richmond calls the 
‘local-local’ or the local agents beyond the stereotypes generated around the civil 
society) (Richmond, 2009b, p. 331). The hybrid everyday would shed light on 
the, ‘unscripted conversations’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 234), unexplored needs, 
‘infrapolitics’ (Richmond, 2011a, p. 18), intentions and strategies of a wider 
variety of local actors beyond the elites typically engaged by the liberal peace 
(Belloni, 2012, p. 31). 
Overturning the hegemony of the liberal peace requires also identifying 
forms of agency that express themselves primarily against said hegemony. As 
such resistance is often referred to as a crucial expression of the everyday, both 
in its function of countering hegemony and in its dynamic function of producing 
agency. The point of contact between the everyday and resistance is most notably 
identified as the transformative value resistance that seeks to replace 
misconceptions and avoid romanticisation and stereotypisation. Resistance 
speaks to the malleability of the everyday in that it is said not to require public 
organisation to be effective. “Efforts do not have to be public, organized, formal, 
or unambivalently intentional to qualify as resistance” (Riessman, 2000, p. 122). 
Often, said expressions of resistance “can be seen in even the smallest activities” 
(ibid, p. 122). Furthermore, resistance may also not necessarily be wilfully 
organised, and forms of unconscious resistance have been identified, which are 
of great relevance to scholars in order to acquire a different understanding of the 
ways in which problems are conceived by international and local stakeholders. 
Where, for instance, resistance has been identified in the case of Northern 
Ireland’s riots, graffiti and damage to the pockets of peace created by the 
internationals, this has not been primarily an attempt to raise a conscious issue 
against the liberal peace and its agents, but can be read as a form of discontent 
against the existing attempts to resolve the conflict, by accepting local discontent 
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as a form of raising awareness regarding a different perception of the stakes of 
the conflict, of what matters and what the problem at hand is (Mitchell & Kelly, 
2011, p. 321). Resistance thus represents the everyday on its atomic level, and 
in particular it concerns the transformative quality of the everyday that translates 
recalcitrance, dissent or even de-politicisation into a useful and tactical 
expression of agency. 
The atomic, informal and fragmented quality of the everyday gives it its 
unique non-linear analytical function.  In the local turn, the appreciation for the 
complexity of the local and the everyday marks the end of linear and universalist 
understandings of conflict. Critiques oppose this form of top-down governance 
by suggesting that the ‘everyday’ is a realm of messy contingency that is almost 
natural and as such not subjected to the imposition of linear cause-effect 
relations. This sets it in a position to oppose the linearity and universality of 
liberal paradigms (Robins, 2013, p. 51). Indeed, critics have suggested that 
because of the complex nature of social relations, peace itself cannot be a linear 
process (Bush, 2004, p. 41; Castañeda, 2009, p. 237; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003, 
p. 256; Lederach, 2003, pp. 30–31). Indeed, scholars have specified that the post-
conflict milieu itself does not follow a linear logic, nor do conflicts (Jabri, 2007, 
p. 21). Mac Ginty, in fact, specifically suggests that since indigenous or local 
realities do not share western “sequential notions of time it is unsurprising that 
traditional societies found, and still find, Western versions of peace alien” (2008, 
p. 149). At best, without paying attention to the realities of the local context, it 
is suggested, peace-builders would be unable to fulfil the requirements of the 
society they are meant to represent (Chatterjee, 2004; Migdal, 1994). More 
crucially still, an acknowledgment of the relevance of local everyday practices 
places significant limitations on the linear understanding and management of 
post-conflict contexts: “At best, understanding will always be partial, 
contingencies will play havoc with linear notions of cause and effect and 
predictability will be at low levels.” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 24). 
Furthermore, contingency and movement are fundamental aspects of the 
complex milieu, where identities are not fixed (Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008) 
and multiple communities and networks exist, interact and overlay “without 
necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea” (Richmond, 
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2008b, p. 457). As a result, accessing the local necessarily requires an approach 
that does not limit itself to reproducing universalised ideals, to applying cause 
and effect calculations or to rely on blueprint and lessons learnt, but rather 
requires an appreciation of said complex webs of relations that may be dependent 
on actions, circulations and events that are nearly untraceable, as “non-linear 
interactions […] spontaneously result in self-regulating behaviour through 
complex feedback systems” (de Coning, 2013, p. 4). Thus, overall, the end of 
linearity and the emergence of the contingent and the everyday has one important 
implication for governance and for peace-building in that it signals the end of 
assumptions regarding the possibility to predict and prescribe policy 
interventions to ‘fix’ conflicts. 
This is then an evolution from the fuzzy understanding and instrumental 
appreciation of the complex conditions of the post-conflict operated by previous 
critiques (as outlined in Chapter 1), in that it signals a definite break with the 
previous paradigm (liberal peace) and acknowledges the impossibility of 
exercising governance from the top (or through cosmopolitan and global 
solutions that do not originate in the immanent and complex realities of the local 
‘everyday’), or to understand building peace as a linear, causal effort to building 
governance. The complex reality acknowledged by critical perspectives on 
peace-building can no longer be ‘grasped’, as it is perceived as a social plane 
where ideas and identities interact and overlap in ways which defy formal 
control, within the realm of the everyday. This, Richmond suggests, is a matter 
of operating at the level of the everyday as the ontological space within which 
the quality of freedom exists. In this context, the emergence of the everyday is 
also the emergence of self-government, and the end of top-down regulation. 
This, in turn, is taken by Richmond to signal the end of liberalism’s claims to 
universality and instrumental mastery of society: “self-government, rather than 
top-down regulation may be taken as a critique of political liberalism’s grand 
interventionary strategies on behalf of others” (2010a, p. 201). 
The everyday is, therefore, an ‘alternative space’ (Richmond, 2010b), a 
locus of contestation, the ground upon which the roots of agency sprout, a place 
of hybrid encounter and, in Foucauldian terms, it is the ‘naturalness’ of the 
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complex milieu within which power is exercised fluidly and takes different 
expressions. It is a realm of contingent materiality, visible in physical forms of 
resistance and in the hybrid encounters between international and local, but it is 
also, arguably, an abstracted realm which has not fully been accessed by peace-
builders, and lies beyond the instrumentation, manipulation and fictional 
understandings of the liberal peace. It is ‘truer’ and more ‘authentic’ by 
implication, particularly when it is opposed to the fiction of the liberal peace. 
The everyday, however, has yet another important role; as argued below, 
the emergence of the everyday not only signals the end of top-down governance 
and an important shift towards fluid, pluralising and fragmenting forms of 
power, but that through it, the local turn has been embraced as the next step in 
the conceptualisation of peace-building. Bottom-up approaches to peace-
building frame local agency as existing within this ‘authentic’ and ‘organic’ 
realm which, arguably, hints at the presence of an undeniably ‘natural’ quality 
of the population subject to peace-building. The question of what to do with this 
agency is a central issue of concern to the local turn as it enables yet another 
shift, I argue, towards a form of power akin to biopower in its rejection of 
absolutist and totalising power and in its reliance on the real and ‘natural’ 
attributes of the ‘everyday’. 
4. Biopower & the Local Turn 
The following section draws out the significance of the emergence of the notion 
of ‘everyday’ for the re-conceptualisation of peace-building. The critique of the 
liberal peace operated by the local turn is one that seeks to change not just the 
way in which peace-building is carried out, but the very epistemological and 
ontological premises that form the corpus of knowledge employed in thinking 
about peace. Moving towards the everyday has been proposed as a practical as 
well as a theoretical move away from frameworks that either reproduce liberal 
governmentality, or are tainted by western ‘virtual’ and fictional understandings 
of the local, its needs and its expression. When earlier accounts coming from the 
neo-institutionalist camp acknowledged the problems with the liberal paradigm, 
the solutions were, however, framed by the critique as still liberal and ‘more of 
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the same’. The difficulty of governing complex post-conflict realities is 
acknowledged only insofar as governance needs to be diffused and fragmented 
to operate more efficiently. This critique I advanced earlier is also shared by 
some post-structuralist scholars of the local turn, with the sole but important 
difference that these post-liberal perspectives attribute such refinement in the 
techniques of power to govern directly and mainly to the coherent liberal peace-
project. 
Because of this sense of intentionality, sparked by the identification of 
the hegemony of the liberal project, critiques suggested an ontological and 
epistemological move away from the liberal peace, a declaration of the need to 
end absolute control and lack of legitimacy (Lemay-Hébert, 2013). This requires 
a form of pluralisation that is said to differ consistently from that operated by the 
liberal peace paradigm. “Liberal peace-building is an interrupter device that 
slews political momentum towards pluralism and representation with the 
objective of legitimating itself as a cosmopolitan process and the institutions it 
emphasizes as a means of achieving peaceful politics” (Roberts, 2013, p. 83). 
The shift to the everyday is then aimed at countering absolute control and lack 
of legitimacy by renouncing these cosmopolitan processes as not grounded in 
everyday realities, and calling for an ontological restructuring. 
This ontological restructuring, I have suggested earlier, is consistent with 
a preference for non-linear approaches that call for the fragmentation of 
governance to avoid the rigidness of linearity. If the critique of liberal peace-
building is aimed at declaring the end of a type of top-down governance that has 
so far only created a wide gap between the local and the international and 
perpetuated the hegemonic objectives of the liberal peace, and if the critique has 
then called for the emergence of a paradigm that can embrace the contingent, 
blurry, and indefinite nature of the social and the political, then a question 
emerges regarding the persistence of the framework of intervention within which 
peace-building continues to be enclosed. Where I have suggested in Chapter 1 
that disciplinary approaches to peace-building did not jettison interventionism, 
this is arguably understandable given the fact that many of the solutions offered 
engendered calls for ‘more’ engagement rather than less. Yet, while the local 
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turn’s explicit attempt is to question the very project that leads liberal peace-
builders to engage in social engineering (as well as the outcomes), it is possible 
to question why such fundamental ontological ‘revolution’ did not eschew the 
question of the need to intervene per se. 
Examining the emergent power at play in the local turn may bring 
forward some issues of governance that the local turn itself is subject to, which 
may also, in turn, shed light upon what the local turn’s project of ‘accessing’ the 
everyday means for peace-building in general.  Here, I argue that a link can be 
made between biopower and the local turn. Since peace-building does not escape 
the issue of governance and as such is fundamentally tied to the problem of 
managing populations, what is at stake in the identification of the ‘everyday’ is 
arguably consistent what Foucault suggested in relation to the emergence of the 
‘milieu’ as a problem of governance in the 17th century. By milieu Foucault 
identified the complex realm within which actions occur and circulate. The 
milieu is a pragmatic realm of naturally occurring social as well as biological 
and physical phenomena (births, deaths, famine, disease, conflict) that are 
complex and interconnected to the extent that they defeat the linear and causal 
knowledge employed to govern them (Foucault, 2007, p. 36). 
The relevance of this to peace-building and to the local turn can thus be 
explained; if what is at stake is circulation, as Foucault suggested, then the notion 
of everyday posited by advocates of the local turn is also one that has to do, 
fundamentally, with circulation and relationality, particularly as it focuses on 
pointing out the limits to governing on the basis of cause and effect, and of linear 
understandings of social interactions (2007, pp. 36, 93). In Foucault’s study of 
governance, the relevance of the complex nature of societies was instrumental 
in the emergence of a new form of power to govern populations, particularly in 
contexts where a particular problem, such as disease or famine, brought forward 
the limits of existing methods. Where individuals could no longer be seen as 
legal subjects that would simply absorb and react to top-down edicts, but had to 
be acknowledged to be complex entities bound to the materiality within which 
they exist in complex and often untraceable ways, a different type of power 
developed to govern over populations that could no longer be assumed to be 
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controlled from the top-down. Foucault suggested that such acknowledgment of 
the complexity of the social generated a shift first from the sovereign power to 
rule, to the power to discipline populations at the individual as well as collective 
levels, and later to a form of power, biopower, which addressed the body of the 
individual to govern populations as living organisms. Biopower was a response 
to the innate natural quality of human beings which, when combined, made it 
impossible to predict not specific events or crises but the inevitable ‘natural’ 
potentiality of the same (e.g. death, natural disasters, disease, etc.) (Foucault, 
2007). 
It is important to note that elements of biopower are not ignored by 
critical approaches to peace-building in particular. In fact, some scholars - 
particularly those informed by Foucauldian analyses - have also suggested that 
elements of biopower are still present in the way in which peace-building and 
development support is carried out and conceptualised, even after shifts towards 
partnership and local ownership. For many, this is mostly evident in the way in 
which liberal understandings of conflict as abnormal led to peace-building 
following a therapeutic logic in the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
particular (Campbell, 1998; Chandler, 1999; Duffield, 2010; Pupavac, 2001). 
Others have suggested that the fragmentation of power has enabled liberal 
governmentality to employ biopower in order to access the lives of the subjects 
it seeks to regulate, and that this is particularly evident in the ways in which both 
development as well as security have targeted the biological and natural elements 
of the populations. For instance, Shapiro suggests this is evident in the rise of 
biometrical approaches to intelligence and surveillance of the war on terror 
(2004, p. 165). Audra Mitchell’s exploration of the ‘everyday’, too, specifically 
targets issues of biopower, suggesting that the immanence of the everyday may 
make societies more open to bio-political manipulation: “the penetration of the 
basic elements of daily life – survival, hygiene, social structure, and behaviour, 
for instance – is one of the bases of bio-political control” (2011, p. 1631). 
What many of these perspectives have in common, however, is the 
suggestion that these elements of biopower originate in the liberal project of 
hegemony itself. It is then often reiterated that biopower enables liberal 
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governmentality. Mark Duffield, for instance, discussed the development agenda 
of the 1990s as one that sought to “transform the dysfunctional and war-affected 
societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, 
especially, stable entities” (2001, p. 11). The transformative aspect of 
development and peace-building are framed, thus, within the larger plan of 
providing a distinctively normative direction to the new global order of the post-
war era. This view is also espoused by other Foucauldian approaches to 
development and peace-building, focusing, in particular, on drawing out the 
methods, techniques and apparatuses employed to expand the liberal system. 
Disparate forms of methods are then attributed to the liberal actors’ project of 
controlling zones of conflict. These methods range from techniques designed to 
establish partnerships to promote the infiltration of liberal governmental power 
in recipients societies (Joseph, 2012), to techniques of individual “empowerment 
and citizenship” (Dean, 1999), bio-political forms of control that are focused on 
the regulation of the life, reproductive ability, and death of subjects (Rose, 2001). 
At the international level, they also include the establishment of a global network 
of surveillance through liberal institutions such as the UN (Debrix, 1999), or the 
establishment of human-centred discourses such as ‘human rights’ that frame 
interventions as ‘saving others’; these ultimately create a further sphere of 
intervention, global and transnational in essence, but one that still employs 
juridical and political instrument to order the life of the subjects (Jabri, 2007, p. 
187). These accounts share, in common, a focus on the liberal interests that lurk 
behind all these methods and ultimately provide a telos that binds the most 
disparate techniques and apparatuses in the pursuit of it. 
These approaches do not, as Chandler suggests, critique the liberal basis 
for interventionism per se, but rather focus on critiquing the liberal endgame that 
drives interventions and peace-building (2011, p. 177), namely the attempt to 
perpetuate the enlargement of liberal and neo-liberal systems and maintain the 
hegemony of the liberal way of life. Furthermore, the analysis of biopower in 
terms of biopolitics remains quite limited to an identification of the point of 
origin and exercise of said power, and its instrumental role in enabling liberal 
actors’ vision of social transformation through instrumental intervention in 
societies. Seldom is biopower examined in itself as a constitutive force, as a pre-
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existing quality of the ‘everyday’ and thus as a form of power that can be 
manipulated and used by multiple actors in multiple ways,10 thus rendering its 
association solely to the liberal system cumbersome and limited. Indeed, these 
approaches seldom question whether elements of biopower could be found in 
alternatives provided by perspectives that consider themselves post-liberal. 
When they do, these are still grouped within the label of liberal 
governmentality.11 
Many scholars have conflated the governmentalisation of biopower at the 
domestic level with the workings of biopower at the international level (Debrix, 
1999; Finkelstein, 1995). For example, Vivienne Jabri argues that the processes 
at play internationally represent a form of domestication of governmentality at 
the global level; the author takes the example of post-conflict reconstruction to 
suggest that “what we witness in practices of intervention associated with state-
building is the culmination of the governmentalisation of the state rendered 
transnationally” (2007, p. 126 my emphasis). What this indicates is that a simple 
translation of the discourse of domestic biopower and governmentality may also 
work, in parallel, at the international level.  Indeed, the lure of associating 
biopower with the ‘liberal peace’ might be understandable. Foucault did, after 
all, refer to biopower as a particular strategy employed by western modern 
states.12 Nonetheless, it can be suggested that insofar as biopower is a technique 
                                                             
10 For an examination of this, it is necessary to go beyond the peace-building debates where the 
subject has been dealt with in a more insular manner. Accounts of biopower coming from 
political theory, such as Lemke (2001, 2002), and Coleman and Grove (2009) offer greater 
insight into the preconditions for biopower, its expressions and possibly its employment by 
different approaches and paradigms.  
11 Julian Reid’s recent contribution to a volume on state-building can be considered a notable 
exception to this trend. Reid’s work, in fact, warned against ignoring the potentiality of any 
narrative to become hegemonic, whatever its provenance (2014), suggesting, much like 
Foucault’s own work did, that because of the heterogeneous nature of power and biopower in 
particular, most narratives in their attempt to subvert the hegemony of a meta-narrative are also 
expressing their own desire to become hegemonic by replacing the orthodoxy. In this sense, all 
narratives, when they struggle, aspire to replace the other in a struggle for power, “in effect, 
between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual 
linking and a perpetual reversal” (Foucault, 1982, p. 794).  
12 He does this particularly in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), where he expands on the notion of 
biopower elaborated in Security, Territory and Population (2007) to focus mostly on liberalism 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 21). In Security, Territory and Population, he rather vaguely defines 
biopower in theoretical terms and within the modern context of its emergence, which is 
connected to the salience of the problem of population. This was engaged with by western liberal 
countries in the 18th Century, tied to both the emergence of the Enlightenment movement, the 
progress of science and the particular history and development of European monarchies and the 
manner in which these ruled over the land (2007). Biopower in itself is loosely described as a 
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of governing that has as its object populations, it is also possible to suggest that 
identifying the emergence of biopower does not necessarily rely on pointing to 
liberal intentionality, nor does it require centring the discourse of governance 
only around the liberal paradigm and its perceived goals. Insofar as it has been 
argued in Chapter 1, section 3, that ‘western’, ‘liberal’ and ‘peace-building’ may 
not necessarily be so easily identified as a coherent paradigm, it is also possible 
to suggest that the emergence of biopower is primarily a problem of governance, 
rather than an issue to do principally with liberalism, and thus is a question that 
does not escape critical approaches to peace-building. 
However, focus on a coherent international liberal governance plan may 
be questioned particularly because Foucault’s own work, whilst undoubtedly 
revolving around liberalism, was however centred around the internal working 
of domestic governance apparatuses of western liberal states rather than an 
exploration of the much more complex webs of social and political elements that 
make up post-conflict international peace-building. Indeed, in the case of peace-
building, the apparatuses of governance cannot be reduced to the state unit, 
requiring an appreciation of the mechanisms of governance that cannot rely on 
the simple identification of a singular, coherent point of origin of power. In 
addition to this, the mechanisms responsible for the foreign policy decisions that 
make up the missions construed as part of the liberal peace are substantially 
varied (see Chapter 1, section 3) and may represent variations on the liberal 
theme, which may make the attempt to identify a singular ‘liberal’ hegemonic 
drive inconsequential at best. 
Furthermore, even if one were to accept the existence of a coherent 
liberal peace paradigm, it would be problematic to identify it as the origin and 
only point of extension of certain types of hegemonic power. Foucault himself 
warned against identifying power as coming from a singular, particular source 
                                                             
technology of power that has its origins in liberal states, but retains epistemological and 
ontological rationales that are more widely associated with positivism and modernism (and 
therefore, arguably, not only limited to political liberalism but potentially to other ideologies and 
political systems that employ modernist methodologies to understand the world and govern over 
it). The exploration of biopower and its potential in itself is later foregone in favour of a focus 
on biopolitics (a concept which is, for instance, much more referenced in I.R. approaches to 
peace-building than biopower).  
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(2007, p. 16).  Despite the focus on modern western societies, he also warned 
against seeing biopower as a theory of power per se. Foucault, in fact, pointed 
out that,  
…if we accept that power is not a substance, fluid, or something that 
derives from a particular source, then this analysis could and would 
only be at most a beginning of a theory, not of a theory of what power 
is, but simply of power in terms of the set of mechanisms and 
procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when they 
are unsuccessful, of securing power (2007, pp. 16–17)  
Indeed, insofar as the issue of governance is a modern issue, it may still be 
possible to suggest that it may not necessarily be an exclusively liberal issue and 
may, thus, apply to other paradigms that work on a modernist logic, beyond the 
‘liberal’ one. 
I will, for the time being, set the critiques of liberal governmentality 
aside, to focus on biopower as it concerns the local turn’s own contentions. The 
emergence of the naturalness of the everyday framed as opposed to the rigid 
interpretation of the social provided by the liberal peace seems to bring forward 
agency as the innate natural quality of human beings, existing beyond the direct 
control of those who want to govern it. Prima facie¸ the declaration of the 
existence of the ‘everyday’ and ‘authentic’ would seem to signal a final 
departure from the previous paradigm and the end of top-down, linear and 
universalist paradigms of peace-building. However, acknowledging the 
existence of an authentic ‘everyday’ realm may inadvertently place the 
emergence of biopower in the position not to abandon the will to govern, or to 
question universal framework of governance in themselves, or even to question 
the relationship between legitimacy, authority and governance. Since these 
approaches are not, arguably, free from dealing with the issue of governing, that 
is with the establishment mechanisms and procedures whose main aim is to 
secure some form of power, then it is possible to suggest that the manipulation 
of biopower might not be an exclusively ‘liberal’ tendency, as scholars of 
governmentality have dedicated themselves to study. 
Indeed, just as the turn to discipline did not question the need for peace-
building interventions, so the focus on the everyday did not fundamentally lead 
to a re-conceptualisation of interventionism, since the very need for peace-
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building interventions is not questioned.13 The fragmentation of governance and 
the emergence of biopower, then, does not represent the cessation of an 
aspiration to govern, as much as it embodies an attempt to refine the mechanisms 
of governance to target the individual, not as a rational entity, but as a living 
organism, and the collective, not as the sum of its parts, but as a complex 
organism whose functioning may not really be traced but whose potentiality for 
failure was always present.  
The end of top-down governance suggested the need to focus on 
operating at the very molecular level of individuals and societies, by addressing 
those ‘natural’ and untraceable qualities that held so much potential for failure. 
Thus, just as Foucault’s analysis turned to the emergence of bio-political 
solutions aimed at addressing issues such as mortality and reproduction to 
manage demographics in booming modern societies, one could suggest that a 
similar shift is evident in the emergence of paradigms that focus on ‘everyday’ 
forms of agency, concerned in particular with harvesting and embracing the 
natural qualities of the subjects of peace-building. These qualities are not only a 
conscious reaction to the hegemony of the liberal peace (such as resistance), but 
they are also innate characteristics that may be expressing themselves 
unwittingly and without previous organisation (such as resilience to conflict, or 
forms of urban resistance found in the graffiti-making of Northern Ireland (see 
Mitchell & Kelly, 2011) ); these forms of agency need to be accessed, valorised, 
listened to and used to build up not the predictability potential, but the ability of 
                                                             
13 Some critics problematise the very possibility or need to initiate peace-building interventions. 
Cunliffe brings forth the paradoxical relationship between external state-building and the sources 
of domestic legitimacy (2007), Jeffrey Herbst, on the other hand, argues against interventions to 
save some weak states as these should have never been granted the status of state, suggesting 
state failure to be a natural process of the modern cycle of state construction and destruction 
(2004). These perspective are not included in this analysis as they do not advocate the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building from the bottom-up and, as such, do not encounter the 
paradox of having to pluralise the knowledge on peace-building whilst at the same time not 
rejecting peace-building interventions. Without exception, recent attempts to rethink peace-
building towards the local imply the need to address conflict, as they frame their research within 
the larger aim of conceptualising more efficient, and ‘better’ approaches to peace-building. 
Scholars such as De Coning, Aoi and Thakur (2007), and Popolo (2011), who have recently 
employed pragmatic and radical post-modern approaches such as complexity theory, also avoid 
more substantial engagement with the need of peace interventions or indeed the uncomfortable 
fit between the will to avoid asymmetric and hierarchical relations and the very asymmetrical 
and hierarchical nature of foreign interventions.  
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the subject to bounce back in the face of potential threats that cannot be 
controlled or predicted, such as conflict or natural disasters. 
Where I argued that the previous shift identified in Chapter 1 attempted 
to grasp the complexity of the milieu through extending disciplinary power 
mechanisms to enhance and multiply exposure to such complexity in an attempt 
to grasp the bigger picture, it is possible to suggest that the local turn seeks to 
further embrace the naturalness of the milieu by declaring the need to accept the 
existence of the ‘authentic’, the ‘local local’ and the ‘everyday’ as a limit to 
forms of governance with a telos. The difference is, however, that where 
discipline operated in a realm that is near reality, biopower claims to operate 
within reality itself, or what is called the ‘everyday’, just as Richmond notably 
suggested that accessing the everyday requires operating at the level of society 
(2010a, p. 201). The ‘natural’, undefinable and ungovernable nets of connection 
and circulation that tie individuals to each other and to the materiality that 
surrounds them comprise the social and the political everyday realities of the 
post-conflict and these, it is implied, can no more be governed by cause and 
effect calculations, than could the modern cityscapes found in Foucault’s 
analysis. 
The emergence of biopower does not, therefore, mark the end of peace-
building itself, but rather emerges as a form of power that enables the local turn 
to target specifically this issue of the complexity and ‘ungovernability’ of the 
naturalness of the population. To deal with the fragmentation of governance, 
Foucault suggested, this new form of power emerged as a, 
…set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of 
the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a 
general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 
eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the 
fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species (2007, 
p. 16).  
Importantly, Foucault suggested that the emergence of biopower did not put an 
end to the existence and exercise of older types of power, including disciplinary 
and sovereign (top-down) rule (ibid, p. 22). The impact of this claim on the shift 
towards the local is central. One could, in fact, argue that the turn towards the 
local did not signify a complete abandonment of disciplinary methods nor of the 
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rationale that lead to the identification of the post-conflict as a site of illegalities 
that need to be prevented, addressed and cured, but that the claim to access the 
potentiality of populations, the naturalness, the realities, the needs and the 
everyday concerns of the populations, made the power to govern more effective, 
if less visible. 
Arguably, it is precisely the qualification of the everyday as a more 
authentic, truer reality beyond the artifice that allows biopower to be used as a 
means to ‘access’ such realms of complexity. Access, here, is the operative word. 
Despite the fact that, as will be seen in Chapter 4, it is somewhat unclear how 
these critical perspectives suggest to valorise and embrace the complex nature 
of the social and the political, it is still possible to identify certain elements of 
normalisation that puts biopower to work in a way which, whilst renouncing 
absolute power, top-down governance and teleological solutions, is still not 
giving up on the will to peace-build and thus, to intervene. When questions of 
autonomy, agency and asymmetrical relations of power are critiqued without 
changing a core assumption – intervention – that has fundamentally to do with 
such questions, then the critical value of the local turn is overshadowed by a 
paradox. The adaptation of the seemingly contingent and non-linear concept of 
‘everyday’ then becomes quite open to exercises of governance, particularly 
when ‘accessing’ the everyday is framed as a project of reaction to the liberal 
peace paradigm, and is accepted as a normative necessity. In such cases, as will 
be seen in Chapter 4, ‘everyday’ practices are constructed as being more 
‘authentic’ than the perceived liberal fiction – the contours of which are 
identified by the critique itself – as such, the ‘everyday’ is not a contingent 
reality, but is embraced as a normative, idealised goal-oriented policy aspiration. 
Therefore, it is possible to question the extent to which the local turn may 
be free from its own potential to generate or influence the emergence of forms 
of governance that contain their own processes of norm formation, normalisation 
of societies, subjectivation and the consequential outcomes of marginalisation 
and exclusion of certain narratives.  As of yet, no current critiques of the liberal 
peace, including those that draw on Foucauldian governmentality critiques, have 
extended such questioning to the foundation of the local turn itself. Notably, I 
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do not wish to suggest that the local turn may be extending a form of power that 
is consistent with liberal hegemony, and that the local turn is symptomatic of yet 
another shift in liberal governmentality, but rather, that this type of power, with 
its associated effects on the subjects and on societies, is not the exclusive remit 
of any ‘liberal paradigm’ per se, and that to limit the critique to an eventual 
‘liberal peace’, may result in an uncritical belief in the benevolent nature of the 
new paradigm that could potentially obscure the mechanisms of power inherent 
within the local paradigm itself. These mechanisms will be explored, with 
particular emphasis on the processes of normalisation and subjectivation, in 
Chapter 5. For now, it is sufficient to raise awareness of the presence of an 
important shift whereby, despite the call for the end of top-down governance, 
the local turn has, however, identified a solution that has not signalled the end 
of peace-building or indeed even problematised the need for interventions. 
Indeed, the fact that the problematisation that gives rise to the need of 
intervention is left out of these re-conceptualisations of peace-building, may be 
sufficient ground on which to raise questions regarding the nature of the shift 
towards the local. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the contemporary shift in the conceptualisation of 
peace-building by focusing on critiques comprising the local turn. Following 
attempts to break with the intransigence of linear perspectives and informed by 
post-positivist and critical theories, critiques emerged in the mid-2000s with the 
intention of identifying and displacing what was perceived to be the foundations 
of a hegemonic project of liberal peace promotion. The critique’s concern for the 
hegemonic power of the liberal peace, in particular, has produced a coherent 
vision of a project whose understanding and approach to peace-building are 
construed as limited and damaging to the heterogeneous expression of agency in 
recipient societies. Given the unfavourable record of liberal peace-building, the 
solutions offered raised the need to acknowledge the limits of top-down, 
universalist and imposed solutions, declaring the impossibility to impose any 
form of governance without doing damage to the complex nature of the post-
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conflict context and the consequential impossibility to rule by cause-and-effect 
and according to linear understandings of conflict and peace. 
Previous theoretical as well as policy attempts to expand existing 
frameworks of peace to include the local in the form of partnership or local 
ownership have also been addressed by the critique as being at best rhetorical 
and inconsequential, and at worst, as attempts by the liberal paradigm to expand 
its hegemony by employing methods that rely less on coercion and more on 
consensus. These critiques in particular have identified forms of liberal 
governmentality in projects of partnership, and have also claimed that theoretical 
frameworks coming from the scholarship of the early 2000s are insufficiently 
stepping out of the liberal paradigm. What has been offered to counter such 
hegemonic projects of the liberal peace has been a fundamental re-
conceptualisation of the ontology and epistemology of peace to avoid 
reproducing the fallacies of the liberal peace paradigm. These efforts have 
focused particularly on replacing top-down with bottom-up in order to fragment 
governance and diffuse power. Critical approaches to bottom-up peace-building 
have been particularly adamant regarding the end of universal solutions and 
causal reasoning, and have offered the need to access the realm of the ‘everyday’ 
practices that have meaning beyond the fictional and mythical representations of 
it provided by the liberal peace. 
This shift to the local, it has been argued, is consistent with a deeper shift 
that has allowed the emergence of biopower, a set of mechanisms that have the 
population as its object and centre, and that seeks to reject ready-made solutions 
and teleological approaches to governing populations, by harvesting the innate 
‘naturalness’ of the social in all of its complex, interconnected qualities. Yet, it 
has also been suggested that the shift to biopower should not merely be seen as 
an extension of liberal governmentality itself, but rather, that this form of power 
(along with others, discipline included) may also be advanced within the critical 
and post-liberal paradigm, and that to confine the critique to the liberal paradigm 
may centre the discussion too much on liberalism and not sufficiently on 
governance itself. Furthermore, the chapter has suggested the need to enquire 
about the significance of this shift, questioning the extent to which the 
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emergence of biopower has not signified a more fundamental questioning of 
interventionism but has rather still been framed within the necessity of peace-
building interventions.  
In the next two chapters, I will continue questioning the extent to which 
this shift has sufficiently been able to influence the formation of multiple and 
different ontologies of peace.  The next chapter will discuss how, despite calls 
for avoiding the ‘romanticisation of the local’, the re-conceptualisation of peace-
building in Kosovo has only been framed as a solution entirely dependent on 
liberal peace-building as an object of critique. This solution has thus been created 
and advanced against the liberal peace instead of in spite of it, and, as a result, 
attempts to access the ‘everyday’ retain a particularly arbitrary form of selection 
which is not too dissimilar from the very rationale the local turn initially raised 
objections to.  
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Chapter 3 
Reflections on Kosovo: 
Shifting Discourses and Paradigms of Peace-
Building 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the case of Kosovo to illustrate the shifts outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2. This chapter does not focus on the conflict in Kosovo itself, 
but rather mostly reflects on the way in which Kosovo has been used to frame 
different approaches to peace-building. It is argued that Kosovo has been central 
to the framing of the need to re-conceptualise peace-building, thus also largely 
reflecting the two abovementioned stages of the creation of the critique of the 
liberal peace. Where, for instance, the establishment of the peace-building 
mission in itself is symbolic of the shift from minimalist to intrusive, disciplinary 
forms of peace-building, particularly in light of both neo-institutionalist and 
cosmopolitan support for the deepening and extension of a multifaceted mission, 
it is also argued that the latter stages of the mission have also been instrumental 
for the setting up of the local turn’s critique of the liberal peace as a shift towards 
the end of top-down governance of post-conflict territories. The fifteen year-long 
intervention in Kosovo and its by-products, outcomes and paradoxes, are 
identified by the scholars of the local turn as signs of the limitations of 
universalist and top-down liberal peace-building. Through a lessons-learnt 
debate on Kosovo, in particular, a few more elements are added to the host of 
problems under the label ‘liberal peace-building’. These include the lack of 
accountability to local stakeholders, the rising frustration caused by the lack of 
an exit strategy, and the marginalisation and alienation caused by a merely 
rhetorical engagement with the local which is said to hide behind ‘partnership’ 
a more fundamental inability and unwillingness to hand over authority and 
autonomy to local actors. As a whole, the case of Kosovo is a relevant example 
of the construction of the ‘liberal peace-building’ paradigm as an object of 
critique, and of the consequential identification and selection of legitimate 
agency at the basis of the new critical paradigm. 
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The chapter discusses the relevance of Kosovo for the shifts in the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building beginning with the first section on the 
emergence of disciplinary peace-building. The first section suggests that the 
widening and deepening of the post-conflict mission in Kosovo is consistent 
with the shift towards a more comprehensive form of peace-building born out of 
the need to understand and tackle as many aspects of the conflictual milieu as 
possible. This shift generated justifications and legitimisation for the more 
invasive form of peace-building witnessed in Kosovo since 1999. The second 
section discusses the critiques to said muscular forms of intervention, by 
reflecting on the relevance of Kosovo for the emergence of the later shift, the 
local turn. The section argues that critical approaches assessed the record of 
peace-building in Kosovo with the liberal peace’s perceived hegemony, 
strengthening the critique of the liberal peace paradigm, and offering the 
problems witnessed on the ground as evidence of the need to move beyond 
linear, liberal and top-down approaches to peace-building and towards locally 
produced solutions. The final section then suggests that the realm of the 
everyday, in Kosovo, is associated largely with resistance to the liberal peace, 
both as a project of raising awareness of alternative narratives of peace, as well 
as an acknowledgment of the contingent realities of the local that defeat the 
stereotyping operated by the liberal peace paradigm.  
The identification of the everyday with resisting agency, I suggest, 
begins to outline traces of selective engagement with agency that may, as a 
result, be problematic for the critical turn’s own objectives of a radical, non-
linear, re-conceptualisation of peace-building. Indeed, the chapter ultimately 
argues that ‘localisation’ could paradoxically become the very problem that the 
bottom-up approaches sought to resolve. Just as previous disciplinary forms of 
power enabled the observation and understanding of the polity’s behaviour 
aimed at regulating its productive functions, peace-building ‘from below’, may 
inherently facilitate the manipulation of the contingent qualities of the 
‘everyday’ in order to enable the observation of collectives and individuals. In 
this case, the local turn runs the risk of being a merely symbolic reversal of the 
roles within an unchanged modernist framework of assumptions regarding 
societies and their functioning.  
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1. Kosovo: Towards Disciplinary Peace-Building 
The shift to intrusive peace-building in Kosovo was perceived to be a necessary 
step to respond to what were identified as limited and minimal approaches to 
resolving complex conflicts. The solutions, framed on a lessons learnt basis, 
quickly involved external actors, in a mission that was deemed to be substantially 
different from anything experienced before, involving a plethora of actors, 
methods and strategies aimed at tackling the construction of peace on a number 
of different, non-linear levels. The establishment of a state-building mission, and 
the embedding of Kosovo within larger international and transnational networks 
represented a form of deeper and more extensive attempt to control problem-
affected polities, in a manner which unites both supporters of institution-building 
as well as cosmopolitans around a comprehensive and multi-layered 
approach. ⁠To understand the logic of the shift towards more invasive forms of 
peace-building it is important to briefly examine the manner in which the early 
critiques of peace-building framed the need to create a more inclusive approach. 
The shift from minimalist to intrusive peace-building is firstly evident in 
the very establishment and nature of the peace-building mission in Kosovo. 
Following a bombing campaign that began in March and ended in early June 
1999, the allied forces negotiated an agreement for the retreat of Yugoslav 
military and para-military groups from the territory of Kosovo. On the 10th of 
June 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, mandating the 
deployment of a UN-led force to support the repatriation of the refugees whilst 
“performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required” (United Nations Security Council, 1999).  Through the establishment 
of a mission whose primary function was not to firmly and resolutely express 
itself on the singular issue of the sovereign status of the territory, but rather to 
set up a multilateral and multi-layered external presence to support the 
attainment of substantially autonomous self-rule, Kosovo became an institution-
building mission that focussed on the development of a corpus of norms and 
values attuned to international principles of human rights and multiculturalism. 
Furthermore, the resolution itself deeply entrenched the future of the polity in 
extensive global networks, highlighting elements of a transnational nature such 
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as the regulation of refugee returns, the establishment of human rights provisions 
and unimpeded access to humanitarian and aid organisations. The rapid 
development and branch-like extension of the mission in Kosovo demonstrated 
just how fast the shift towards deepening and widening interventions took place 
in policy circles, just as surely as it also brought together the concerns of both 
cosmopolitans and neo-institutionalist scholars. Scholarship engaging with the 
chronology of Kosovo’s ever expanding mission identify phases or generations 
in order to explain the methods employed and the aims sought. King and Mason, 
for instance, identify ‘four distinct phases’ that, according to them, best 
exemplify the “changing relationship between the mission and its local 
counterparts” (King and Mason, 2006, p. x). Other scholars, including Douzinas, 
also identify two distinct phases to suggest a shift in US foreign policy ideology 
from Clinton’s cosmopolitanism to Bush’s imperialism evident in Kosovo’s 
embodiment of the security/freedom interventionist nexus (Douzinas, 2007, 
p.147).  
Kosovo has been considered to be the embodiment of “a progressive 
shift” in the international community towards strategies of peace-building and 
state-building (Lemay-Hébert, 2012, p. 468). The generational approach to 
categorise the chronology of the Kosovo mission has been employed in order to 
explain the emergence of new actors as well as the employment of diverse 
methods. In Kosovo, Ernst compares the period between 1999-2005 in Kosovo 
suggesting that whereas the first period was marked by negotiations, shifting 
patterns of consensus, and generally what the scholar considers to be a state-
building endeavour as a 'deeply political process', the second period is rather 
marked by the initiation of the status process in 2005, seem to represent, for the 
scholar, the disappearance of politics from the negotiations, with a distinct 
preference for diplomacy as carried out between the countries of the 'Quint' (a 
contact group made up of the foreign ministers of Italy, UK, USA, Germany, 
and France) (Ernst, 2011, p. 133).   
 Generational accounts of Kosovo frame the chronology both as a factual 
account of different actors and methods, as Bieber does in relation to outlining 
the strategies employed by the EU as a state-building actor (2011). A 
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generational categorisation of the mission, furthermore, is also more crucially 
relevant as a tool that enables a fundamental shift in the conceptualisation of 
peace-building, born out of a reflection of what are construed as increasingly 
insufficient approaches. For instance, Florian Bieber notes a general shift in the 
practice of state-building away “from direct intervention to conditionality” 
(2011, p. 1791) born out of considerations to do with the impossibility to 
reconcile impositions with democratic governance, as well as with the rise of 
local dissent through unfavourable political groups such as Vetevendosje, a 
decisively anti-external intervention political party.  Malte Brosig also notes a 
shift from ceasefire peace-keeping types of engagement with post-conflict 
territories towards more complex state-building missions, in particular due to 
heightened importance of institutional cooperation in peacekeeping missions, 
thus noting that the manner in which international institutions operate within a 
mission in a post-conflict territory now presents more awareness of the need for 
a more comprehensive and wholesome approach to integrate all the efforts of 
different actors (2011, p. 185).  
In general, these approaches do not limit themselves to outlining existing 
shifts in Kosovo; it can be argued that in the theoretical re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building, reflections on the case of Kosovo has also been instrumental in 
making the shift possible. The categorisation of the mission in Kosovo along 
clearly delineated generations is also responsible for the creation of new 
approaches by presenting the limits of previous perspectives and calling for the 
need to deepen the engagement, as is the case with perspectives that call for the 
need to engage with NGOs on the ground to meet the demands formerly ignored 
by previous, strictly institutionalist approaches (see also Knudsen, 2006, p. 159)  
Whilst this chapter discusses shifts and changes in the manner in which 
Kosovo has been conceptualises, it does not seek to suggest that its chronology 
can, or indeed should, be so easily categorised and rigidly understood. Instead, 
the chapter suggests that these generational approaches carry out a discursively 
productive role, in that they construct an evolving narrative concerning Kosovo 
that presents the solutions purported as natural outcomes of a progress of 
development in peace-building conceptualisation and practice. Instead, where 
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shifts are identified in this chapter, they are understood as a reflection of the 
scholarship’s engagement with Kosovo, rather than as ‘factual’ categorisation of 
methods and means. This exploration of shifts and ruptures then becomes an 
analytical engagement that can enrich our understanding of how Kosovo has 
been become instrumental to framing new ways of thinking about peace-
building.  
Kosovo has, in fact, often been referred to for the purpose of identifying 
fallacies, lacunae and notable insufficiencies in previous approaches to peace-
building, from the inability to tackle the conflict by leaving the question of 
Kosovo out of the Dayton peace accords (O’Neill, 2002, p. 22), to the failure to 
address the regime responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and 
elsewhere in the region (Booth, 2001, p. 3). Kosovo has also been used by the 
critical perspectives of the mid-1990s, to point to other notable insufficiencies, 
including the inconsistency of the framework of humanitarianism and its reliance 
on state-centrism. Perspectives advocating for the rise of transnational 
governance, for instance, suggested that whilst Kosovo evidenced a consistent 
pattern of state erosion, the solutions thus far had only met this issue with a type 
of humanitarian advocacy framed only as a ‘corset’ around what remains an 
essentially realist understanding of foreign policy interactions (Habermas, 1999, 
p. 268). ⁠ 
From perspectives displaying a preference for institution-building, 
Kosovo was also symptomatic of an insufficiently comprehensive approach to 
the management of conflicts. Earlier approaches to peace-building are said to 
display limited understanding of the structural problems that lead to conflict. 
This is claimed to be evident in the way in which local stakeholders are 
beginning to reject the “(violently) homogenised imaginings of political space” 
that gave birth to claims regarding the origins of ‘ancient’ ethnic hatreds (Devic, 
2006, p. 270). A deeper understanding of the conflict itself is said to be 
conducive to a more comprehensive and successful mission. These perspectives 
advocate a wider, more inclusive approach to display a more comprehensive 
knowledge and thus more inclusive solutions to the issues presented by these 
warring societies. As La Cava et al. note with regards to ensuring the extension 
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of the reach of peace-building to all groups of the recipient society, “successful 
results and best practices should be mainstreamed and scaled up to cover the 
entire spectrum of needs” (2000, p. 78 my emphasis). This is partly a matter of 
consultation as, in fact, many neo-institutionalist perspectives suggest 
recognising the value of understanding the logic behind the agendas of the 
warring parties, before being able offer solutions that can encourage leaders to 
recognise the benefits of peaceful resolution of grievances (Covey, 2005). This 
requires employing strategies that require the peace-builders to accommodate 
their agendas through compromise both amongst international actors with the 
purpose of avoiding duplication of tasks (Brosig, 2011, p. 200) and, more 
importantly, with local actors. This was done within a framework that provided 
for the local as a result of the need to limit the resistance of local actors and 
encourage their cooperation (Narten, 2009, p. 270). 
The need to deepen the understanding of the post-conflict milieu had the 
notable outcome of not necessarily focusing the discussion on the tensions 
created by the presence of competing claims to authority (i.e. Serbia, the 
Kosovo-Albanian political elites, the international transitional authorities). 
Instead, the discussion was firmly centred on the need to set the post-conflict 
effort on as wide a basis as possible. The primary concern in Kosovo was, in 
fact, not necessarily the establishment of a strong state, but a strong and multiple, 
horizontal governance framework that could act as a panacea for a variety of 
issues, including the protection of individual rights, the provision of 
infrastructures, and the extension of toleration and cooperation across different 
groups in the polity (see: Chesterman, 2004; Cocozzelli, 2006; European Agency 
for Reconstruction, 2002; Krasner, 2004). The framework provided to engage 
with post-conflict Kosovo was then multi-layered and multilateral, aimed at 
building capacity to govern, without necessarily qualifying the nature of 
governance itself. This capacity is grounded in wide and multiple apparatuses of 
governance, one which is indeed historically tied to a territorial notion of state, 
albeit consistently less strict on how authority is exercised, what mechanisms 
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generate and cement legitimacy, or what other networks of governance exist in 
lieu of the state.1 
In Chapter 1, the overlap between the two seemingly different schools of 
thought was explained as being a function of the need to grasp the complex 
nature of the post-conflict context, as of the need to respond with an equally 
complex and multi-dimensional approach. The concern over the procedural 
aspects of making this happen is what brought the two schools closer together, 
in particular coalescing around the extension, in width and depth of engagement, 
casting the net as far as possible to deal with as many issues as possible (and in 
the process, diminish the need to rely on a strictly Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty as unbound autonomy). The literature on Kosovo also reflects this 
concern, suggesting that the ability to control, manage and rule over the potential 
dangers coming from warring polities, was framed as being dependent upon a 
much more complex engagement than the minimalist approaches employed in 
previous missions could offer (Blair, 2002, p. 7; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; 
Stroschein, 2008, p. 656). The post-conflict peace-building mission in Kosovo 
was set up not merely as an option, an alternative, but as a necessity, to make 
sense of the conflict, and increase the opportunity to normalise relations in 
problematic societies in a more efficient manner. This implied that other 
previously employed methods could no longer be considered viable, beginning 
with the imposition of a ‘victor’s peace’ (see Richmond, 2005, p. 25), and 
continuing with the extension of privatisation packages (Knudsen, 2013). 
Within this move away from minimalist to more intrusive approaches to 
peace-building one could also identify another important element. The need to 
engage with more nuanced and comprehensive understandings of the conflicts 
gave way to the horizontal expansion of the governance framework, framed in 
                                                             
1 The absence of the state, in the case of Kosovo, was the constitutional precondition for 
autonomous rule. As such, Kosovo was never truly a ‘state-building’ mission to begin with, and 
the institution-building measures taken were more geared towards building a diffused form of 
governance rather than being strong, centralised structures of government. Unlike Bosnia, then, 
the mission in Kosovo was uniquely framed in a way which represented the most temperate 
expressions of neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan perspectives, namely an internal governance 
structure (self-governing authorities) embedded in larger international and transnational 
networks (UN and EU, as well as the wide variety of transnational non-governmental 
organisations employed in extensive governance provision projects all over Kosovo since 1999).  
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terms of finding “the proper mode of governance” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 213) and 
establishing a more “inclusive, participatory and holistic security 
transformation” (see Dudouet et al., 2012), operated to grasp a fuller image of 
the conflicts that peace-building was addressing. This is arguably consistent with 
a more fundamental move away from employing coercive power to fix conflict. 
This shift then represented a move away from the ‘spectacle’ of peace 
interventions,2 and towards a more efficient form of involvement, that starts with 
an appreciation of lessons learnt (for instance, in Bosnia) and ends with a 
seemingly more reflective, conscious and inclusive form of engagement based 
on a productive form of power, disciplinary power.3 
The move towards more subtle and comprehensive forms of peace-
building has been theoretically fleshed out in Chapter 1; nonetheless one could 
look at the manner in which this took place with relevance to the case of Kosovo, 
particularly as it concerns the transformation of the methods employed in peace-
building to reflect the emergence of mechanisms that relied less on coercion and 
forcefulness, such as the very violent spectacle of militarised peace operations. 
The transformation of these practices enabled the emergence of apparatuses that 
relied more on a softer form of power, more consistent with discipline than with 
coercion. Indeed, this shift is visible in the depictions of Kosovo as a more 
‘reflective’ form of engagement, wary of flexing the muscle whilst being 
continuously sure of both the moral grounding of its argument and the need for 
multi-layered international intervention.4 Here, a useful comparison between 
                                                             
2 I draw on Foucault’s work on punishment (1991a) to indicate ‘spectacle’ as an ensemble of 
apparatuses, methods and actors aimed at identifying and punishing ‘abnormal’ behaviour 
through modes and practices that largely appeal to sensationalisation, grandeur and visual 
impact. These methods are designed to imprint a strong image of the crime-punishment nexus, 
through an almost artistic and spectacular enactment of the ritual of punishment. Muscular 
military interventions, such as the bombing campaign in Kosovo and the Gulf War, are such 
forms of punishment against the abnormal conduct of politics that leads to conflict and 
widespread violence.  
3 This can also be seen in the shift advocated by cosmopolitans from the self-justified muscle-
flexing of the West in Kosovo, to a more nuanced and reflective form of cosmopolitan rights 
regime, grounded in the global civil society, as outlined in Habermas' perspective, earlier. It is 
also evidenced in both scholarly and policy concerns of avoiding the hydra-headed structure of 
the Bosnian mandate (Fukuyama, 2011). 
4 Several accounts of the months before the intervention refer to policy-makers’ acknowledgment 
of the potential political crisis that military intervention might cause, particularly due to the 
Vietnam Syndrome, to memories of Somalia and to public concerns over deploying military 
force yet again (Tatum, 2010). Signs of this form of self-reflectivity can be found in scholarly 
cosmopolitan accounts of humanitarianism, such Habermas’ condemnation of NATO’s methods 
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Kosovo and Bosnia can be made. Despite the seemingly common moral dilemma 
guiding the core of humanitarian advocacy in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the 
depiction of the intervention in Kosovo as a worrying, problematic decision, 
paraded particularly by policy-makers’ tendencies to articulate the moral 
conundrums, inner turmoil and doubts prior to the decision to intervene,5 seems 
to indicate a different rationalisation of peace intervention. Douzinas, for 
instance, suggests that the missions initiated in the mid-1990s were indicative of 
the power of spectacle, that is, a mixture of “warlike fantasies, police action and 
law” that provided the missions with a normative backbone to back up the 
interventions both at home and internationally (2007, p. 249). Sörensen, too, 
agrees that the bombing of Yugoslavia represented a display of western power, 
an element that superseded the need of “disciplining evil dictators” (2002, p. 2).  
The reflectivity witnessed in the rhetorical endorsement of engagement 
in Kosovo, seems to indicate a reliance on less muscular, less coercive forms of 
peace-building, and a concern for the long-term implications of the plan, also 
mirrored in the scholarly debates on Kosovo. Chesterman, for instance, 
embodies this trend by asserting the need to establish an extensive, albeit clear, 
post-conflict mission unlike the hydra-headed mission of Bosnia (2004, p. 132). 
Zisk Marten (2004) and Paris (2010) reiterate the importance of avoiding 
policies that may draw comparisons with imperialism and colonialism, whilst 
others point to the need to streamline the mission by avoiding the mistakes made 
in Bosnia (International Crisis Group, 1999). Likewise, from the beginning of 
the mission in Kosovo the concern for including local stakeholders was deeply 
                                                             
and rationale (Habermas, 1999), and in more orthodox liberal internationalist understandings of 
conflict management, such as in Kofi Annan’s famous expression of concern for the paradoxes 
of ‘humanitarian bombing’. Other recent, normative approaches such as those supported by 
Buchanan and Keohane also express concern over NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, suggesting 
the need of a more inclusive coalition (Buchanan & Keohane, 2004, p. 19; Murphy, 2007, p. 
198). None of these expressions of reflectivity, arguably, display any sort of doubt or question 
the basic assumption that intervention is necessary beyond showing what could be seen as a 
concern over the mere procedural aspects of making the approach more efficient. 
5  This is quite evident in the rhetoric of both Clinton and Blair’s addresses to the public and the 
parliament respectively, shortly before the intervention, e.g.: “Now, I want to be clear with you, 
there are risks in this military action, risks to our pilots and the people on the ground […]” 
(Clinton, 1999); “Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our Armed Forces? I’ve 
thought long and hard about that question [...]” (ibid); “I say this to the British people. There is 
a heavy responsibility on a government when putting our forces into battle, to justify such action” 
(The Guardian, 1999).⁠ 
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entrenched both in the policy discussions,6 and in the scholarly accounts 
outlining the need to work with the pre-existing and fairly extensive local 
structures (La Cava et al., 2000) and to “capitalize on the popularity of the 
moderates among the Kosovar Albanian community and involve them more 
directly in the peace process” (Chesterman, 2004, p. 208) (for an account 
discussing the importance of acknowleding the breadth of the pre-existing 
structures in Kosovo, see Clark, 2000). 
Arguably these accounts suggest that there are significant limits to what 
peace-builders can do, and how far they can govern over the conditions on the 
ground. Zisk Marten suggests that Kosovo has so far demonstrated that “no 
matter how noble our intentions, we face limitations in our capabilities and in 
the effects that our actions can have”, adding also that “instead of trying to 
change societies, we should change our expectations” (2004, p. 165). This seems 
to imply the beginning of the acknowledgment of the limits of top-down 
governance, which has substantive implications for the claims that the local turn 
will make later. In particular, it suggests that impositions and coercions are no 
longer viable options. However, it is also possible to note that the publicly-aired 
parading of doubt, along with the scholarly discussions regarding the limits of 
homogenous and monotonous forms of top-down power, and the need to employ 
a more complex approach to peace-building did not suggest that the shift away 
from coercion was to represent also the end of peace-building, or of the 
unfaltering belief in the ability to know and govern what cannot ultimately be 
linearly foreseen. Instead, as suggested in Chapter 1, this shift facilitated the 
framing of new intrusive approaches as a need born out of the very 
acknowledgment of the limits of the previous approaches. Thus, one could 
possibly see this display of concern and reflectivity as more indicative of the 
need to cast the net of control further by economising the strategy of 
                                                             
6 Discussions on the relevance of local needs in divided societies were very much present in the 
early stages of policy-making in Kosovo. Consultation on the value of decentralisation as a 
conflict assuaging policy was centred in fact around the need to give space to local agendas, to 
give locals “a government they can understand and control” (Ebel & Péteri, 2007, p. 13). 
Scholarly accounts on decentralisation in Kosovo, too, have long discussed the need to learn 
from Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland in particular, to apply a comprehensive and 
holistic approach to devolving power to the local level; in this respect, see Brancati’s assessment 
of decentralisation vis-à-vis conflicts of an ethnic nature (2006). 
115 
 
 
involvement. By projecting a reflective, thoughtful acknowledgment of 
contingency and complexity, it is possible to re-frame the parameters of 
intervention without, however, removing the drive and normative imperative to 
know, control and govern the unforeseen. 
Despite the multipronged approach, struggles such as those evidenced in 
Kosovo, are still understood as needing to be managed and prevented. For 
instance, where Narten suggested that early approaches in Kosovo exemplified 
a preference for short-term projects that caused “externally prolonged 
dependency” (2009, p. 267), the scholar then recommended the extension of 
“longer-term cycles of local capacity building” (ibid, p. 278 my emphasis), 
associating the length of the commitment with the quality of the governance 
promoted and thus, with the lessened likelihood of engendering weak basis and 
continued dependency. The prevalence of short-term goals of maintaining order 
has, Ernst concurs, generated “fuzzy governance” rather than long-term goals of 
democratisation or the establishment of human rights regimes (2011, p. 127). 
Conflict understood as the expression of an ‘illegality’, an abnormality, 
a straining from the common understanding of expression, representation and 
interaction within polities and amongst subjects, leads to the unsurprising 
framing of governance as a need to control and rein in the illegality. This is 
proposed both as an inevitable deduction as well as a social imperative. The need 
to prevent the potentiality of conflict, i.e. the recurrence of violence, is in fact 
constantly declared in accounts related to Kosovo. For instance, in relation to the 
tenuous partition resulting from the geographical decentralisation, Newman 
argues that, 
…Kosovo provides a lesson that will appeal to sectarian extremists. 
[…] It clearly has negative, and potentially destabilising, 
implications for minorities within ‘new majorities’ and the danger of 
ever more ‘ethnic security dilemmas’, for example the remaining 
Serbs in Kosovo after the latter’s declaration of independence (2009, 
p. 35 my emphasis). 
The potentiality here is given as almost pre-existing, and then further 
exacerbated by the previous approach employed. The discussion, however, does 
not preclude that the potentiality for conflict is there, associating the possibly 
homogenised status of ‘remaining Serbs in Kosovo’ with the violent potential 
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attributed to them by what appears to be an essentialised and ethnicised 
understanding of the conflict. Calls to employ differing and pluralist methods 
are then framed as a need to address the potentiality of conflict, thus, arguably 
reinforcing the view of intervention as a given. 
A reluctance to rethink the problematisation of the need to peace-build is 
evident in the lack of deeper discussion of the content of self-determination and, 
particularly in the case of Kosovo, of the tension caused by establishing local 
autonomy within a vague framework of authority. While many accounts in fact 
mention the difficulties spurred by the paradoxical endeavour of promoting self-
governance through temporary external authority (see, for instance: Barnett & 
Zurcher, 2009; Lidén, 2011; Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012), many accounts 
mostly discuss said paradox within a framework that sees said temporary 
suspension of authority as a ‘necessary evil’ (see, for instance: Brinkerhoff, 
2005; Chesterman, 2004, p. 47; Fukuyama, 2005), thus focusing the discussion 
mostly on the desirable length of external rule and the extent of control, rather 
than on the very possibility of establishing and promoting ‘self-rule’ through 
‘external’ mechanisms. 
When the paradoxes of establishing autonomous self-rule externally are 
faced with the potentiality of conflict, the threat of the latter prevails. Questions 
of whether interventions are suitable methods to attain peace, or questions 
regarding the very nature of both conflict and peace, become secondary at best. 
Arguably, this implies that rather than a deeper attempt to rethink the issues of 
concern at the very basis of the governance of post-conflict territories, the multi-
layered mission in Kosovo is more symptomatic of a technical refinement of the 
tools of social engineering: one which disciplines and normalises, just as it 
individualises, fragments power and dilutes governance across horizontal 
networks of actors and agents. 
Thus, an analysis of the content of the re-conceptualisation of peace-
building from minimalist to intrusive indicates not so much a tendency towards 
a deep re-conceptualisation of the deductive logic that leads to the core 
assumptions of peace-building, but rather a focus on the procedures and 
mechanisms, responsible for the correct attainment of the ideal norms regime, 
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the effective and efficient obtainment of the end game: the ‘normalised’ polity. 
What this indicates is, thus, that the final element of commonality amongst these 
scholarly accounts and between them and the policy world, is a procedural 
concern for the need to economise peace-building in Kosovo to avoid the 
mistakes of the past (O’Neill, 2002; Van Meurs, 2004), which results in solutions 
that do not reject or question the need of social engineering, but rather seek to 
create more efficient mechanisms to peace-build better. 
The intervention in Kosovo is not necessarily a shift that demonstrates 
the end of certainty itself, but the beginning of a more contingent, reflexive, ad-
hoc certainty, one which permits, indeed relies on the extension of a disciplinary 
form of power that seeks to administer to the impossible, to control the 
uncontrollable by extending its normative gaze to the ‘prevention’ of multiple 
forms of behaviour, to cater for all possible consequences. This form of power 
concerns itself with the ‘unintended consequences’ that have not yet happened 
in this case, but have seemed to cause a lot of problems in the past (i.e. Bosnia). 
The lessons-learnt approach employed in Kosovo provided the opportunity to 
focus on those ‘unintended consequences’, making it possible to extend the 
control of the conduct of society into the potential future. 
As the mission in Kosovo developed and expanded, and as scholars 
attempted to make sense of the situation on the ground, several critiques, such 
as those I outlined in Chapter 2, began to assess the progress in Kosovo by 
comparing the ethos of the mission to its methods and apparatuses, as well as to 
the extent, breath and length of the peace-building interventions.  These critiques 
soon began to target the structural hegemonic disposition of liberal peace-
building outlined in Chapter 2 as the principal reason for the multiplication of 
actors and projects involved in Kosovo and for the emergence of substantial 
forms of local resistance. I now turn to the emergence of the critique of the liberal 
peace by examining the localisation discourses in Kosovo. Where I have, so far, 
outlined a shift towards disciplinary modes of governing that enabled peace-
building to acquire a distinctively invasive and prescriptive nature, I suggest 
below that Kosovo was crucial to the emergence of bottom-up approaches to 
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peace-building primarily because of the ways in which critical approaches gave 
the meaning of resistance to the forms of agency identified on the ground. 
2. The Limits of Top-Down Peace-Building in Kosovo & the Rise of the 
Local 
The re-conceptualisation of peace-building is operationalised through the rise of 
the local, as discussed in Chapter 2, in a manner which aims to beyond the 
stereotypical and limited approaches to local ownership attributed to the liberal 
paradigm. Kosovo best demonstrates an understanding of the rise of local agency 
that is framed both as a reaction to the practical consequences of liberal peace-
building, as well as an instrument of critique to enable the rethinking of the 
foundations of societies beyond hegemony. 
The authority structure in Kosovo has, in the past 15 years – and more so 
since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 – been the subject of 
extensive critique in the scholarship of peace-building. One of the points most 
frequently made by critics of the externally imposed mission in Kosovo, is the 
inability to fully hand over authority. UNMIK’s continued presence is often 
taken as proof of the inability or unwillingness of liberal peace-builders to face 
the impasse they have been responsible for. From the inability to work out an 
exit strategy (Knoll, 2005), to the reluctance to let go of the reins (Richmond, 
2009a, p. 575), the legal presence of a structure higher than local authorities is 
symptomatic of a number of issues that demonstrate the fundamental 
inappropriateness of the imposed protectorate mission in Kosovo, and more 
generally, the paradox of promoting autonomy through the establishment of 
externally controlled systems of governance. In more general terms, it is 
suggested, the peace-building effort so far has privileged vertical relations over 
horizontal ones, across and amongst local actors (Fawn & Richmond, 2009). 
Authority in this sense is said to be built through methods of state-building that 
do not sufficiently eschew the Weberian understanding of state formation as 
occurring through securing the monopoly on violence, mobilising revenue, and 
providing goods; this understanding of authority, it is suggested, reveals a 
blindness towards the conditions for the emergence of legitimacy to be found, 
Sörensen argues, in already existing local structures and power relations, through 
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which actors choose to compete, ally or contest (2013, p. 269). Kosovo, it is then 
suggested, is evidence of how such a model of peace-building has generated 
“fraught state-building experiences”, questioning the validity of such view of 
authority vis-à-vis outcomes such as predatory political settlements and weak 
statehood (Salmon & Anderson, 2013, p. 42). The authority structures existent 
in Kosovo – for instance the EU Special Representative – are claimed to 
represent only a simulated, arbitrary form of power that has little connection both 
to the politics internal to the institution that issued the mandate (the EU in this 
case) or to the Balkan society subject to it (Chandler, 2014b). 
The dilution of accountability and legitimacy in Kosovo has been 
considered one of the main problems with the extension and diversification of 
modes of intervention. In the critique, it is suggested that the extension of multi-
layered and multi-dimensional missions, has been able to minimise the lines of 
accountability in a manner which has eluded all traceable responsibility 
(Bickerton, 2007; Visoka, 2012a). 7 Generally, it has been suggested, externally 
imposed state-building in Kosovo demonstrates a fundamental fallacy of the 
liberal peace, namely the establishment of authority without the basis of 
legitimacy (Kostovicova, 2008; Lemay-Hébert, 2009; Mulaj, 2011). The 
question of legitimacy, it is suggested in critical accounts, goes far beyond the 
issue of representation and participation as enacted by liberal peace-building. 
Lemay-Hébert, for instance, draws attention to the dangers of privileging a 
procedural understanding of legitimacy-building by focusing all attentions to the 
establishment of democratic political structures; individuals may flood to the 
polling stations, the author suggests, but that would not necessarily say much 
regarding the sources or local understandings of the relationship between 
authority, power and legitimacy, which may be consistently different from those 
held by external actors (2012, p. 475). 
                                                             
7 Visoka calls this ‘Kafkaesque Accountability’. In his research into human rights abuses 
allegations against UNMIK, the scholar suggests the existence of complex, multiple layers of 
regulatory mechanisms and review practices set up to deal with allegations, which the author 
suggests are responsible for the weakening of the right to seek justice through an over-
complication of the procedures for dealing with cases. This, the author suggests, is evidence of 
a systematic attempt to avoid public accountability and transparency (Visoka, 2012a, p. 208 n.1). 
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Critics have also suggested that top-down approaches are responsible for 
engendering alienation and marginalisation of those identities in Kosovo that 
have not been formally socialised within the international normative framework. 
Thus, for instance, it is suggested that the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Turk, 
Gorani, Vlach, Bosniak and Croat minority communities have often been 
marginalised by international provisions (Sigona, 2012, p. 1215; Visoka, 2012a, 
p. 202), if not inaccurately or stereotypically represented (Blumi, 2003, p. 222) 
both in peace-building practice and theory. Furthermore, much attention has 
been given to the sensationalisation of multiculturalism and inter-ethnic 
relationships in the problematic northern areas, whilst insufficient attention has 
been given to the readjustment and development of inter-ethnic dialogue in other 
areas of southern Kosovo (Devic, 2006, p. 261). Women and children are also 
reported as being largely left out of the reconstruction efforts or mainstream 
peace-building conceptualisations, despite both their positive input and their 
potential role in producing civil unrest (Watson, 2010, p. 371). In more general 
terms, the problem of marginalisation is attributed to the liberal understanding 
of the origin of the conflict (the inability to manage difference and to turn 
irrational disagreement into rational peaceful competition, outlined in the first 
section of this chapter), which is claimed to exhibit, as Žižek and Hamza note, 
an inability to understand the context of conflict in Kosovo beyond stereotyped 
and at times racist understandings of ethnicity and difference (2013). 8 
When looking at the record of peace-building in Kosovo, critical scholars 
have indeed acknowledged the existence of a practical shift in the methods 
employed by the peace-builders. For instance, Florian Bieber notes a general 
shift in the practice of state-building away “from direct intervention to 
conditionality” born out of considerations to do partly with the rise of local 
dissent through political groups such as Vetevendosje, a decisively anti-external 
                                                             
8 Indeed, veiled stereotypical views of the Balkans continue to accompany discourses on Kosovo 
coming from the policy world. Ample example of this is the rhetoric utilised in UK Member of 
Parliament and diplomat Denis MacShane’s account of the negotiations in Belgrade after March 
2004:  
I have to say I don’t trust any of them. I don’t believe what they say. Perhaps they 
mean it when they say it but I just don’t think they have any real capacity to deliver. 
I tell them all to work with the Kosovans to find a solution but they hate them with 
a deep, passionate and enduring hatred (2011, p. 80).  
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intervention political party (2011, p. 1791).  Hehir also notes how, by March 
2004, UNMIK was forced to “significantly rethink the resolution of the 
province’s status” (2007, p. 128). The events of March 20049 are depicted as the 
watershed moment at which UNMIK realises the bleak state of the mission and 
a blindness to the state of the affairs thus far: 
UNMIK found itself in a captured peace-building situation with 
respect to the Kosovo-Albanian elite and majority population in the 
aftermath of the riots […] some of the latter being members of the 
parliamentary assembly who openly agitated against UNMIK 
apparently regarded the external peace-building agenda as 
illegitimate (Narten, 2008, p. 382). 
Yet, for the most part, the practical shift is indicated to be little more than a 
response to the need to make do with the realities on the ground. It is thus 
suggested that the turn towards local ownership in the policy world remains little 
more than a justification, consistently tied to a logic of furthering interventionist 
approaches. In fact, as Hehir crucially points out, the phased pull-out strategy 
undertaken as a result of the March 2004 events and embodied by the precepts 
of the Eide Report10 did not signify a call for total international disengagement, 
as enabled more ongoing, direct, international control, by framing a move away 
from Standard before Status not as the last stage of the international presence, 
but as the next (2009, p. 133). He rightly points out how such a strategy of 
                                                             
9 On March 15th 2004, a Kosovo Serb was wounded by allegedly Albanian assailants. The 
following day, Serbs blocked the road to Gjilan and the KLA staged a protest against UNMIK's 
arrest of KLA commanders on charges of war crimes. On the same day, the media reported that 
three Albanian children had been drowned in the river Ibar whilst escaping from Serbs. The 
tensions of the events of the previous two days exploded drastically on March 17th, with 
widespread clashes across Kosovo, in particular in Caglavica and Mitrovica, resulting in 19 
people dead and thousands of Serbs fleeing to neighbouring countries.  
10 In May 2005, Kofi Annan appointed Kai Eide as Special Envoy to the Secretary General, 
tasking him with the compiling of a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, with a 
view to “look at the actual political realities, as well as the formal preconditions for launching 
the future status process on the basis of continuing and effective progress towards 
implementation of the Standards for Kosovo” (United Nations Secretary General, 2005b). In his 
report, Eide suggests that the time is ripe to enter discussions on the status issues, whilst 
acknowledging that although “there will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future 
status […] the time has come to commence this process”. Despite this, Eide does not suggest a 
radical departure from the standards implementation approach, as he reiterates that “further 
progress in standards implementation is urgently required” (United Nations Secretary General, 
2005a), thus maintaining the legitimacy of the contents of such an approach unchallenged, 
reasserting the need for continued international presence, as well as reinstating the importance 
of emphasising the very same areas of development previously highlighted in other documents, 
approaches and strategies from 1999 to 2005 (i.e. human rights, rule of law, returns, heritage 
protection, inclusiveness, accountability, economic liberalisation, etc.). 
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continued involvement signified firstly an inability to return power to local 
actors, and secondly the growing dissatisfaction of local groups with such 
ambiguous and reluctant plans. As a result, Narten suggested, the period after 
the March 2004 riots demonstrated how the external actors on the ground had so 
far been unable to generate momentum, thus limiting themselves to merely 
reacting to local demands (2008, p. 386); local ownership, it is finally suggested, 
remains an ‘empty signifier’ when employed by the policy world (ibid, p. 381).  
The shift towards intrusive peace-building, visible throughout the establishment 
of the multi-layered mission in Kosovo, has been thus critiqued both as a form 
of perpetuation of a liberal plan to establish a distinctively liberal form of state 
at the expenses of a more hybrid ‘shared’ form of sovereignty (Fawn & 
Richmond, 2009) as well as a fundamentally unsuitable framework for the 
understanding of conflict that privileges universal, cosmopolitan and essentially 
non-local ideas and principles and thus is not suitable for accessing the everyday 
needs and realities of the population (Debrix, 1999, p. 115). 
Other forms of ‘local ownership’ such as policy attempts to further 
involve local actors in the decision-making process are also addressed as being 
insufficient. In the case of the establishment of the Interim Administrative 
Council (a body established in 2000 and appointed by the SRSG with the purpose 
of engaging local elites in political negotiations), Lemay-Hébert suggests that 
elites reportedly often complained of decisions being made largely behind their 
backs before consultation (2012, p. 427). What is suggested in critical accounts 
is, therefore, that previous liberal understanding of and responses to local 
realities in Kosovo have fallen short of having a real impact on the everyday life 
of populations partly because they have been imposed, partly because they have 
continued to follow a vertical logic by including elites and excluding other 
possibly disenfranchised or different forms of agency, and generally because 
they represent forms of virtualised, abstracted and stereotyped views of local 
everyday realities (Richmond, 2010b). 
These limited understandings are also present in the literature, as Lemay-
Hébert suggests. The author in fact notes that “the Kosovo experiment stands as 
a useful reminder that the institutional focus, so pervasive in the contemporary 
123 
 
 
literature on state-building, leaves crucial elements out of the equation, such as 
the structural conditions under which legitimacy emerges in state-building 
processes” (2013b, p. 100). The fundamental limitation of linear, universalist 
paradigms – including those that draw on transnational horizontal, cosmopolitan 
approaches – is evident in the crossover with the practice of peace-building. 
Nowhere is this clearer, it is often suggested, than in the gap between local needs 
and international ideals. Critics have suggested that where peace-builders have 
attempted to bring the process of peace-building closer to the people these 
projects have been unable to significantly impact high level decision-making and 
the policies of the UN protectorate (Devic, 2006, p. 257), and have mostly been 
subservient to the goal of building a liberal state and a neo-liberal economy 
(Richmond, 2009a, p. 560). Even attempts to increase the role of civil society 
and NGOs are pointed to as being far from ‘local everyday practices’. In the case 
of Kosovo, for instance, it is noted that the civil society faces extensive pressure 
from western donors and from their ethnocentric views of inter-ethnic relations 
in the region, which bear limited affinity to the reality of everyday interactions 
(Devic, 2006, p. 258). In other cases, it has been suggested, NGOs in Kosovo 
have had limited impact in bringing attention to local issues of concern, 
particularly when these were related to local/international interactions, as in the 
case of NGOs advocating for equal treatment for different ethnic groups from 
international police forces (Chip Carey, 2010, p. 255). 
Thus, local ownership as practised through previous approaches is 
associated with the perceived cultural and political hegemony of liberal peace-
building. This top-down understanding of peace-building is claimed to enable 
the marginalisation and exclusion of sections of the local population from the 
initial governance framework, in order to control the progress of the mission. 
For instance, the inclusion of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
combatants into new political parties and civil society has been said to represent 
a useful method to extend custodial relationships with local elites with the 
purpose of disciplining spoilers (Visoka, 2012b, p. 28). What this has caused, it 
is suggested, is a manipulation of the ambiguous nature of the post-conflict 
transition, both on the side of the international actors and by local elites, to push 
for their respective agendas, leading to a form of path-dependency that has only 
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brought forward closed off politics and fragile structures of representation (ibid, 
p. 28).  The continuous gap and friction between the top-down and the everyday 
forces of the bottom-up have also directly contributed to the creation of new 
paradoxes, amongst which is the wave of popular oppositions against 
international administrations (Lemay-Hébert, 2012, p. 467). Some of this 
resistance originates, it has been argued, in plans to foster local ownership of 
governance such as the decentralisation project. These plans, Baskin has 
suggested, “were not the product of a genuine partnership between international 
and domestic (Kosovar) officials and have encountered a good deal of local 
resistance” (2006, p. 88 my emphasis). 
Resistance here is key, in the case of Kosovo, as it is framed both as a 
material reality of the contingent and complex everyday, as well as a normatively 
sound starting point to reject and counter the unwanted liberal paradigm. Below, 
the next section investigates the framing of resistance as the key to unlocking 
everyday forms of agency in Kosovo. The section suggests that resistance is 
framed both as a response to the liberal peace, but also as a natural quality of the 
everyday subject of peace. Thanks to this framing, the end of top-down 
approaches is met with the instrumental use of resistance as a method to ‘access’ 
the everyday to conceive alternative and non-linear ontologies of peace. The 
practical exercise of ‘accessing’ the everyday through the identification and 
legitimation of certain forms of agency may however present some notable 
limitations to the conceptual objective of non-linearity established by critiques 
of the liberal peace as outlined in Chapter 2. 
3. ‘Resisting’ Everyday Agency in Kosovo 
In Chapter 2, I outlined one of the local turn’s primary aims, that of presenting 
alternatives to the liberal peace as counterweights to the fiction produced by the 
liberal peace, placing emphasis on non-traditional and informal forms of 
political agency in order to upset the traditionally elitist, hierarchical and still 
dominating understanding of ‘partnership’ promoted by the liberal peace 
(Chandler, 2006; Devic, 2006, p. 261).  Here, the realm of the ‘everyday’ can, 
once again, shed light on the significance of the shift and the relevance of the 
emergence of discourses of localisation, in Kosovo. 
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Given the temporal and physical extent of the peace-building mission in 
Kosovo, the local turn seeks to draw out the material conditions of exploitation, 
marginalisation and ‘othering’ that the liberal peace is predisposed to cause (see 
Chapter 2, section 2).11 The ‘everyday’ is then presented as a hybrid reality that 
is more nuanced than the fiction of the liberal peace in that it embodies both the 
‘authentic’ local that Oliver Richmond described, as well as hybrid and co-opted 
realities that the liberal peace seems to be unwilling to own up to (Visoka, 
2012b). This fundamental de-centring and unsettling of what is perceived to be 
the orthodoxy in peace-building begs the question of whether the previous 
unwanted disciplinary tendencies of the liberal peace have indeed been 
abandoned or even displaced. To assess in what way the local turn is different 
from its own object of critique, the following section starts by looking at the way 
in which the local is identified and valorised in Kosovo. It is then suggested that 
a shift has indeed taken place with the local turn, away from the more rigid 
disciplinary forms of peace-building outlined in the previous section. This 
section focuses particularly on resistance as the predominant discursive element 
that enabled the local turn’s call for the fragmentation of governance along non-
linear, complex lines. 
Resistance plays a crucial role in critical scholarly accounts. These often 
begin by pointing to local discontent as the first expression of resistance. Local 
discontent is, in fact, often cited as one of the most common and visible 
outcomes of the continued mission in Kosovo. By 2005, in fact, it is suggested 
that the top-down approach employed by external actors, spearheaded by 
UNMIK, began to backfire, giving rise to pockets of resistance. This is evident, 
Narten notes, particularly in the Kosovo-Serb voting and assembly boycotts, in 
forms of resistance against Steiner’s Standards before Status policy12 on the side 
                                                             
11 Critiques of liberal approaches to international development focus particularly on how a 
western-centric notion of evolution engender grossly misconceived representation of the Third 
World and of non-western societies in general (see, for instance, Spivak, 1988; Kapoor, 2008). 
Critiques of liberal peace-building also draw on this trend, by suggesting that western notions of 
peace are embedded in colonial articulations of other cultures that support supremacy, 
subjugation and domination (Jabri, 2007, p.65). 
12 In August 2003 Harri Holkeri was appointed as the new Special Representative to the Secretary 
General. Under Holkeri’s direction, the Provisional Institution for Self Governance and UNMIK 
drafted a report titled “Standards for Kosovo” in December 2003, with the purpose of outlining 
the standards to be reached in the field of governance before opening up the discussion on the 
status of Kosovo (UNMIK/PISG, 2003). 
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of the Kosovo-Albanian communities, who demanded a parallel ‘Status and 
Standards’ policy, and finally in the rise of armed militant groups such as the 
Albanian National Army (2008, p. 381). Furthermore, rising support for anti-
interventionist movements such as Vetevendosje (Lemay-Hébert, 2013, pp. 91–
95) are also taken to be examples of the opposition amongst the locals to 
continued external authority. Discourses on Kosovo are pregnant with 
meaningful moments of resistance,13 in which local everyday realities find 
representation beyond the traditional channels of authority and representation 
created by top-down, externally imposed vertical structures of power. In 
Kosovo, resistance in its multiple forms has often qualified the very agency of 
the local subject, from the peaceful resistance of the student movement in 
defiance of Serbian oppression  (see, for instance Kostovicova, 2005), to KLA 
resistance against the violence of Yugoslavian paramilitaries and parallel 
education as resistance against marginalisation (Clark, 2000), and to current 
boycotts and defiance methods of Kosovo Serbian resistance against the policies 
of UNMIK and the Pristina local government after 1999 (Gow, 2009). 
In recent times, attention has been given to the role of resistance, whether 
directed at the liberal peace, or in itself, directed at any other form of imposing 
and hegemonic power. In the first case, resistance is identified as an outcome of 
the “unfulfilled promises of liberal peace-building” (Visoka, 2011, p. 124). 
Resistance is also framed as the expression of a material gap between the 
imposing policies of the external actors involved in the liberal peace project and 
local needs and agendas (Lemay-Hébert, 2013b). The hegemonic tendencies of 
the liberal peace are again invoked, where resistance is framed as a form of 
‘political alterity’ that counters the de-politicisation of the reconstruction effort 
of the liberal peace in Kosovo (Pugh, 2011, p. 154). Disappointment with the 
work of the liberal peace-builders is not, however, the only perceived origin of 
resistance. Another one is, in fact, the establishment of additional elements to 
the existing missions, such as the EULEX mission, considered to have been met 
with extensive resistance from Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo 
                                                             
13 Sörensen’s piece on intervention and state-building in Kosovo further identifies different 
forms of resistance in Kosovo: the pacifist, the activist and the militant positions. These also 
imply various expressions of dissent including demonstration, occupations or more militant 
strategies (2002, p. 272). 
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alike because of matters of legitimacy (Sahin, 2013, p. 29). Resistance to the 
liberal peace in Kosovo is seen as taking a different form. Non-participation is 
noted as a common form of resistance, one which has the potential to unlock 
meaning behind a seemingly unproductive disengagement with mainstream 
politics. In the case of the Serb boycott of the elections in Kosovo, for example, 
Mac Ginty has suggested that this is actually a prime example of a political act 
that “can be interpreted as a form of communication at the out-group and in-
group levels. It is worth stressing that the agency involved in principled non-
participation is reactionary and is a response to an agenda largely set by others” 
(2012a, p. 174). Resistance is thus a form of local and ‘authentic’ expression, a 
mode of political participation that is pitted directly against the liberal peace, 
through bringing forth customary or hybrid forms of politics (Richmond, 2009a). 
Beyond the way in which the policy world includes the local in its 
agendas, local forms of resistance are given attention by critical scholars that 
employ them as the starting point of a re-conceptualisation of peace-building not 
just in Kosovo but in more general terms; resistance is taken to signal a meeting 
point between politics, armed resistance and everyday society, united in the 
common effort to change the intolerable status quo (Bekaj, 2010, p. 14; Weller, 
2009, p. 187). What the critique suggests in relation, for instance, to the violent 
events of March 2004, is that these events are indicative of the limits of liberal 
peace-building itself, reflected in the inability to bring the process of peace-
building closer to the people that are affected by it. Lemay-Hébert also notes that 
2004 represented in the statistics on satisfaction with the work of UNMIK the 
lowest ever point, suggesting the March riots to be tied to a fundamental moment 
of local discontent (2012, p. 472, 2013, p. 95). The resistance witnessed in 
Kosovo five years into the mission, was thus associated with a depletion of 
legitimacy born out of the inability to “to actually accommodate local political 
interests” (Narten, 2008, p. 386 my emphasis). This problem bears consequences 
not merely for the resolution of the impasse in Kosovo, but for the wider notion 
of foreign interventions to bring peace. Recurring violence, as understood within 
critical perspectives, is not evidence of the inability of local actors to resolve 
their grievances peacefully or to manage their differences, but rather it is 
associated with the rigid, top-down approach of liberal peace-building. Newman, 
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for instance, suggests that the top-down structure of ‘soft partition’ imposed 
from above is responsible for the potential recurrence of violence in Kosovo 
(2009, p. 35). 
The solutions proposed through localisation, in the literature, are not just 
proposed as material responses to the need to bring the process of peace-building 
closer to the people for efficiency’s sake. Whilst this is, willingly and directly, 
one of the policy world’s driving motivations for employing a policy of 
localisation,14 the critical scholarship places on top of its agenda the need to 
bridge the gap between peace-building and the people, for the people’s sake. In 
other words, by placing the subject at the centre of this re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building, localisation does not want to offer a mere empirical alternative 
to ‘get to Denmark’15 but becomes, in itself, a much more profound method of 
critique through which to bring forward the illiberal, intransigent and 
unbecoming aspects of peace-building so far, to question the suitability of the 
liberal project. Co-option and resistance are then framed as real, often hybrid, 
fragile outcomes of non-attuned processes of liberal peace-building (Narten, 
2008, p. 386) and localisation, as a method of critique, becomes an explanatory 
paradigm that acts as an alarm bell to warn against the oppressing, forceful and 
ineffective methods of liberal peace-building. 
Resistance in Kosovo is thus framed as a useful, productive form of 
agency. Michael Pugh, for instance, exemplifies this discourse by suggesting 
that examples of locally organised collective resistance such as the Democratic 
                                                             
14 The policy agenda also often seemed to indicate the need to change the approach employed 
towards local ownership in Kosovo. This concern is largely reflected in the interviews I have 
carried out with representatives of key international actors in Kosovo. A key EULEX official 
mentioned ‘local ownership’ to be “the very modus operandi of the [EULEX] mission” (Face-
To-Face Interview, 2011). The concern for localising peace-building was also strongly supported 
in earlier policy agendas, as can be seen in the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo’s Report of 2000:  
…in the end, the people of Kosovo have to solve their own problems, together with 
their neighbours. The international community can provide the framework for a 
Kosovo at peace but it is for the citizens of Kosovo to make it a reality (2000, p. 
286).  
This commitment to localisation can also be seen in Ambassador Eide’s report reinforced by the 
UNMIK SRSG’s calls for a concrete diplomatic engagement with all parties to move the process 
of status along (United Nations Secretary General, 2005).  
15 The phrase was coined by Francis Fukuyama in Origins of Political Order to indicate the 
process of achieving liberal democracy (2011). 
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Alliance movement headed by Ibrahim Rugova can make space for 
“intersubjective forms of politics” in peace-building (2010, p. 275). In this 
context, accounts have focused on the cohesive and constructive value of certain 
forms of non-violent resistance in withstanding “opponent repression while 
promoting internal unity around a set of realistic goals and methods” (Stephan, 
2006, p. 76). As such, resistance is central to the local turn’s fragmentation of 
power (see Chapter 2, section 4), in that it is directed at the monotonous and 
monodirectional use of hegemonic power, whomever it is exercised by. 
Undoubtedly, one of the strengths of the recent conceptual shift towards 
localisation, visible particularly in the case of Kosovo, is precisely its ability to 
initiate a material change in the peace-building by bringing attention to the 
voices of the marginalised other. The value of bringing to the surface the 
marginalised forms of agency that take expression in more or less vocal forms 
of resistance lies, most importantly, in the idea that such forms of agency can 
access the everyday in a way which is fundamentally different from the liberal 
peace’s preference for expressions of agency that are usually only limited to 
axiomatic associations of liberalism, work and productivity. Thus, Mac Ginty 
includes non-compliance and resistance to open up space to consider “multiple, 
complex and often unanticipated ways in which local and international actors 
engage with the liberal peace” (2012a, p. 183 my emphasis). 
This plays well within the aim to re-conceptualise peace-building along 
non-linear lines, which is, as suggested in the introduction to this thesis and in 
Chapter 1, a fundamental aim of the local turn. The emergence of the everyday, 
however, as will be seen below, is not entirely unproblematic. The process of 
‘accessing’ such a level in a way which is fundamentally dissimilar from that of 
the liberal peace, presents certain operational issues that will be explored below, 
which may significantly hinder the possibility of the local turn to open up to 
multiple, complex and contingent realities, without resulting in generalised, 
abstracted and linear assumptions. The remainder of this chapter explores how 
accessing the everyday requires exercising a somewhat arbitrary form of 
instrumentalisation of biopower. 
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4. The Biopower of Kosovo’s ‘Everyday’ 
The framing of resistance in the case of Kosovo is crucial for the shift I have 
outlined in Chapter 2, from disciplinary power to biopower. The emergence of 
the forces of everyday realities, particularly when understood as agency resisting 
the hegemony of unsuitable, imposed and top-down solutions, indicates that 
Kosovo has been instrumental in the latest phase of the re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building. The framing of the need to access the everyday needs of the 
population in Kosovo, it is argued below, not only enables a shift towards 
biopower, but it crucially reveals something of the aspiration of this critical set 
of scholarship that bears important consequences for the project of rethinking 
peace-building beyond linear understandings. When the everyday is ‘accessed’ 
for the purpose of reversing the hegemony of the liberal peace, this project 
requires the identification of the forms of agency to accept, legitimise and 
valorise which has a profound normative impact on the manner in which agency 
and subjectivity is understood. The case of Kosovo begins to shed light upon the 
qualities that are attributed to the emergent contingency of the everyday. The 
actions and behaviour associated with the everyday are not only qualified as 
more ‘authentic’ than the stereotypes of the liberal peace, but these are then 
identified and spatialised particularly in forms of resistance, as seen above. 
The focus on the complex nature of the everyday life of populations in 
Kosovo has brought forward a decentring of peace-building, shifting attention to 
the framing of the ‘problem’ of the management of populations. What this 
complexity seems to tell us is that acting upon conflicts on the basis of linear, 
reductionist understandings of events and temporalities as determining a 
particular outcome (Popolo, 2011, pp. 201–204) is not possible and can only 
produce problematic ‘virtual’ outcomes that do not sit well with the ‘organic’ 
complexity of the everyday. Resistance then, becomes not just the ‘inevitable’ 
outcome of this virtual imposition (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 775), but 
also a positive starting point to upset the primacy of the liberal peace-building 
agenda in Kosovo, and to shed light upon the complex web of interaction that 
comprise the post-conflict milieu. Yet, one could argue that it is in its attempt to 
go beyond the liberal peace, as will be seen in deeper detail in the next chapter, 
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that the local turn exhibits some paradoxes that limit its appreciation of the 
contingent nature of the everyday. Indeed, the inherently normative value of the 
local turn (particularly when it is opposed to the liberal peace as in resistance), 
born out of assumptions relating it to a somewhat closer and more organic 
understanding of the ‘authentic’ ‘everyday’ confers to the local turn yet a further, 
and extremely crucial, quality that carries important consequences. In its 
identification of the ‘local’ voices in need of empowerment, as the case of 
Kosovo's resistance suggests, this displays potentially dangerous elements of 
selectivity, just as the paradigm continues to showcase similar elements of 
selectivity in its identification of the liberal peace and its expressions. 
The case of Kosovo is in fact useful in taking stock of the logic behind 
the identification of the ‘local’ and the ‘everyday’. Despite openly recognising 
the difficulty and potentially limiting effects of identifying a coherent local,16 
the critical scholarship has, willingly or unwittingly, exhibited a paradoxically 
deterministic view of everyday agency. In accounts on Kosovo, this is 
particularly evident. In her account of local civil society in Kosovo, Devic, for 
instance, launches a critique against liberal, western-style multiculturalism as a 
limit to the potential of local civil society and local everyday forms of 
multiculturalism. At the same time Devic, however, also warns against the 
dangers of “‘less civil’ sectors of civil society, such as the KLA veteran’s 
associations” which she considers responsible for the March 2004 violence 
(2006, p. 262). Fawn and Richmond, also point to the agency of local actors, 
whilst at the same time warning against traditional pre-conflict forms of elites, 
who may use their agency to manipulate the process of peace-building towards 
a particularist and ethnocentric view of the exercise of sovereignty; the two 
scholars point to Kosovo and Republika Srpska as evidence of two such polities 
(2009). Richmond himself specifies his focus on ‘civil’ forms of everyday 
agency as opposed to ‘uncivil’ ones (2009a, p. 572) 
If the notion of everyday is what provides the struggling voices with the 
legitimacy to be heard and brought forward as an expression of authentic agency, 
                                                             
16 The rise of the local is accompanied, in the scholarship, by a warning call to avoid 
romanticisation or indeed homogenisation of the ‘local’ agent (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, 
p. 272; Pouligny, Chesterman, et al., 2007; Pouligny, 2006; Richmond, 2011b).  
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then it is worth questioning how everyday struggles are identified and given 
meaning and, most importantly, what other forms of agency are not given 
meaning or are not included as expressions of ‘authentic’ or meaningful 
everyday agency. These debates demonstrate a potentially arbitrary 
identification of which ‘local’ forms of knowledge are to be privileged. Narten’s 
critique of liberal peace-building’s inability to “actually accommodate local 
political interests” (2008, p. 386 my emphasis) also does not shed light upon 
what actually accommodating local demands means or how this fits into an 
existing mission which is, by default, invasive and top-down; neither does it 
illuminate the question of how these political interests take expression and what 
form they should take when they are ‘accommodated’. Furthermore, despite 
concerns over the potential ‘romanticisation’ of the local (this is a central feature 
addressed by several scholars of the local turn in peace-building; for instance, 
see: Lidén, Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2009; Mitchell & Richmond, 2011; 
Richmond, 2011b; Roberts, 2013, p. 68), these accounts, whilst acknowledging 
the fluid and contingent nature of the identities involved in the ‘local’, continue 
to operate on a discursive binary by defining the outer limits of the local against 
what is perceived to be the ‘external’, their counterpart, or their ‘other’. For 
instance, in the discourses on Kosovo, Kostovicova welcomes a nuanced view 
of the local by warning against romanticisation and wholesale accounts of what 
the local is. Later in her project, however, she also dedicates a section to 
outlining the issue of local discontent by focusing on ‘the Serbs’ (2008, p. 640). 
This is problematic particularly because, despite attempts to acknowledge the 
unfixed reality that shapes the polity in Kosovo, it reinforces a unitary vision of 
a portion of society, advancing an implied understanding of a sense of common 
belonging, or even of common concerns amongst the individuals of Serbian 
provenance, ignoring, amongst many other factors, differences in income, 
geographical location, personal historical experience of the war, etc. The same 
could be argued in relation to views on resistance, which run the risk of 
becoming wholesale accounts of what individuals may be fighting for (or 
against) regardless of the differences that make up the collective expression of 
the resistance movement. It is not difference itself but the way in which 
difference is valued according to biased preferences that becomes problematic. 
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For instance in Richmond’s account of the local turn, ‘enclavisation’ and the 
‘Kosova dominated’ declaration of independence of 2008 are critiqued as 
undesirable forms of statehood achieved through ethnonationalist projects 
(2011a, pp. 79–80), without taking into consideration that these ethnonationalist 
projects may, in themselves, be the very expression of some forms of the 
‘everyday’ agency that the author himself has endeavoured to draw out. 
Similarly, the “post-communist culture of distrust of central government, which 
also bred a tradition of non-communication and non-cooperation with central 
government structures” is critiqued as a negative feature of Kosovo-Serb 
communities (Richmond, 2011a, p. 81), where, elsewhere, non-cooperation is 
otherwise hailed as a form of valuable agency (2010b). 
Furthermore, the discussion on hybridity is also particularly exemplary 
of the paradox generated by the local turn in its attempt to celebrate the diversity 
of the social in its interconnectedness. Given that critical approaches place 
particular weight on hybridity as a notion that can best exemplify the untraceable 
and complex nature of contingent relations, many accounts focusing on hybridity 
present contradictory conceptualisations of hybridity, particularly where they 
attempt to trace the boundaries of the hybrid identities, their origin, their ethos, 
and their agendas. For instance, Visoka suggests that examining the different 
levels of hybridity can bring clarity to what forms hybridity takes in Kosovo 
(2012b, p. 23), although it can be argued that the endeavour of identifying the 
physical point of contact that generates local/international hybridity still relies 
on an exclusionary principle that forcefully imposes definitional limits upon 
what is local and what is international. Particularly, when hybridity is used as an 
instrument to identify patterns of subordination (Visoka, 2012b, p. 24) or to 
combat what is perceived as being ‘structural’ power such as the hegemony of 
the West (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765), the concept then necessarily 
serves the explanatory purpose of recognising the identities of the actors before 
qualifying the interactions. This is also true for those assessments that 
acknowledge an even more complex concept of ‘prior hybridity’17 but focus on 
                                                             
17 I am not arguing that the notion of ‘prior hybridity’ is either unappealing or useless. However, 
when it is used solely as an instrument to demonstrate the inability of the liberal peace to access 
local realities its potential remains limited to a mere instrument of critique, for instance, when it 
is advocated as a lens to examine how the non-elite level has been marginalised, forcing a rather 
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the vertical interaction between top-down and bottom-up (Mac Ginty & 
Sanghera, 2012, p. 4), thus relying on the identification of certain qualities and 
characteristics that identify which actors fit the top-down and which fit the 
bottom-up at the moment of interaction. 
These paradoxes demonstrate the difficulty of attempting to reflect the 
plurality and non-linearity of social processes vis-à-vis the practical endeavour 
of ‘building’ peace by starting from identifiable actors to work with. What this 
suggests is precisely the ‘problem’ of managing populations that biopower 
becomes the answer to, in that biopower is not necessarily the constituent power 
of the everyday, but the process of ‘making sense’ of the everyday, that which 
makes it possible to ‘access’ it in order to ‘build’ peace. Biopower, then, operates 
at the intersection of the multiplicity of the social, amongst the ‘naturalness’ of 
the everyday: 
To say that this is the sudden emergence of the ‘naturalness’ of the 
human species in the field of techniques of power would be 
excessive. But what [before] then appeared above all in the form of 
need, insufficiency, or weakness, illness, now appears as the 
intersection between a multiplicity of living individuals working and 
coexisting with each other in a set of material elements that act on 
them and on which they act in turn (Foucault, 2007, p. 37 footnote 
*). 
It is the ‘naturalness’ of life, therefore, that renders biopower appealing as a 
technology of governing and disciplining individuals and populations (Nadesan, 
2010, pp. 3–5). Yet, one could suggest that the naturalness of life as the innate 
contingent quality that biopower seeks to harness in principle is not just 
subjected to techniques of power coming from liberal governmentality. 
Biopower, then, is a typology of power that emerges in certain conditions but is 
not limited to them, as Foucault suggested it could not in itself be pinned down 
to a singular origin (2007, p. 16). In this sense, biopower could be anything and 
anywhere, and may be inherently resisting (of rigid linear frameworks), without 
                                                             
blunt division of individuals across the elite/non-elite line (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 4). 
A possible analytical alternative to engage with hybridity might investigate how processes of 
constant contact and interaction (of different kinds) are replicated numerous times in society and 
how this interconnectedness represents the fundamental logic behind how publics are formed 
and interactions amongst individuals maintained. 
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needing to be actively framed as resistance against something or towards any 
objective.18 
When, however, the quality of the contingent is identified in resistance, 
and when resistance is given a particular object (i.e. the liberal peace and its 
symptoms) and a particular ethos (that of identifying and overturning relations 
of subordination), then it is also given a particular origin point, and power is 
localised, spatialised and identified with those sources who identify themselves 
with, or are identified as opposing, the liberal peace. This bears yet another 
important implication for the framing of the everyday as a tool of critique of the 
liberal peace. Whilst the local can be taken as the centre of the shift from a 
subject victimised by hegemonic forces to a resisting-subject, an expression of 
agency associated mostly with resistance, the notion of ‘the local’ could 
potentially attribute a productive value to the subject which is not dissimilar from 
other modern forms of disciplinary and even governmental powers. Where, for 
instance, Foucault suggested that the barracks, the schools, the prisons, as 
symbols of disciplinary power, sought not just to punish abnormal behaviour but 
to place the subject in a positive, productive position, this was indicated as 
evidence of the economisation of punishment towards managerial forms that 
could be useful to the system itself (1991a, p. 210). This could also, potentially, 
                                                             
18 I do not seek to venture into the risky field of theories of power, nor do I wish to attempt to 
sketch a framework within which biopower could be positively used to represent this innate 
‘naturalness of life’. Such an attempt can be seen in Lipschultz and Rowe’s critique of 
governmentality, where they suggest that the power of the everyday can be harnessed to counter 
global governmentality: 
…what is necessary is not the global wielding of the power to influence […] but, 
rather, to produce power ‘locally’. To make this possible, a restoration of the 
political to everyday life, and the ‘acting’ on which it depends […] is essential 
(2005, p. 4).  
However, I can suggest, in contrast, that it is precisely the attempt to access the naturalness of 
life that generated what Foucault identified in biopower as a set of mechanisms to further control 
societies and individuals. Foucault’s own work on biopower does not, in fact, address the other 
possible uses of biopower, nor does it suggest that biopower could perhaps represent the 
contingent and non-linear nature of complex social interactions and the different mechanisms 
that make these interactions possible, but rather specifically frames it as an issue of governance, 
as a set of methods and actors employed for the sole purpose of governing over populations and 
individuals, as a method to ‘secure power’ (2007, p. 16). Likewise, most approaches to biopower 
also share this negative understanding of biopower as an extension of neo-liberal 
instrumentalisation of power for the purpose of the regulation of the body politic (Dean, 1999; 
Nadesan, 2010; Reid, 2010; Rose, 2001).  
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be the case for the identification of legitimate struggles, and for the normative 
drive to utilise the resisting subject as an empowerment tool. The selectivity 
demonstrated in the process of giving meaning and identifying the ‘local’ and its 
struggle, has the reverse result of that which it sought to accomplish, as it 
demonstrates a nearly hubristic assumption regarding ‘what the locals really 
want’, by suggesting the existence of an ‘authentic’ everyday beyond the artifice 
created by the liberal peace. 
Localisation could then become the very ill it sought to extinguish, by 
manipulating the contingent naturalness of the everyday, to observe and enable 
the collective to exist and be useful, just as previous disciplinary forms of power 
enabled the observation and understanding of the polity’s behaviour aimed at 
regulating its productive functions. Peace-building ‘from below’, ultimately, 
could represent a mere symbolic overturning of the roles, a switching of top-
down with bottom-up, particularly if certain modern assumptions are not 
changed, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Finally, one could also suggest that the shifts from minimalist to intrusive 
and from intrusive to locally-focused peace-building, are not as separate and 
compartmentalised as they seem and that, as such, the overlap of methods 
pertaining to all these different forms of power is visible and constant. Indeed, 
Sörensen suggests that if ever reforming the way we think about intervention 
through employing cosmopolitan approaches failed, then the ‘humanitarian 
bombs’ are never really far away (2002, p. 18). Similarly, one could suggest that 
elements of ‘spectacle’ (i.e. flexing muscle, bombing, etc.), as well as elements 
of disciplinary power consistent with less coercive forms of capacity building 
through state-building (Merlingen, 2011), as well as elements of biopower, could 
concomitantly be present, as these methods would themselves be part of a further 
‘economisation’ of peace-building, through which power is instrumentalised and 
directed when it is identified, pinpointed and given an origin (resistance) and 
aim (empowerment of a particular group, identity, or actor). 
Pointing out the limits and marginalising tendencies of top-down 
approaches and fragmenting the governance structure and logic behind peace-
building has been the core objective of the critical turn towards the local. Yet, as 
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I have outlined some problematic issues inherent in the conceptualisation of the 
local in the latest critical shift, as evidenced in Kosovo, it is possible to question 
the extent to which the outcomes and tendencies of peace-building outlined by 
the critique as typical of liberal frameworks, have actually been abandoned with 
the latest critical shift. In the next chapter, I will continue this exploration of the 
implications of the local turn, hypothesising that just as the reflectivity 
demonstrated in the shift towards intrusive forms peace-building played an 
important role in the justification of further invasive modes of normalisation, so 
can the sensitisation to the local of the latest critical shift also carry similar 
dangers. Legitimising certain forms of struggle as expressions of the ‘authentic’ 
agency can unwittingly reproduce the dualisms and arbitrariness that the critique 
associates with liberal peace-building. 
Conclusion 
Amongst the many instances of post-conflict foreign engagement, Kosovo has 
undoubtedly offered the scholarship several insightful elements to draw from. 
This chapter has in fact suggested that in the discourses on intervention and 
peace-building, Kosovo is an emblematic case, taken to represent the limits of 
minimalist approaches to peace-building first and of invasive and hegemonic 
forms of liberal control later. Kosovo arguably pushed the boundaries, exposed 
the limits, supported paradigm shifts and continues to represent, to this date, a 
world of endless possibility. Not yet as problematic and divided as the stalemate 
in Bosnia (Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 99; Mitchell, 2001, pp. 251–259), nor quite 
as independent from Security Council politics as East Timor  (Lemay-Hébert, 
2012, p. 465), and never quite finished (Gow, 2009), the case of Kosovo is 
constantly meaningful. Kosovo exists in a complex and unfixed reality which 
eludes understanding and is, because of this, always bound to be conceptually in 
need of making sense, and practically in a “permanent state of exception” (Žižek 
& Hamza, 2013, p. 101). ⁠ 
This chapter has sought to discuss the significance of Kosovo for the 
shifts in the conceptualisation of peace-building. Kosovo’s relevance lies 
particularly in its unfinished and transitory status that has attracted attempts, 
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coming from across the ideological spectrum, to manage and regulate the 
conduct of the conflict and its resolution. The muscular intervention in Kosovo 
demonstrated a deep and subtle shift towards disciplinary forms of power that 
have enabled it to be framed as an ongoing test site and which have framed 
intervention as necessary whilst refining it in its methods to make it more 
efficient. This shift has also enabled a ‘complexification’ of forms of 
intervention that has generated multi-layered and multi-levelled invasive 
approaches. The extension of said forms of intervention has brought together 
both the neo-institutional and cosmopolitan schools of thought on the issue of 
peace-building, whilst it has also seen a practical implementation through the 
extension of a top-down transitional administration in Kosovo. 
The protracted external presence in Kosovo, as well as the wave of 
scholarship in support of a lengthier (and more invasive) form of intervention, 
has then generated extensive critiques focusing on the negative outcomes of 
externally imposed institution-building. Local dissent, the recurrence of 
violence, corruption and other forms of resistance have been identified as by-
products of the liberal-peace, increasingly non-attuned to local realities and 
engendering marginalisation of authentic forms of agency beyond liberal 
fictional understandings of civil society and elites. The emergence of the 
everyday, it has been suggested, is associated largely with the issue of resistance 
in Kosovo, which is identified as both a material reality, a quality of local 
agency, and as an outcome of inorganic liberal peace-building policies. 
Resistance has then been qualified as representing a more authentic expression 
of the everyday needs of the population and has taken centre stage in the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building from the bottom up, away from universalist 
and linear understandings of the complex contingencies of post-conflict 
territories. 
Whilst acknowledging the immense value of recent critical approaches 
to the liberal peace, particularly in shedding light on some of the most notable 
problems with the establishment of authority structures and their relationship 
with legitimacy and accountability, this chapter has also highlighted some of the 
issues with localisation in Kosovo, which will be examined in more detail in the 
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next chapter, with reference to the rationale behind this critical shift in general. 
These mostly focus on the way in which local agency is given meaning and 
legitimised. Given the fact that the local turn itself, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, is not free from its own normative assumptions, then the process of 
identifying a truer and more authentic form of everyday agency may present 
similar issues of selectivity that earlier approaches – now mostly discarded by 
the critique – also exhibited. 
Two questions, then, become pressing. Just as critical approaches suggest 
the shift from minimalist to intrusive peace-building to be insufficiently critical 
and a refining of liberal and linear methods to impose power, is it possible that 
the shift towards localisation, hailed as conceptually fundamentally different and 
non-linear, is also only a technical project? What can account for the manner in 
which the everyday is accessed, and biopower is potentially employed to 
‘harvest’ the everyday? These questions will be investigated in the next chapter 
with references to the logic that drives the project of change supported by the 
local turn, in order to understand the impact of the local turn’s emancipatory 
drive on the project of rethinking peace along multiple and non-linear directions.  
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Chapter 4 
The ‘Emancipatory’ Local Turn? 
The Limits and Paradoxes of the Local Turn’s 
Normative Project of Re-Conceptualisation 
Introduction 
So far, my research has addressed the shifts in the conceptualisation of peace-
building, pointing to the turn from minimalist to intrusive approaches and from 
intrusive to localisation. Bearing in mind that this shifts do not need to be 
considered as absolute chiasms in what would be an otherwise linear narrative 
of peacebuilding, it has been suggested in Chapter 2 that a critique of the 
hegemony of the liberal peace paradigm has given birth to a shift in the manner 
in which peace-building has been conceptualised, towards the local, the aim of 
which was to fundamentally overturn the logic that engendered the 
marginalisation of alternative, often locally produced, modes of thinking about 
peace. The local turn has now obtained a level of consensus visible in the fact 
that recent conceptualisations of peace-building are now almost always 
accompanied by references to local ownership or to local agency. Yet, some of 
the more practical paradoxes identified with the local turn’s handling of agency, 
explored in Chapter 3 in relation to Kosovo, have also raised a significant 
question, which are further addressed in this chapter and the next: to what extent 
are the rationalities that distinguish the local turn from the previous approaches 
different to what has been identified as problematic in the liberal peace 
paradigm? 
The focus on the local, it was suggested in Chapter 2, is not only the 
solution that seeks to practically reverse the position of subordination of the local 
subject of peace, but it has also been argued to be the foundation of a radical 
shift to open up multiple ontologies of peace. There is no question regarding the 
unsuitability of the identified liberal model amongst the critical scholarship, 
which then attributes to the critique itself an emancipatory aim. This draws out 
the agency of the subject to be empowered from the resistance to the old 
paradigm that needs to be overcome in order to break with the continuum of 
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marginalisation and alienation extended through invasive methods of 
interventions across different eras. This is, arguably, a radical project of 
empowerment and emancipation, where the subject of peace becomes the subject 
of empowerment and where emancipation is the transitory process that can break 
with the dominance of the liberal peace by presenting it as the point to 
emancipate from. Accessing and valorising the ideal, contingent, multi-layered, 
complex realm of the ‘everyday’ is implied as the point to emancipate to. 
This chapter reflects on the significance of the local turn’s own project 
of emancipation, by comparing its logic to that which formed the subject of the 
critique of the liberal peace. If the liberal peace is, in fact, responsible for 
engendering causal understandings of emancipation as linear developments 
which in turn have operated on the basis of a process of inclusion/exclusion, the 
chapter also suggests that the local turn’s own project of emancipatory peace 
bears linear elements. To articulate this argument, in the first section, the chapter 
looks at the critiques of linearity operated by the local turn in relation to previous, 
mainstream forms of emancipatory engagements with peace-building. The 
second section contrasts these approaches with the local turn’s own non-linear 
logic of emancipation. In the third section, I begin unpacking this project by 
examining the subject of this project of change. By understanding the logic that 
drives the identification of the typology of agency to valorise and legitimise, I 
begin to draw attention to the unexplored normative dimensions of the local turn 
itself that can account for the way in which the ‘everyday’ is ‘accessed’.  In the 
final section, I suggest that the underlying normativity of the local turn’s project 
of emancipation outlines a tension in the way in which the local turn has been 
presented, which has to do with the friction between the linearity of certain 
normative assumptions and the opposing, fragmentary power of the contingent, 
the complex and the ‘everyday’ understood as an immanent plane of fluidity. As 
is suggested in this chapter and the next, this has important implications for the 
effects of the local turn on the individual, and on the relationship between the 
emergence of the local turn and the issue of the governance of the conduct of 
societies. 
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1. Beyond the Linear Modern Narratives of Change 
As seen in Chapter 2, the critical scholarship of the mid-2000s claimed to be able 
to re-conceptualise peace-building in a manner which is closer to the needs and 
interests of local populations by providing a fundamentally different 
understanding of political change to that commonly associated with the liberal, 
linear forms of emancipation that have traditionally been at the core of theories 
of economic development. It is to this understanding of political change that the 
chapter turns. 
With the critical turn in IR and the emergence of critical and anti-
foundationalist perspectives, several scholars sought to displace some of the 
underlying assumptions of modernity that had been perceived as forming the 
orthodoxy in International Relations theory as well as practice. In particular, 
what was critiqued was the manner in which the Enlightenment movement had 
established a grand philosophy of the world that acted as a meta-narrative 
through which causal relations could be employed to understand and operate in 
the world.1 Since the meta-narrative is understood fundamentally as a 
legitimation of a specific manner of ‘knowing’ and being in the world, it has 
specific implications for the manner in which human development, emancipation 
and change are understood. 
Claims to change underlying modernist projects revolve around 
assumptions regarding the ability of the rationalist subjects to be transformative. 
The framing of the transformative subject is associated with liberalism and thus, 
several critiques of modernity define the meta-narrative they critique as ‘liberal’, 
in that its origin is traced to the discourse of European Enlightenment and the 
consequential specific axiomatic assumptions regarding human mastery of 
nature which underpinned most liberal notions of development, productivity and 
welfare (Walker, 1993; Zein-Elabdin, 2001). 
The linear quality of the narrative is attributed to certain unchanged 
attitudes to development and progress across different eras, which originate in 
western-centric understandings of liberal modernity and continue not only to 
                                                             
1 For a comprehensive overview of critical and post-positivist approaches to mainstream I.R., 
see the edited collection by Smith et al. (1996). 
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marginalise other non-European types of development, but also exhibit a 
fundamentally flat and evolutionary understanding of linear historical 
development (see Mitchell, 2000). Anti-foundationalist approaches critique 
modernity as a form of meta-narrative which employs scientific knowledge to 
find the ‘truth’, to draw out patterns and cycles of behaviour, but also crucially 
to affirmatively create the rules of its own game, producing a discourse of 
legitimation for itself called philosophy (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiii). This requires 
creating a consensual basic value of a truth claim between all the interlocutors 
that need to assess that claim; in the case of the grand-narrative of the 
Enlightenment, this context is given by the consensus and unanimity between 
rational minds, dictating that knowledge works towards a normative idea of, for 
instance, universal peace (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). 
Meta-narratives operate a binary form of exclusion/inclusion which 
determines what is proper and what is not, what is good and what is bad, what is 
true and what is false. As such, the meta-narrative produces discourses which 
carry out a pathologisation to identify abnormal and unideal behaviour, not 
compliant with the parameters set by the meta-narrative. This is said to have 
been the logic behind modernisation theory, which has been notably critiqued 
for marginalising, racist, policies towards non-European others (Kiely, 2005, p. 
121; Zisk Marten, 2004, p. 73). The meta-narrative asserts a claim over ‘what is 
real’, based on the need to know, understand and modify social, political and 
material realities. It is this concern for ‘what is real’ that drives the agents within 
the meta-narrative to try and organise the world and to continue to represent it 
(Mitchell, 2000, pp. 17–18). 
In modernity’s linear project of change, human emancipation became a 
matter of instrumentally projecting “human values and desires on the world 
through scientific instrumental rationality, enabling the active intervention into 
and exploitation of nature” (Bielskis, 2005, p. 8). The modern human subject is 
framed as amenable to change and transformable insofar as it is accepted that the 
environment within which he lives is also subject to instrumental exploitation 
and engineering, by virtue of being knowable and its limits being quantifiable 
and identifiable. This has several implications for the political projects of change 
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and development initiated within the linear meta-narrative of a liberal nature. In 
fact, the process of providing meaning and interpretation, of understanding the 
world in a specific manner seeks to supersede and overcome older methods in a 
transformative manner, thus revolutionising, reflectively and rationally, the life 
of the subjects. This, it is suggested, is a distinctive characteristic of European 
Enlightenment, of the self-reflective concern with the ‘darkness’ of the pre-
modern times (Gray, 1986, p. 82), which framed the self-proclaimed project of 
emancipation as a matter of rupture with the past.  It was western philosophical 
tradition that suggested that modern subjects could aspire to transcendental 
universal rationalism to represent themselves and transcend their traditional 
constraints of history, faith or geography and transform themselves in a manner 
that is only possible through the establishment of a claim to a privileged position 
of “disembodied observer of the world” (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 20–21). The 
modern subject was thus placed in a unique position to know and understand the 
previous limitation to its potential, and placed in an empowered position, 
projected into a life of learning and improving. 
From anti-foundationalist perspectives the notion of emancipation is 
evidently linear, as the liberal project of change implies the possibility of 
identifying a starting point to emancipate from (the ‘Dark Ages’). Emancipation 
itself revolves around the idea that change is geared towards a potential future 
where progress will help improve human existence by wiping out the conditions 
for the subject’s unhappiness. This is operationalised, in the liberal episteme, 
through technological advancements which allow the subject to engineer, 
manage and interact with his environment to alter, quicken and potentiate the 
course of his interactions (within and with the system) by gearing it towards his 
perceived desires and wants. Within the liberal meta-narrative, the subject is ‘the 
people’, who are legitimately in the position of having the right to decide for 
society; legitimacy comes from consensus and deliberation is the manner in 
which the subject expresses himself. The notion of progress, Lyotard suggests, 
is thus an outcome of the assumption that knowledge moves by accumulation, 
and that such movement is extended to the socio-political subject much in the 
same way that scientific knowledge is accumulated by scientists  (1984, p. 30). 
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The linearity of this approach is problematised through raising a number 
of different objections. Some critics have suggested that the relationship between 
the human subject and its own emancipation presents a crucial paradox: it is 
suggested, in fact, that the call for emancipation emerged as a result of the 
creation of mechanisms from which humanity needed to be emancipated 
(Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 200).⁠ What this means is that the subject of 
modernity found himself in the paradoxical position of feeling sufficiently 
uncomfortably unassimilated by the system to want to resist and be emancipated, 
but content and comfortable enough within the existing order to perpetuate and 
work within the logic of the order itself (ibid, p.200)⁠. The individuality 
championed by Enlightenment, in fact, crystallised a blindness to the repressive 
power that individualised the subject in the first place. In short, the modern 
subject, when it recognises the need to emancipate itself from the system, is 
already playing the game of the system that created his capacity to recognise his 
own individualised right to be emancipated. 
Other critics have focused on the inherent tendency of the Enlightenment 
project of emancipation to end up in domination, fascism and exploitation 
(Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Jahn, 2005). Liberalism, it is suggested, exhibits 
strikingly paradoxical positions regarding emancipation, that made the task of 
translating the utopian project into a practical system of societal organisation 
cumbersome. In particular, and central to the local turn’s discussion regarding 
the possibility of a post-hegemonic emancipatory paradigm, a question arises 
regarding who is supposed to possess the claim to superior reason and to the 
exercise of said reason, and over whom (i.e. who can emancipate whom?). More 
problematically still, the issue of the selectivity and subjectivity of what could 
be considered as ‘emancipatory’ to some and not to others was also largely not 
explained beyond the veil of utopian universality (Harvey, 1989, p. 14). 
The post-liberal critiques of the liberal peace have largely also embraced 
the above mentioned lines of critique of modernity. This is not least because of 
their own theoretical affinity with anti-foundationalist perspectives, coupled 
with what I described in Chapter 1 as being a tracing of an intentional and 
coherent project of liberal discursive and practical hegemony.  As such, linear 
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evolutionary claims typical of liberal modernism – such as those that informed 
modernisation theory and developmental practices after WWII – became the 
subject of extensive critique, particularly because of their association with a 
universalist understanding of progress that diminishes the importance of 
alternative modes of being beyond the liberal understanding of normalcy 
(Chandler, 2010; Duffield, 2010; Jabri, 2010; Pugh, 2009; Reid, 2010; Roberts, 
2011). This point of critique was frequently raised in regards to the exercise of 
informal (for instance, cultural) and formal structures (for instance through 
transitional justice structures) of hegemony in post-colonial relations (Maddison 
& Shepherd, 2014; Shapiro, 2004; Vieille, 2012) and has been increasingly 
central to critical, bottom-up approaches to foreign interventions and peace-
building. 
The modernist logic of emancipation, it has been suggested in much of 
the critical scholarship on peace-building, has dictated the practice and 
conceptualisation of peace-building in all of its forms and adaptations so far, 
from minimalist approaches based on neo-liberal economic reforms (Barbara, 
2008; Pugh, 2010; Tadjbakhsh, 2009) ⁠, to more hands-on humanitarian 
interventions (Bachmann, 2012; Gabay & Death, 2012; Haahr & Walters, 2005; 
Larner & Walters, 2004; Williams & Young, 2012) ⁠. Traditional approaches to 
interventions such as those that characterised both developmental projects of the 
1990s and interventions such as in Bosnia, are then said to imply an 
emancipatory claim that stems from the desire to fulfil individual and collective 
universal desires (e.g. ‘human rights’). This emancipatory claim is associated 
with a particularly specific linear, normative vision: “international interventions 
based on social and economic development also entailed a strong emancipatory 
element based on the powerful normative image of modernisation and 
‘prosperity’” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1637). 
This normative vision is said to rely on inclusion and exclusion at the 
discursive level in order to articulate a material image of what is considered to 
be a desired, good, form of governance, this results in the exclusion of all other 
alternative narratives that then become pathologised as abnormal and unideal, 
marginalised in favour of practises that are considered more acceptable 
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(Chandler, 2000, p. 148; Pugh, 2005). It was then suggested that this meta-
narrative acquired hegemonic status and was thus concerned with the production 
of a specific type of emancipation, one that was based on northern/western forms 
of knowledge employed to strengthen hegemony (Franks, 2009; Kapoor, 2008; 
Richmond, 2010b). 
Within this framework it is suggested that subjects are empowered to act 
as part of a larger plan for the active intervention into, and exploitation of, the 
nature of the societies subject to peace building. It is thus suggested that this 
form of peace-building does not create a form of peace that is conducive to 
emancipation: “as part of the regulative post-Cold War peace […] local consent 
and the liberal peace are juxtaposed”, suggests Richmond (2009c, p. 58), 
indicating also that the liberal peace does not serve the interests of local agents, 
as it rests on “‘cold institutions’ lacking empathy, care and the capacity for 
emancipation” (ibid, p.58). As such, the type of change generated by the liberal 
peace’s project of emancipation constructs the idea of the autonomous and 
responsible subject only insofar as it is instrumentally pertinent to the 
implementation of its own agenda (Dillon & Reid, 2009). For instance, taking 
the example of the promotion of NGOs as autonomous agents free from 
governmental control (close to both neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan 
approaches to peace-building), Hynek suggests that far from empowering the 
subjects, this strategy only oils the totalising machinery of new humanitarianism 
and speeds up the attainment of the liberal human security agendas (2011)⁠. 
The central question raised by critics discussing liberal peace-building 
then revolves around how best to ‘access’ other narratives so far silenced by the 
predominance of linear understandings of peace and human development. As 
explained in Chapter 2, critical approaches sought to bring forward those 
marginalised voices and alternative narratives. As will be seen below, the turn 
towards the local exemplifies an effort to understand change in a fundamentally 
different way to that of linear perspectives, precisely to avoid the logic of 
narrative inclusion/exclusion typical of linear understandings of change. This is 
indeed an ‘emancipatory’ approach, although, as I suggest below, there are 
several reasons why one might be sceptical or wary of the way in which this 
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‘emancipatory’ understanding of change is promoted as substantially different 
from previous linear ones. This begs the question, which will be investigated 
below, as well as in Chapter 5, to what extent, and in what way, is the project of 
change championed by the local turn different in its logic from that of linear 
approaches? 
2. Emancipatory Peace-Building 
Despite the scepticism towards linear emancipatory paradigms, particularly 
given their association with the ‘unbecoming’ elements of liberal modernisation 
and development, it is important to note that most critiques of the linear notion 
of emancipation do not, however, advocate the absolute abandonment of the 
notion of emancipation in itself, but merely the need to reclaim it from the 
modernist framework (Roberts, 2011a) and rethink it along non-linear lines. 
These critical approaches are driven by the desire to overturn the conditions of 
exploitation generated by or supported by previous approaches and 
understanding of peace-building as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Since these are 
associated with the inherent flaws of the liberal approach (see Chapters 1 & 2), 
then the type of political change advocated is designed to resist and counter this 
narrative by building the new paradigm on the basis of a fundamentally different 
logic. The shift towards the local is, therefore, framed as an enabler of the 
emergence of “greater emancipation from structural violence, some degree of 
indigenous autonomy in determining peace-building priorities” (Roberts, 2013, 
p. 67 my emphasis). This project of emancipation has featured prominently in 
“the idea of the ‘everyday’ as a focal point for ‘post-liberal’ or fourth generation 
peace-building” (ibid, p. 67). 
Even those accounts that do not explicitly make reference to what 
Richmond specifically calls the ‘emancipatory’ model (2008a)⁠ support the need 
to embrace a critical position in order to positively affect the discursive and 
empirical dynamics that have so far shaped the orthodox approach to peace-
building and that have been responsible for the negative outcomes most often 
mentioned (particularly with regards to the loss of autonomy, the inability to 
alter policy-making that is imposed from outside, and the general tendency of 
149 
 
 
the local subject to be subordinated by the exporters of the liberal peace). The 
type of change championed by this critical scholarship promotes a shift in focus 
toward the “hidden scripts of peace” (Mac Ginty, 2013) ⁠, with a particular 
preference for those expressions of agency that can be empowered and 
emancipated as they resist or counter the liberal hegemony (Demmers et al., 
2004; Kapoor, 2008; Lemay-Hébert, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2008) ⁠. 
The focus on the everyday as a method to alter and replace the orthodoxy 
of the liberal peace and its modernist foundations in its fixed hierarchical vision 
of post-conflict contexts, I argue, inherently presents an emancipatory 
conceptual model for rethinking peace-building that starts with the fundamental 
acknowledgment of the limits to top-down, linear governance. Pugh, for 
instance, rejects forms of governance such as the “economic diktat of Kosovo’s 
constitution”, regarding its unsustainability as the “death of the neo-liberal 
consensus” (2005, p. 26 emphasis in original). Duffield too, shifts attention to 
the power of the ‘below’, as suggested in Chapter 2 in relation to the emergence 
of the forces of the ‘everyday’, suggesting that space can be found in a form of 
emancipatory governance that is centred around “the solidarity of the governed” 
(2007, p. 234). 
Recent critical perspectives on emancipation offer diverse paths to 
understanding empowerment beyond the liberal peace. Despite differences in 
focus, most critical accounts agree on the need to move beyond traditional 
liberal-driven understandings of empowerment as human security (see, for 
instance: Chandler, 2012; Duffield, 2001; Owens, 2012). Some of these 
perspectives suggest that the emancipatory potential of liberal human-centred 
approaches is fundamentally flawed because of the permanence and resistance 
of forms of biopolitics that co-opt and capture even the most benevolent forms 
of ethical approaches to development and human rights (Tadjbakhsh, 2009, p. 
648) ⁠, thus advocating a much more radical overcoming of the discursive 
structure that has determined orthodox understandings of empowerment and 
emancipation as human security so far. This, it is argued has only seemingly 
reproduced asymmetrical power relations and bio-political forms of societal and 
individual regulation through sovereign power (Turner, Cooper, & Pugh, 2011)⁠ 
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and through other more subtle forms of technologies of domination (Doucet & 
De Larrinaga, 2011) ⁠. Others suggest that the everyday can emancipate human 
security itself by bringing back the political in the social, that is, by shifting 
attention on the ‘real’ everyday concerns of local communities, rejecting 
universalised abstractions and grounding heterogeneity in discourses of 
pragmatic and alternative everyday concerns such as welfare and the 
environment (Alt, 2011) ⁠. 
As suggested in Chapter 2, critical approaches to peace-building indicate 
that bringing forward such a new manner of thinking about the foundations of 
peace requires an appreciation for the heterogeneous and complex nature of the 
social (see Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 87). It is suggested that this is not possible 
within a modernist logic, since this orthodox understanding of emancipation, 
however, would only engender hierarchical relations and exploitation through 
the imposition of black and white, cause-effect explanations regarding the nature 
of the world, and the best way to conduct society; within this framework, it is 
suggested, emancipation is not ‘for everyone’ (Roberts, 2011). Therefore, the 
focus on the local and the everyday becomes a unique methodological tool to 
reopen “the debate on power, peace, social justice, the evolving framework and 
terms of emancipation” (de Coning, 2013, p. 3 my emphasis). In these accounts, 
the notion of the everyday can only be empowering if it is not understood in a 
strictly organisational sense, but rather, it if is taken to mean an approach that is 
attentive to the pluralities of power (Pugh, 2004, p. 54), and to focus on the 
‘inbetweenness’ the ephemeral space within which mixtures and relations of 
power can be valorised through the deconstruction of discourses and binaries 
(Mitchell, 2011).⁠ 
The local turn, it is suggested, is emancipatory because it opens up the 
field in favour of “a more expansive epistemology that is able to overcome the 
artificial conceptual boundaries imposed by the notion of state sovereignty” 
(Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 768) ⁠; it helps “thinking more creatively” 
about new political spaces (ibid, p. 779) ⁠, and it contributes to the exploration and 
understanding of how change takes place, without considering traditional 
methods such as reforms as ends but rather as potential strategies that may have 
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little impact without the participation of local stakeholders (Cubitt, 2013, p. 
111) ⁠.  Thus, the notion of emancipation and change supported by critical, 
bottom-up approaches to peace hinges upon a radical transformation of the 
foundations of peace-thinking operated through ‘the local’, the focal point of 
agency as resistance. 
So far, I have suggested that the subject of the ‘emancipatory’ local turn 
is framed as materialising its needs and participating to the political life of the 
community through everyday practices that do not necessarily privilege 
western/northern knowledge on peace. The everyday is then framed as an ideal 
end point, as well as a potential field of action; as an ensemble of effects that, if 
unlocked and sufficiently paid attention to, could more fruitfully capture and 
involve every aspect/actor within the highly complex context of post-conflict 
peace-building.  The re-conceptualisation of peace-building is thus, arguably a 
political project driven by a normative drive projected into the future towards 
emancipation of individuals and societies away from the hegemonic practices of 
the orthodox approaches. But how radical is this re-conceptualisation and how 
far beyond the linear logic has it been able to go? The next section begins to 
chart some of the elements of the local turn’s conceptual bearings to assess 
whether they significantly differ from the modernist logic from which they seek 
to depart. 
3. Critiquing the Critique: Who is being Emancipated? 
So far it has been suggested that the critical turn towards the local has sought to 
re-conceptualise peace-building in a radically different manner by addressing the 
modernist assumptions that have so far captured the notions of emancipation and 
empowerment. Whilst it is possible to agree with some of these critiques in the 
identification of how certain dominant practices and technologies have been 
extended to further facilitate the control of the conduct of societies (as I have 
done in Chapter 1 in relation to the shift towards more invasive forms of peace-
building), it is also important not to assume that this pattern has now ceased with 
the advent of a new turn towards the local and the post-liberal. Secondly, whilst 
agreeing with the identification of certain disciplinary forms of power visible in 
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intrusive approaches to peace-building (see section 4, Chapter 1), my research 
seeks to avoid taking part in the construction of the ‘liberal peace’, in order to 
de-emphasise both the consensus around its nature, and the sense of coherent 
intentionality that is inherent in critiques of it. To that end, this section 
investigates the local turn’s project of change in its own terms, to discuss how 
far ‘the radical apple has fallen from the tree’ by examining how different the 
rationale of the radical critique of the liberal peace is from the rationale of the 
meta-narrative it rejects in the way in which it ‘accesses’ the everyday. 
Indeed, several scholars have pointed to the dangers of accepting the 
inherent benevolence of post-liberal ‘emancipatory’ arguments, or have called 
for a clarification of nebulous and unclear understandings of the ‘emancipatory’ 
peace. In these cases it seems that the problem is one of clarity. For Visoka, for 
instance, the fallacy of post-liberal approaches lies in the association of 
emancipatory agency only with certain forms of behaviour. In relation to Oliver 
Richmond, Visoka suggests: 
…while in theory Richmond seems to favour local agency and self-
government, as well as locally initiated political developments, in the 
context of Kosovo he seems to find problematic Kosovo’s claim for 
statehood, considering it as a monopolisation of the entire state-
building and peace-building process by the Kosovo Albanians (2011, 
p. 106).  
Sabaratnam, too, places emphasis on what could be a problem of a missing 
emancipatory drive, one which can be more substantially found in post-colonial 
scholarship (2011a, 2011b). Whilst this is definitely a valid position of critique, 
it still does not explain what would happen, within this post-colonial perspective, 
to competing claims that may wish to be ‘co-opted’ by or adopt liberal agendas.2 
                                                             
2 Critiques of the local turn have been assessed, recently, by two of the local turn’s most vocal 
supporters, Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond. In a 2014 article the scholars defend the 
emancipatory push of the local turn whilst acknowledging the limits that a liberal heritage poses 
on the local turn’s radical reconceptualisation project. Indicating the need to adopt a more honest 
and clear positionality, to examine the epistemological foundations of analyses and critiques, and 
to move the discussion towards the examination of hybrid political orders (2014, p. 184), the 
scholars, however, do not indicate how the epistemological assumptions behind the local turn 
would fare vis-à-vis the unchanged framework that continues to indicate the necessity of 
interventions to ‘fix’ conflictual relations as an a priori given. Furthermore, whilst resting on the 
emancipatory drive as a strong point of the local turn (2014, p. 173), the scholars reject the need 
to qualify or specify the nature of emancipation as a possible contradiction in relation to their 
theoretical framework (2014, p.184). Emancipation, thus, remains a nominally strong but 
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It is also problematic to assume that a post-colonial perspective might not 
operate its own forms of subordinations, alienation and marginalisation of 
narratives just as much as the liberal master-narrative does. Finally, it seems that 
Roland Paris’ attempt to ‘save’ liberal peace-building introduces a slightly more 
nuanced understanding of the problems that the local turn faces, as he raises a 
plethora of questions regarding the content of the emancipatory vision of the 
local turn; the scholar suggests that these questions are largely unanswered by 
the local turn, due to a deliberate and unnecessary focus on equating the 
difficulties of peace-building with a crisis of liberalism. Where critiques have 
pointed to the difficulties of implementing top-down imposed solutions, this, 
Paris argues, “is a criticism of institutional isomorphism, not liberalism” (2011, 
p. 169). Paris argues that the emancipatory drive of the liberal peace can be 
‘saved’ and is not, in fact, in crisis. Although one could disagree with this by 
also suggesting that Paris’ own understanding of the liberal peace is based on an 
extremely wide and perhaps arbitrary selection of elements, actors and missions 
under the label ‘liberal’, it is perhaps possible to concur with his conclusion that 
much more might be made of the discussion on emancipatory politics if the local 
turn were to question the very meaning and direction of its own emancipatory 
politics (including the risks and the potential for marginalisation that normativity 
engenders). Although Paris does this by ‘salvaging’ the potential of the liberal 
peace, I suggest that this is still a limited discussion that risks centring the debate 
around liberal and post-liberal peace-building, rather than questioning whether 
non-linear peace-building can be emancipatory and non-teleological at the same 
time.3 
                                                             
practically empty trope that enables the rhetorical shift towards the local but significantly hinders 
the political impact of the notion. In this respect, perspectives pertaining to Marxist and post-
colonial studies may arguably present stronger, clearer and more politicised understandings of 
emancipatory politics by virtue of not having to reconcile the normative nature of emancipation 
with the non-linear and non-teleological nature of post-modern theoretical framings.  
3 Notably, some scholars have recently begun to put the non-linear, relational ontology behind 
some of the local turn’s claims to the test. David Chandler, for instance, is particularly notable 
for questioning the possibility of advancing any form of emancipatory project within a 
framework of continued interventionism (see see: 2013a, 2013b), whereas Morgan Brigg’s 
conclusion has been more ambiguous, problematising the persistence of a flat ontology behind 
the local turn’s emancipatory project as a limitation for what he considers to be a legitimate 
democratising ethos of the local turn (2013). 
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To go further, one can look at studies of peace-building that mobilise 
complexity theory in order to understand how the everyday is accessed in the 
context of unfixed, untraceable complexity and contingency. For instance, 
Damian Popolo examines conflict resolution as framed within the modernist 
episteme’s ‘analytics of finitude’.4 This concept of finitude, Popolo suggests, has 
determined the manner in which conflicts, particularly the case of Kosovo, have 
been problematised and consequently handled through interventions. Modern 
knowledge, the scholar explains, produced specific understandings of the 
meanings of certain concepts (such as autonomy and agency) which then 
determined the manner in which the conflict was handled (Popolo, 2011)⁠. 
Complexity theory has been suggested by Popolo as an approach that could truly 
reverse the epistemological premises of the modern episteme by destabilising 
both the notion of the linearity of history and the analytics of finitude by 
producing ‘uncertain knowledge’ as an intrinsic quality of the world rather than 
the outcome of imperfect knowledge (2011, p. 209). Immanence is the key to 
this approach, and reason becomes not a way of making sense of complexity in 
a way which makes immanence understandable and certain, but rather a way to 
enable subjects to cope with uncertainty and randomness. The everyday, as 
outlined by many non-linear approaches to peace-building, can be considered 
the immanent field within which the uncertainty is played out, and the 
emancipatory drive of the new paradigm consists in rejecting modern reason, 
although not reason in itself, replacing it with the pragmatic, immanent and 
grounded reason necessary to generate frameworks that can valorise and cope 
with uncertainty. 
                                                             
4 The analytic of finitude it taken to describe the assumption that the limits of human existence 
form the basis of true knowledge in the human sciences (Dean, 1994, p. 50). The episteme 
establishes man’s position “as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows” (Foucault, 
1970, p. 340). Finitude is important to understand the ethos that drives the paradigm’s call for 
emancipation. As a project of political change, I have argued above, emancipation implies 
positivity and futurity. Finitude, Foucault suggests, is what makes this possible; the struggle of 
man takes the form of the endless, the hopeful and the positive precisely because its finitude 
allows for the possible acquisition of knowledge (ibid, p.342). Damian Popolo suggests that the 
modern episteme’s analytics of finitude is supported by a concept of linear history which then 
reveals the limits of the knowable world and places contingency upon the finitude. The manner 
in which the conflict in Kosovo has been problematised prior to the intervention is indicative of 
these two elements of the logic of modernity: “continuous historical time and historical linearity 
are also epistemic formations that allow the idea, according to which persistent ethnic hatreds 
characterise conflict, to be actually thought” (Popolo, 2011, p. 65).  
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Therefore, progressivism is not necessarily rejected, as much as it is 
placed in service of the subjects of peace; in conversation with David Chandler, 
Oliver Richmond argues that post-liberalism: 
…is not a rejection of rationalism or the state, material factors or, 
indeed, the international architecture of peacebuilding. But it does 
position them all as subjects to a range of sites of authority and forms 
of legitimacy beyond their own bureaucratic structures (2015, p. 7). 
This may, arguably, represent a much less radical claim than the previous 
positioning of an emancipatory, “interdisciplinary, pluralist agenda” that sought 
to break with “notions of a territorially bounded international space and 
concurring with sovereign liberal or neoliberal governance” (Richmond, 2008b, 
p. 463). Admittedly, the relationship between the liberal and post-liberal is 
unclear, particularly in Richmond’s work. The emancipatory drive of post-
liberal approaches to the local, Richmond claims, “is not being lost in the crisis 
of liberal and neoliberal power; instead, it is being reconstituted in a more 
pluralistic manner” (Chandler and Richmond, 2015, p. 11). 
If it were conceded, as it is by Richmond, that “a clearer approximation 
of the possibilities of emancipation may be found in a world with liberal and 
neoliberal sets of infrastructures” (ibid, p. 6) by finding a common ground with 
significant ranges of local agency, it remains, however, difficult to see how this 
may work in practice. This project, if indeed carried out in the name of 
contingency and complexity, and thus on the basis of a logic of 
interconnectedness that puts a premium on non-causality and blurred boundaries 
of identity, would imply a pluralisation of governance structures in a manner 
which may, necessarily, fragment even ‘liberal’ forms of governance to the point 
of making them unrecognisable in their ‘new’, pluralised, hybrid and 
interconnected forms. Furthermore, where it is implied that the emancipatory 
value of the local turn may result in a fundamental reconceptualisation of 
traditional notions, such as the Rule of Law, in a way which may “at least counter 
some of the issues pertaining to legitimacy and sustainability” (Peterson, 2010, 
p. s34), the reverse might also be true. Local agents may, in fact, have a radically 
different understanding of legitimacy and sustainability to the point that the 
hybrid order generated might no longer be to the liking of either the local turn 
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proponents or the liberal peace-builders themselves. It is assumed that the local 
agents will work towards the same understanding of closing the legitimacy gap, 
although one could ask, what happens when local agents veer off into a 
completely opposite, and possibly uncharted, direction, establishing a 
fundamentally different notion of legitimacy? Would that not be an expression 
of ‘everyday’, ‘true’ agency? Where a supposedly linear, liberal normative 
framework would have an answer to normalise what it perceives as ‘abnormal’ 
and undesirable forms of behaviour (i.e. spoilers), the same cannot be said, at 
least in theory, for the local turn. 
Indeed, it is possible to suggest that a form of normalisation does occur, 
when certain forms of agency are chosen over others. It is precisely in this issue 
of the identification of agency to be empowered that unchanged modernist 
assumptions regarding the possibility to know and control the world are most 
evident. As discussed above, the goal of emancipation that drives the critical 
scholarship is meant to be obtained through the valorisation of everyday forms 
of agency rather than through a strict focus on traditional methods of expressing 
agency such as representation, consensus and participation. Both as an 
acknowledgment of the untraceable links that produce ‘already existing’ hybrid 
identities  (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012) ⁠⁠, and as an acknowledgment of the 
inevitable processes that connect and change individuals inside networks 
(Canclini, 1995), hybridity is taken to be the starting point for focusing on 
unscripted and hidden practices of the everyday and their outcomes, in particular, 
as hybridity does not fit clear-cut models and does not reflect fictional identities 
often provided in orthodox, linear peace studies.  Yet, the manner in which these 
identities are recognised, given meaning and valorised, raises an important 
question: if the local is the subject to be emancipated, how could hybridity do 
that conceptually – let alone ‘practically’– without delimiting and constraining 
in a binary way the identities of local and international actors? The manner in 
which the actors to be empowered and emancipated are identified remains 
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particularly problematic, despite the critique’s reluctance to delineate clear-cut 
identities.5 
Everyday forms of resisting agency are identified and rendered 
legitimate in a manner which is not immediately evident to the reader and 
without much exploration of the normative content of this legitimisation. 
Mitchell and Kelly’s work on Northern Ireland and Bosnia explores, for instance, 
how populations have reclaimed spaces previously appropriated by liberal 
peace-builders (for instance, areas that had been designated for certain 
development projects) by exercising everyday forms of occupation and 
resistance as graffiti (2011)⁠. This exploration of the methods with which 
populations express their discontent with the policies imposed by outside agents 
is useful in drawing attention to the arbitrary nature of foreign interventions, but 
at the same time it does little to explain why resistance is expressed in that 
particular way rather than in other ways (why drawing graffiti and not launching 
rockets?); nor does it say much about what other types of agency these subjects 
could be expressing and where this could be visible beyond the territorialised 
and spatially specified areas of friction and contestation. 
Finally, it is possible to question the extent to which the critical 
scholarships’ conceptualisation of the everyday and of hybridity have been able 
to reflect on agency without resorting to tools of exclusion, categorisation and 
                                                             
5 Non-linear, critical perspectives display a reluctance to define the limits of the local, and push 
for a focus less on the identities that comprise the actors subject to hybridity and more on the 
process of hybridisation itself (Popolo, 2011, p. 209). This is because previous approaches to 
peace-building referring to ‘local’ communities necessarily presented a delimited and defined 
understanding of the ‘local’, whilst new approaches recognise that discussing communities 
according to their identities is a notable problem, and one which partly derives from the problem 
of reaching an agreement on the criteria defining a particular kind of community. This issue is 
particularly visible in the fact that even scholars of the local turn find themselves bound to 
identity descriptors such as ‘Albanians’ and ‘Serbs’ (as the major stakeholders) to discuss 
complex interactions, regardless of how much they seek to valorise their hybrid nature, their 
existing hybridity, and the constitutive agent-producing quality of their material interactions. For 
instance, where Ropers replaces ‘dilemmas’ with the pluralist notion of ‘tetralemmas’ (2011, p. 
160), and where this is specifically done with the problem of ‘polarising’ positions in mind, it is 
not clear whether the interactive process itself may profoundly alter the identity of actors to the 
point that it is not helpful to identify who they are any longer. This becomes even more 
problematic if one is to take into consideration the possible ‘tetralemmas within tetralemmas’, 
i.e. the existing hybridity within these positions or the simultaneous presence of different desires, 
needs and cross cutting identity markers that may blur the identification of these positions even 
further. The question remains, at what point do complex interactions change the identities of the 
actors to the point that traditional descriptors are rendered redundant?  
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delimitation identified as responsible for the marginalisation and alienation of 
narratives typically operated by the liberal peace-building paradigm. When 
discussing hybridity even as a process and not an outcome, the point of encounter 
discussed by Richmond, Mac Ginty and others seems to draw a line between the 
local and the international  (or between other elements that are, at one point prior 
to the hybrid moment identified as self-standing identities). This is reflected, for 
instance, in the research questions that examine the compatibility of the liberal 
model with international engagement with the local (Albrecht & Moe, 2014; 
Canclini, 1995). Despite calls to avoid one-sided views of both internationals 
and locals, very often these research questions, whilst valid in themselves, do 
not seem to be able to conceptualise interaction without qualifying the agents 
that are taking part to that interaction according to their orthodox positions (i.e. 
‘internationals’ vs ‘locals’), ignoring issues regarding the manner in which these 
actors may already be assemblages outcome of numerous untraceable previous 
interactions. Often these accounts may call for the relativisation of identities, but 
continue to provide a coherent external variable to explain the logic of 
interaction, such as using political economy as a determinant in the interaction 
between agents in complex networks (Felix da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012, p. 54). 
In other accounts, whilst valorising the prior hybridity that has co-constructed 
these identities, the calls for acknowledging the previously silenced ability for 
self-organisation of certain networks, these potentially sharp conceptual 
critiques continue to frame this process on the basis of a binary understanding 
external and internal agendas in need of ‘balancing’ (de Coning, 2013, p. 5). 
Even the notion of ‘friction’, recently used to further emphasise the relational 
element of hybridity as a process, does not seem to go beyond the identification 
of the identities which are subject to the frictional encounter (Björkdahl & Gusic, 
2013; Jarstad, 2013; Öjendal & Ou, 2013), focusing on how the liberal peace has 
imagined identities, whilst failing to recognise how even critical approaches 
have similarly ‘imagined’ spaces for hybrid agency to flourish. Other power-
based appraisals of everyday, focusing in particular on the how control and 
governmentality may even be promoted through everyday, local or hybrid 
trajectories, continue to demonstrate reluctance in abandoning a traditional 
local/international dichotomy, using it instead one of the conceptual building 
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blocks to ascertain where and how liberal disciplinary power is exercised 
(Mitchell, 2011, p. 1645). 
Other dichotomies are also present, even in localisation accounts which 
are highly sensitive to the negative potential of hybridity discourses and to the 
importance of relativism, such as with Albrecht and Moe’s work. The scholars 
in fact suggest the need to focus on the simultaneity of discourses of authority to 
by-pass the binary between the liberal and the non-liberal other, by focusing on 
how certain agents may enact different roles at the same time embodying 
different sets of interests. They take the example of traditional tribal Chiefs who 
may be able to reinforce their influence by drawing on different sources of 
authority and interacting fruitfully, at the same time, with both international 
agencies and traditional structures (Albrecht & Moe, 2014, p. 15). From this 
perspective, however, whilst the truly non-linear and complex moment of 
hybridity seems to take shape in the figure of the traditional Chief, in its 
dialectical encounter with either side (internationals, locals) it still relies on an 
assumption of dissonant interests and agendas that makes it possible to identify 
the moment of hybridity itself (i.e. when the traditional Chief is successfully 
being ‘hybrid’). Furthermore these moments of hybridity are not only 
identifiable in time (i.e. the moment of enactment) but also driven by a similarly 
linear understanding of opportunities and challenges that determines the 
incentives for participation of the actors involved. Lastly, the understanding of 
the meanings of concepts such as participation and representation are not 
dialectically altered in the moment of hybridity, so whilst the actors may be 
fluidly co-constructed, the manner in which they then exercise their agency 
(participation, representation, co-option) is not understood in a different manner 
from the traditional forms that critique has so far identified with liberal peace-
building practice and theory. Thus, for instance, whilst acknowledging the need 
to discard the preference for western/northern forms of knowledge, critical 
appraisals still rely on the language of ‘rights’, statehood, representation and 
social contract typical of the frameworks they critique.6 
                                                             
6 For instance, the language of hybridity, resilience and ownership remains fundamentally 
anchored to the rhetoric typical of previous approaches associated with liberal orthodoxy. Whilst 
condemning the unbecoming aspects of liberalism linking it to its colonial legacy (Richmond, 
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The identification of the legitimate forms of agency to valorise and 
emancipate, or alternative narratives that necessitate giving a voice has, 
therefore, an important two-fold consequence: firstly, it arguably produces 
reductionist understandings of the alternative narratives which are categorised, 
delineated and become almost as fictional as those ‘imagined’ by the liberal 
peace-builders; secondly, these are then given meaning according to a new 
normative order the driving principle of which is to resist the liberal peace. 
Yet, the manner in which agency is identified and legitimised is also 
problematic for another reason: despite the fact that the critical turn undoubtedly 
offers an element of emancipation from hegemony and exclusionary practices, 
the manner in which it does so, arguably, is not entirely dissimilar from more 
traditional, orthodox claims to emancipation, consistent with modernist and 
linear frameworks. In its emphasis on resistance, the critical local turn has 
focused primarily on power in its coercive dimension in order to locate the 
original site of violence and coercion to fuel and drive its critique (de Coning, 
2013, p. 3), and thus associating power as power upon, and freedom as its 
diametrical opposite. Yet, one could suggest that this identification of the unitary 
source of power is, arguably, what reproduces the familiar story of linear modern 
emancipation even in a paradigm that seeks to escape it, where the rational 
subject can take consciousness of those conditions that engender its exploitation 
(be it from the dark ages or from the tyranny of imposed liberalism) and sets up 
normative regimes that can constitute the social, enable agency and positively 
work towards a ‘normalised’ understanding of subjectivity. This is partly what 
Foucault warned against, in his analysis of power, suggesting that to focus on 
the effects of power was not to suggest that power is the antithesis of freedom, 
and therefore to discursively frame an opposing force from which to counter the 
forces of marginalisation (1982). Indeed this has been the tendency of many 
critical studies on liberal governmentality, which have opposed modernist 
framings of emancipation that understand progress as the advancement of 
technocratic consciousness exercised by the autonomous and rational subject 
                                                             
2009b), some critical scholars still retain the framework of ‘social contract’ (Richmond, 2010b; 
Van Leeuwen & Verkoren, 2012) which retains significant ties to state-centric, Westphalian and 
typically modern understandings of consensus, peace and political representation. 
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(Scott, 2005, p. 32) by integrating alternative, and marginalised narratives into 
the mainstream discourse. It is then difficult not to turn the tables on the critique 
of the liberal peace itself, in that the project of emancipating (away) from the 
liberal peace may not inherently be taken as free from the potentiality of its own 
normative aspirations. 
If, then, the aspiration of these critical struggles is to identify the 
conditions that limit the subject’s freedom and to emancipate the subject towards 
better futures, how different is this logic from that of what is identified (and 
condemned) as the liberal way of development? Arguably, not sufficiently. “The 
liberal way of development privileges adaptive self-reliance” says Duffield 
(2010, p. 67), although this, in a way, is not dissimilar from the self-reliance 
expected of the empowered local subject whose resisting voice can potentially 
be its ticket to success in a world of ever changing meanings and unfixed 
realities. 
This manner of valorising local agency as the expression of a pragmatic 
‘everyday’ understands local agency as the enabling element that can develop 
‘new ways’ of thinking about peace by presenting alternative narratives as 
delineated forms of interest-based agency.7 If previous transformations in 
paradigms, such as that from liberalism to neo-liberalism, were taken to be the 
emergence of new and more invasive ways of governing through the 
instrumentalisation of individual agency (Hindess, 2000, pp. 71–2), then one 
could also question whether the conceptual framing of the ‘everyday’ as 
instrumental to the empowerment and emancipation of the local subject can also 
part-take in framing individual agency as interest and as an abstracted, future-
projected ‘possibility frontier’. This, as will be seen in the next chapter, lends 
                                                             
7 The fixing of agency within a neatly identifiable set of interests with a telos and an ethos, (in 
particular when it is tied to the terminology of the ‘local’ or when it is framed as ‘resistance’) 
could also explain why hybridity can hardly be considered a post-modern solution to a modern 
problem. Instead, it is much more likely to be a modern solution to a modern problem, much in 
the same way that emancipation of the subject is a solution given by modernity to a problem that 
modernity itself created. Pieterse suggests that “hybridity is a sensibility of our time in that 
boundary and border-crossing mark our times” (2001, p. 20), in that the inclusion of hybridity 
for the improvement of the human condition would not be necessary if we did not accept, a 
priori, the existence of difference, boundaries, demarcations. This could partly explain why, as 
I have mentioned above, regardless of the level of conceptual nuance towards prior hybridisation, 
complexity and contingency, the discourses on hybridity inevitably result in some degree of 
binary-making. 
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itself quite appropriately to the further extension of regulatory methods to control 
the conduct of society, to planning, benchmarking and calculating. This does not 
mean, necessarily, that the local turn is ‘liberal’, or that it perpetuates liberal 
governmentality willingly or even unknowingly. Indeed it is valuable to move 
away from assuming that certain epistemological methodologies are only 
‘liberal’ or that the liberal peace is a coherent and cohesive discursive category 
(see Chapter 1). Instead, it may be worth understanding how the rationality of 
governance which is at play in the vision of the local turn’s project of political 
change may also responsible for the manipulation of biopower for the purpose 
of societal control. 
4. ‘Accessing’ the Everyday? Normativity in the Age of Fragmented 
Governance 
I have suggested that a normative ethos provides direction to the emancipatory 
project of the local turn. In this section, I suggest that the arbitrary selection of 
which agency to valorise as the ‘truer’ form of the ‘everyday’ beyond the fiction 
of the liberal peace is at odds with the theoretical foundations of the local turn’s 
non-linear logic. What this produces is a tension between the normative 
imperative that drives the selection of worthy agency, and the desire to fragment 
governance to give space to the interconnected, flowing power of the everyday. 
What is at stake here is primarily an issue of analytical coherence; 
admittedly, the theorisation of the normative basis of many of these critical 
perspectives is limited, if not secondary or entirely omitted in light of the non-
linear attempt to not close the horizon of possibilities. Yet, one could suggest 
that there is a point to identifying the existence of a baseline of normativity. The 
relevance, in particular, has to do with the link between normativity, linearity 
and universal claims, through which it is increasingly difficult to conceive of a 
multiple, fragmented and contingent reality. The normativity of the local turn 
itself (along with what this normativity implies ontologically and 
epistemologically), despite not being openly engaged with in critical accounts, 
is evident in the way in which local agency is valorised. As a practical example, 
in studies on post-conflict pacification, narrative therapy is taken to be a 
legitimate manifestation of everyday responses to trauma that subjects can use 
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to re-shape the course of their lives (Pia, 2013); yet, other forms of responses to 
traumas – existing in an ethical grey area, but existing, contingently and 
empirically, no less – are largely under-researched in their contribution to the 
discourse of the everyday. To what extent could, for instance, the armed ‘bridge-
watchers’ of Mitrovica (Kosovo) be responding to trauma in their own 
‘everyday’ way? And what would it mean to acknowledge the impact 
(normatively neutral at least in theory) of such behaviour? 
Other forms of agency are also more clearly assessed on the basis of their 
violent/non-violent expression (Mitchell & Richmond, 2011, p. 24).  It is 
particularly difficult to distinguish violent from non-violent resistances 
(particularly as some struggles have changed their approaches throughout time, 
and as there exists a thin line between violence and lack thereof, filled with 
different, blurry and nebulous psychological quasi-violent methods). If the 
acceptability of these local forms of resistance as worthy of the discussion on 
the everyday were to hinge on their positionality regarding conflict/non-conflict, 
this would rely on a binary distinction not just of local/international (which is 
what critics such as Sabaratnam (2011b)⁠, Heathershaw (2013) and Hameiri 
(2011) ⁠ have already cautioned against) but also, importantly, between 
violence/non-violence, which is not unproblematic and is, in fact, predicated on 
generalisations and arbitrary definitions of what ‘violence’ or ‘conflict’ would 
consist of and what forms these struggles may take. Their allocation to either 
camp for the identification and promotion of “non-violent ways of conflicting” 
(Mitchell & Richmond, 2011, p. 24) would similarly be as arbitrary as more 
traditional, linear attempts to identify acceptable non-violent forms of 
confrontation or, indeed, to identify a clear status of ‘peace’. The unclear logic 
that drives the manner in which the alternative voices in need of emancipation 
are legitimated finally raises a core question to deal with the conceptual logic of 
the critique, namely, the normative framework which dictates the terms and 
characteristics of what/who needs to be empowered, how, and in what direction. 
The case of Kosovo demonstrates that it may, in fact, be the case that in 
their interaction within fluid networks, individuals, agencies, institutions (that 
which critics call ‘hybridity’) may evidence the appropriation, alteration, 
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assimilation and hybridisation of the actors’ defining characteristics, agendas 
and ideas, although in ways which are not always necessarily identifiable. The 
transformation of certain political parties’ agendas is arguably a fitting example. 
This goes for parties such as LDK and PDK that have traditionally been tied, 
through elite politics and diaspora connections, to foreign donors, international 
organisations and agencies, where the influence of external ideas is more 
obviously evident (see Sörensen, 2006). But it is also the case for the 
transformation of political parties that have gone through a radical 
transformation, such as Vetevendosje, from underground resistance movement 
upon its inception, to the fringes of political life in the early phases of the mission 
in Kosovo, to established and institutionalised participants in parliamentary 
democracy. Vetevendosje’s agenda has also altered with time, as has its stance 
on the presence and role of international actors, from an openly hostile stance 
(mostly visible in the famous graffiti slogans painted all over Pristina), to a 
tolerant and even supportive one. In general terms, concepts such as democracy, 
liberalism, or ‘European’, have been adopted by local groups and adapted to suit 
local understandings of the same in ways which may, at times, counter traditional 
western/northern understandings, but which may equally demonstrate a 
fundamental agreement with the European understanding of the concept. When 
asked about having any objection towards the imposition of external European 
principles and ideas, Vetevendosje’s leader Kurti asserted: “I’m okay with 
European integration. […] us making steps towards EU is good.” (Face-To-Face 
Interview, 2012a). Director of political NGO Jeton Zulfaj, when asked the same 
question responded that the real problem was the unrealistic nature of the 
extension of these principles, through in particular the unfulfilled promises of 
joining the EU; he stated “only the lucky ones can go over to western Europe 
and touch this European democracy. We want euro, we want NATO, we want to 
be like them but we’ve never really enjoyed them, we haven’t seen how it ends” 
(Face-To-Face Interview, 2012b). Despite questioning the techniques, methods 
and paths, often, it seems, concepts and ideas coming from outside are accepted 
in principle, albeit becoming largely altered (or hybridised) when they are 
adopted for policy or agenda-making. Less identifiable forms of hybridity at that 
point could be represented by the unique brand of capitalism adhered to in the 
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country, which is in itself a conflation of – but not limited to – elements of 
Islamic communitarianism, Christian secularism, and neo-liberal developmental 
approaches.  
What this latter example suggests is that the agency required to enact, 
appropriate, exchange and relate inherent in a truly fluid network can actually be 
negated when it is framed mainly as resistance to a set of ideas that are associated 
with previously negative outcomes (i.e. the liberal peace), which is what happens 
when scholars of the local turn ask the question “what if local agencies do not 
concur with their liberal agendas?” (Richmond, 2010b) ⁠. Whilst not suggesting 
that this question is in itself irrelevant, it is also possible to conceive of the 
possibility that agency, when framed within the idea of the social as endemically 
complex and contingent, may express itself in the form of co-option or even in a 
way that subscribes to a liberal model, for a variety of reasons, interests and 
circumstances. This, arguably, would accentuate the tension between the desire 
to open up to multiple ontologies of peace, and the acknowledgement that some 
of these may aspire to be ‘liberal’ or something possibly more unpredictable that 
has not even figured in the local turn’s understanding of agency yet. To be clear, 
this is not an apologia for any or all forms of interventionism, all agendas or 
policy proposals, but it merely employed to suggest that by picturing the local 
as always resisting the ‘liberal’, or always ‘resisting’ something, and associating 
that fight with a logic of “resonant emancipation” (Richmond, 2010b), the view 
concurs not only in the very same romanticisation of the local vehemently 
discouraged initially, and in a romanticisation of what the liberal is. More 
crucially and problematically, it works against the local turn’s own objective of 
embracing contingency, by proposing a form of instrumental ‘accessing’ of the 
everyday and its expressions for the main purpose of resisting the perceived 
origin of hegemonic power, thus implying a positionality and a normative 
direction which is evident, albeit ignored or denied. Furthermore, agency is 
limited to retroactive resistance, and it is thus increasingly difficult to square the 
emancipatory circle, without being able to acknowledge any form of agency that 
produces and affirms. 
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This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, vis-à-vis the theoretical 
preference for non-linearity, contingency and complexity, this effort to identify 
and make visible hidden everyday realities implies the separation of identities 
that supposedly make up the untraceable networks of complex, hybrid relations. 
If complexity is, on the one hand, valorised as a material reality within which 
the exercise of separating then international from the local is discouraged by 
critical approaches, on the other hand, the expectation of identifying and 
separating the authentic from fictional and stereotypical representations of the 
everyday requires carrying out precisely that same form of boundary-making 
that separates identities and thus, negates hybridity or complexity. Thus, the 
realm of the everyday is abstracted and imagined as a plane beyond 
instrumentalisation and manipulation, ‘de-politicised’, as Sabaratnam suggests 
(2011a, p. 797), and beyond top-down governance and universalised projects. 
At the same time, however, the everyday, is practically accessed by 
critical perspectives in a manner which legitimises the alternative normative 
project proposed by the critical perspectives. This, whilst continuing to declare 
the end of absolute solutions, universal truths and cause-effect calculations, and 
thus whilst being careful not to provide teleological foundations for its critique, 
implies a normative direction opposed to the liberal peace in its identification of 
resistance, in particular. Thus, arguably, the critique promotes a project which is 
firstly in denial of its normative aims and methods, and secondly, promotes 
disengagement and a virtual ‘authentic’ form of agency, which is, according to 
Sabaratnam, also inherently trivialised as a less political form of engagement in 
virtue of its association with more ‘mundane’ behaviours (2011a, p. 797). 8 
                                                             
8 This may, indeed, be the case for accounts that widely identify everyday agency mainly with a 
large pool of informal actions and behaviours ranging from knitting, to mothering, to graffiti-
making, to the use of the black market. David Roberts’ definition of the everyday includes the 
most disparate forms of human behaviours associated with the everyday: 
 
…selling out-of-date aspirin and sweets outside refugee camps, roadside vendors 
selling petrol in Corona bottles, policewomen bribing motorists, street children 
taking food from people in outdoor restaurants, hawkers at ferry ports selling pigs’ 
trotters for the journey, old men peddling rickshaws loaded with car bodies to scrap 
yards and smelters, or parents openly bribing teachers to provide the desired grade 
for their children’s school exams (2011a, pp. 89–90).  
 
The common thread that ties these elements together is agency understood as “socially 
sanctioned ways in which people outsmart their surrounding limitations and manage the gaps 
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A paradox begins to form, in the shape of a tension between the linearity 
of normativity and the non-linear objectives of re-conceptualising peace-
building to valorise contingency and complexity. The reluctance to acknowledge 
the linear tendency of the normative project of reversing the liberal peace project 
has put forward an understanding of ‘accessing’ the everyday which renders the 
critique potentially vulnerable to a reliance, once again, on goal-driven processes 
of peace-building that privilege a focus on amending procedures rather than 
questioning foundational assumptions and concepts regarding governance of 
post-conflict territories. In the critical turn, the acknowledgement of the 
‘complexity’ of the social milieu, the need to by-pass ‘off the shelf’ universal 
solutions, is met with a call for context-specificity. But the trademark incredulity 
for foundationalism typical of critical approaches is foregone in favour of an 
understanding of change that requires a multi-layered approach to ‘the way we 
plan’, and thus one which does not abandon the ideas of ‘planning’ and 
‘management’ which are typically associated with modern approaches. 
Applying complexity theory to the study of peace-building, Cedric De Coning 
suggests: “in a non-linear social system the ‘one-problem-one-solution’ 
construct does no longer make sense because the linear cause-and-effect logic 
no longer applies” (2013, p. 4). Despite this the author also suggests the need for 
“a new planning model that can recognise the need for continuous iterative 
processes and that enable interventions to evolve along with the surrounding 
system” (ibid, p. 4)⁠; this new planning model requires a new way of thinking 
about knowledge production and transfer (potentially the basis for rethinking 
modernist epistemological foundations) that can replace ‘lessons-learnt 
approaches’ with a “new focus on learning from the context, from the tactical to 
the operational” (ibid, p. 4). Nonetheless, it remains substantially unclear how 
altering the focus of knowledge transmission to make it flow from the bottom to 
the top (or from the periphery to the centre, as De Coning would put it) would 
                                                             
between constraints and aspirations in the face of inadequate disinterested and incompetent 
authority and power” (Roberts, 2011b, pp.412-413). Resistance as resilience-building, or ‘bio-
political resilience’ as Roberts calls it, is also a core theme. The aim of this is to manipulate the 
“surrounding natural, social and economic political structures” (ibid, p. 413). This raises an 
interesting question regarding, again, the identification of everyday forms of agency; if 
everything can be everyday agency, what is the added conceptual value of identifying the 
‘everyday’? And also, if everything is everyday agency, what is not? 
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contribute to a radical project to alter the fundamental manner in which we 
approach the problems of societies, problematise behaviour and understand the 
logic behind the plethora of possibilities and alternative narratives open to us. 
Learning from the context, in this sense, might be akin to expanding the 
knowledge basis to ‘grasp’ and manage complexity, much like I suggested 
disciplinary and bio-political forms of peace-building do. 
Finally, in putting resisting agency to work in the sense of employing it 
as a tool for the emergence of an alternative normative framework against the 
liberal peace paradigm, the critical scholarship then translates the call to 
appreciate complexity and contingency into a plan to chart and guide the subject 
towards resilient subject-building, much like the modernist and linear 
approaches do through the imposition of reform plans, or through less coercive 
and yet still goal-driven projects of capacity-building. The ontological 
assumption here is one profoundly linked to the management of local agency, or 
rather, to the need to initiate an upward move towards empowerment. Just as the 
concept of ‘good governance’ represented a technique in the normalisation of 
behaviour and elimination of illegalities (i.e. abnormal behaviours, elements and 
narratives that were not desirable within a finite understanding of society), so 
can the unproblematic legitimisation of alternative struggles in a way which does 
not shed light upon its normative basis also come to be a technique of 
normalisation of the conduct of societies. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
this shift towards the local could, then, contribute to the internalisation, further 
refinement and further economisation, of methods for the control of societies 
through its call for emancipation legitimated in terms of the ability to turn on the 
transformative potential of the empowered subject. This does not necessarily 
mean that the radical drive behind the critical shift is condemned as irretrievably 
unrealistic and utopian as assessed against some universal understanding of 
feasibility, but rather, that it is far closer to the rationale of modernity that 
informed previous forms of peace-building conceptualisations than its promoters 
care to admit. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that despite advocating a relativisation of the 
identities involved in the conceptualisation of hybridity (Visoka, 2012b, p. 26), 
and of the preference for non-linear approaches exemplified by the emergence 
of the realm of the everyday, the local turn’s framing of the ‘everyday’ has 
presented certain problematic features that could arguably undermine its 
potential for a radical re-conceptualisation of peace-building. 
Through the legitimisation of the ‘local’ as the subject to be emancipated 
and empowered, in fact, the local turn provides a judgement value that gives 
local agency a clearly delineated identity and shape. The critical turn towards the 
local is driven by the rejection of the liberal peace, which provides its search for 
alternatives a point to emancipate the subject from and a logic that somewhat 
provides also a linear direction to emancipate to. The alternative narratives 
championed by the critical approaches on the ‘everyday’ and the ‘hybrid’ are 
then legitimised mainly according to their stance vis-a-vis the liberal peace and 
a number of strategies that are considered to be ‘unbecoming’ and undesirable 
(e.g. lengthy, unaccountable, extensive transitional authorities like the ones in 
Bosnia and Kosovo are now considered to be problematic). It is then implied that 
the more the alternatives are the expression of resistance or non-compliance to 
the hegemony of the liberal peace, the better the chance that they represent 
something more ‘authentic’ and closer to local societies’ real needs (Mac Ginty, 
2012a; Mitchell & Kelly, 2011; Richmond, 2010b; Riessman, 2000). 
This, I have suggested, implies two fundamental assumptions: firstly, an 
epistemological assumption regarding the ability to know and access the ‘real’ 
conditions that determine the social context of the subject, to identify the 
elements that oppress him (i.e. the liberal peace and its actors), which is not 
fundamentally dissimilar from the linear logic that underpinned modernist 
frameworks of development. Secondly, and relatedly, it permits the formulation 
of strategies of emancipation from and to. This, in turn, presupposes that the 
local turn is conceptualised as occupying a position that can identify the practices 
that are holding back the subject and to initiate a ‘revolution’ from a position of 
privilege. In other words, the local turn begins to demonstrate certain normative 
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assumptions on the nature and direction of development itself not unlike the 
modernist tradition that spurred linear understandings of development. 
It may be, arguably, that the drive to operationalise this plan of political 
change, without acknowledging or ditching a normative drive and sense of 
progress, provides a narrow path to these emancipatory perspectives that is 
dictated by goal-oriented imperatives that are, in themselves, the fruit of 
epistemic orders that have normalised and crystallised a certain concept ideal 
path to emancipation itself. In other words, if the problem with modernist 
understandings was mainly the linearity that closed off all other alternative 
avenues that could truly valorise the complexity of network and agency, and if 
this needs to be rethought, it is increasingly difficult to ascertain how a turn 
towards the local could do that whilst promoting an idea of emancipation that is 
still irrevocably goal-oriented and linear. The new paradigm is, thus, doused in 
futurity and embedded in an epistemology of planning for tomorrow, of 
managing the conditions that halt the full potential of the agent and hinder his 
progress along the axis of personal development. If the ‘real’ conditions of the 
everyday are necessary for the unlocking of a more nuanced version of peace, 
this is only because there is an inherent belief that the ‘everyday’ is somewhat 
‘closer’ to a normatively ideal sense of a ‘better’ peace. The focus on the 
‘everyday’, as will be seen in the next chapter in more detail, thus becomes a 
technique of control that categorises social experiences as cumulative and thus 
contributes also to a sense of time as ‘evolutive’ and progressive (Foucault, 
1991a, p. 160)⁠. The next chapter will focus on outlining how the normative drive 
of the local turn outlined above runs the risk of turning these potentially radical 
critical approaches to peace-building into mere technical improvements on 
existing methods of social control.  
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Chapter 5 
The ‘Uncritical’ Turn:  
Between Modernity and Non-Linearity 
Introduction 
The last three chapters have focused on the trend in the re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building which represents the culmination of generations of critical 
engagement with peace-building theory and practice. The local turn, as I have 
identified it, has been concerned with pointing out the negative outcomes of top-
down liberal approaches to peace-building (imposition, coercion, othering, 
marginalisation, oppression, exploitation). The thesis has indicated, in Chapters 
2 and 4, that this shift is underpinned by a critique that conflates the hegemonic 
tendencies with linear approaches under the rubric of western, liberal modes of 
thinking and practising peace-building. Moreover, the previous chapter has 
suggested that the local turn itself, when engaging in its project of overturning 
the liberal peace, presents certain analytical tendencies of selectivity that may 
prevent it from achieving its critical, non-linear potential. 
This final chapter draws attention to an important consequence of the 
critique operated by the local turn. The chapter, in fact, suggests that a tension 
between the need to pluralise peace-building along non-linear lines and the 
linearity provided to the local turn by its claims regarding how the possibility of 
identifying and accessing a more ‘authentic’ form of everyday agency has tested 
the limits of how the local turn’s non-linear emancipatory project. 
To outline the difficulties of the local turn’s project of rethinking peace-
building the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on 
‘spatialisation’ as the process of embedding actors and identities in time and 
space through the selection and legitimation of certain forms of agency over 
other. This, it is suggested, stems from the exercise of a form of normalising 
judgement that derives from the previously identified normative project of 
resistance to the liberal peace (see Chapter 4). The process of translating the 
‘abstract’ everyday into practical expressions of everyday agency presents 
several problems, the most notable of which is the clash between aspirations of 
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non-linearity and complexity, and the linear process of physically identifying 
authentic forms of local agency from the allegedly ‘fictional’ and ‘virtual’ ones. 
The second section, on normalisation, draws out the linear elements of 
the processes of normalisation present in the local turn’s project of change. The 
section suggests that the normative core of the latest critical shift, previously 
unpacked in Chapter 4, makes it suitable to the extension of a normalising gaze 
and techniques to normalise societal control in a manner which is not dissimilar 
from techniques associated to liberal governmentality. An ethos of 
normalisation, different from liberal governmentality albeit based on linear 
principles, results in the local turn handling complexity through managing 
individual and collective behaviours according to pre-established sets of regimes 
of practice (for instance, through the claim to accessing the ‘authentic’ nature of 
the local, through the arbitrary selection of and preference for certain types of 
local agency over others). The normalisation operated by the local turn, whilst 
largely underexplored, remains visible in the bias towards certain forms of 
agency, and arguably further stresses the contradiction between the non-linear 
goals of the local turn and the linear pull of normativity. 
Finally, as the third and final section explores, the contradiction between 
the fragmented, bottom-up understanding of governance and the normalisation 
of society operated by the local turn’s identification of agency in the everyday 
has an important consequence for the individual at the centre of peace-thinking 
in the local turn. The individual is in the paradoxical position of having to govern 
without being able to be governed. As this question of governance is framed 
within peace-building that still retains its aspirations to productively build peace, 
the local turn’s project then attempts to reconcile a loose understanding of a-
political, abstracted everyday agency with a militant, normative understanding 
of what societies should look like (one, for instance, that puts a premium on 
resistance). As such, whilst on the one hand framing the authentic as a realm that 
cannot be managed and governed through traditional top-down forms of 
governance, on the other hand, it also frames the need for emancipation by 
framing peace-building directly against the liberal peace. As a result the resisting 
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subject, the post-liberal subject, is understood as a rational, transformative 
subject through which the project of social change can be practically enacted. 
The thesis’s final contention is proposed in this chapter, suggesting that 
the opening up to multiple ontologies of peace sought by the local turn cannot 
be fully unpacked through the focus on the contingent and the everyday in the 
way in which it has been so far formulated. As it stands in the literature, the 
everyday actually reduces the agency of the subject to spatialised resistance, and 
enables further social intervention in the form of resilience-building, whilst 
negating these effects of power on account of its benevolent aims of 
emancipation through the attainment of the virtual ‘authentic’ plane. 
1. Situating the ‘Everyday’: Spatialising Identities 
The problem of the everyday brings to the fore a tension between the local turn’s 
attempt to pluralise and fragment governance in order to reflect the contingent, 
heterogeneous materiality of the everyday, and the framework of peace-building 
which assigns particular identities and positions to the agents within the 
interventionist paradigm. This section suggests that this tension embodies a 
contradiction, visible in the manner in which agency is identified and legitimised 
as being the expression of the authentic everyday, in the local turn; this is the 
production of a form of ‘spatialisation’ which may run against the principle of 
non-linearity that animates the local turn’s attempt to open up space for the 
conceptualisation of multiple and plural ontologies of peace. 
The issue of spatialisation is important to the local turn in that in their 
attempt to go beyond the binaries and identities created by the liberal peace, they 
seek to embrace the hybrid, complex and fluid quality of everyday agency. As 
suggested in the introduction and in Chapter 4, critical, non-linear perspectives 
condemn the tendency of modernist and linear accounts of International 
Relations to identify a spatial division between identities and agents; in 
traditional development paradigms, for instance, Praeg (2010) suggests that this 
is mostly visible in the identification of the locus of poverty. Within this context, 
the site of social intervention is always outside, externalised, in relation to the 
action and actors that initiate the intervention (i.e. ‘us’ and ‘them’). This also 
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makes it possible to identify a dividing line between interveners and subjects of 
intervention. These lines and identities are often located through: 
…an ideologically over-determined spatialisation and 
temporalisation of a difference on the basis of which intervention 
becomes a voluntary, charitable act of intervention in the lives of the 
poor. Assistance is conceived of in terms of volition and exteriority, 
its ethics, one of conscience and not responsibility (Praeg, 2010, p. 
260). 
These binaries are then solidified in the processes of domination of the 
hegemonic meta-narrative. Jabri, for instance, suggests that modernist 
understandings of conflict included cultural differences only to “determine the 
legitimate, the acceptable, the righteous and the barbarian” (2007, p. 153); 
cultural identity was then used to produce subjects that are “categorised and 
spatialised, shaped in accordance with the rationalisations of discursive and 
ultimately institutionalised modes of identification. In a context defined in terms 
of a global ‘war against terrorism’, such rationalisations are often interlaced with 
friend/enemy identifications” (ibid, p. 153). The binary categories created are 
problematic in that they create a universe of ‘spatialised units of analysis’, which 
support the provision of “a temporal logic” to processes such as development or 
failure; these binary assumptions are said to forego other relational perspectives 
that can open up to multiple understandings of social change (Shah, 2009, p. 19). 
In conflict contexts, spatialisation is said to be contributed to by the formal 
structures of government (i.e. the formal constitutional make up of Bosnia); 
however, this can also be contributed to, unwittingly, by citizens in their 
‘everyday’ actions, as Galvanek suggests in the case of the ‘ethnic spaces’ 
created in Bosnia by citizens’ display of flags and symbols. 
Yet, Galvanek also suggests that the everyday can also be the main 
source of resistance to formal spatialisation, visible in the ways in which citizens 
refuse to be identified with a particular ethnicity, such as the case of people 
refusing to specify their ethnic provenance in Bosnia or across the Green Line in 
Cyprus (2013). Luke, too, has suggested that resistance comes from below, from 
the multitude, and represents a direct attack to the ‘modernising biopower’ of the 
Empire’s project of hegemony. The struggle over control is fought in certain 
‘spatial registers’, with Empire aspiring to extend its reach through fluid, 
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transnational projects of democracy promotion and coalition-building, and with 
the multitude focusing instead on achieving narrower, localised aims of 
autonomy and self-rule, as Al Qaeda in Iraq shows (Luke, 2007). Here it is noted 
that spatialisation is an outcome of institutionalised governance (for instance 
imposed peace-building provisions), and that the everyday is the site where 
resistance to it originates, thus placing the two fields in opposition to each other. 
Indeed, contrary to linear perspectives, relational views of peace-
building would understand ‘the everyday’ as a realm of contingent relationality, 
an assemblage of hybrid networks, where the identification of clear cut identities 
and agendas is discouraged. So within this understanding, accessing the 
everyday is called upon as a way to avoid doing violence to the heterogeneity of 
existence. Mac Ginty and Richmond, exemplify this belief: 
These localised epistemologies and discourses are distinct from 
Western modes of thinking in one important respect: their variance. 
The sheer heterogeneity of the sources of localised thinking and 
expression means that there is no neat framework of ideas and that 
any genealogy of a universal norm or institution will tend to uncover 
hidden injustices that need to be rectified. The local turn is 
characterised by a cacophony of thinking (2013, p. 780). 
These perspectives then suggest that because of this plurality, attempts to govern 
over the complex and contingent, over the hybrid and fluid, have so far created 
warped and virtual forms of peace (Lidén, 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2007; 
Richmond, 2004b), implying, as I have outlined in Chapter 2, the existence of a 
more ‘authentic’ form of everyday agency, an ‘authentic local’ (Richmond, 
2009b, p. 328) ⁠, ‘actual local’ or ‘real everyday’ (ibid, p. 326). Since the reality 
of the milieu can now only be accessed through acknowledging the contingency 
of the everyday, intervention then, was seemingly no longer able to re-create the 
social through an outdated understanding of governance as a mere link between 
ruler and land, shifted towards forms of facilitation, partnership and support 
(Chandler, 2014a, pp. 78–9)⁠. Indeed, the acknowledgment of the contingent and 
complex milieu frames the problem of the social as one that cannot square the 
circle of non-linearity with top-down interventions and theoretically reduces the 
salience of spatialisation. The abandonment of strictly spatialised 
understandings of governance is an issue that is very close to post-modernists in 
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general.1 In theory, the end of top-down governance represents the ultimate 
fragmentation of power and the acknowledgment that the very issue of governing 
populations goes beyond establishing vertical structures that tie the authorities 
to the land, through the population, but that governance itself depended on the 
acknowledgment of the undisputable underground forces of the contingent 
‘everyday’ and their fluid, non-linear, relational nature.2 
Since the complex milieu and its occurrences can no longer be accessed 
through instrumental engineering from the top by fashioning causal connections, 
imposing sovereign authority, or implementing blueprints (Belman Inbal & 
Lerner, 2007, p. 47; Lidén et al., 2009; Pouligny, 2009, p. 15), it was then 
implied that the everyday reality of post-conflict societies can only be made 
accessible through non-linear, pluralised and effused understandings of the 
relations of co-constitution and transformation that constituted the social. 
Linear understandings are problematised because insofar as they 
acknowledge that the world is complex, these perspectives continue to 
understand the occurrences constitutive of the complex milieu, like conflict, as 
‘complex emergencies’, in need of further control. Along these lines, it was 
                                                             
1 For a comprehensive overview of the relationship between anti-foundationalist, non-linear 
perspectives and the issue of space and agency, see Murdoch (2006). Post-colonial scholarship 
is also interested in the ways in which subjects have been constructed and their identities 
cemented in specific physical and social positions of subordination; for post-colonial 
perspectives on spatialisation see Kapoor (2008) and Bhabha (1994). As it pertains to the 
problem of the structure of governance, post-structuralist, in particular Foucauldian scholars of 
governmentality have also been interested in the way in which spatialisation of identities 
permitted particular instruments of governmental control and discipline to persist as tools of 
governmentality; see for instance Kingfisher (2011). 
2 Indeed both Oliver Richmond and Michel De Certeau are concerned with the issue of the 
relationship between non-linearity and the spatial expressions of relationality. The linearity of 
rigid institutional approaches to governance is contrasted by the non-linear, relational and fluid 
‘opportunities’ that arise in the everyday. These ‘opportunities’ in everyday life, as De Certeau 
suggests, lie in “the play of alteration, the metonymic practice of singularities, and, as a kind of 
general effect, an unsettling and wily mobility” (1980, p. 41). Where these two accounts differ, 
however, is in relation to the issue of the spatialisation of the everyday. De Certeau reiterates the 
need to de-spatialise and unhinge the everyday from its spatially embedded identity: “I call 
tactics the calculated action which is determined by the absence of a proper place. Thus no 
delimitation of exteriority furnishes it a condition of autonomy” (ibid, p. 6). On the other hand, 
Richmond more firmly relies on such spatialisation in his interpretation of localisation. 
Localisation for Richmond is not merely a reactionary form of displacement resulting from 
centralised and western-centric, liberal orthodoxy, but it is an actual positive process of 
producing of the loci of agency in the post-conflict context (see: Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, 
p. 775; Richmond, 2009a, p. 572). De Certeau, arguably, proposed a non-linear appreciation for 
the everyday that is somewhat lost in Richmond’s normative grounding of the everyday into 
‘civil’ expressions of agency (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572).  
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suggested that “the concept of a complex political emergency carries with it the 
ideological means of justifying, mobilising and coordinating the state and non-
state actors of liberal peace” (Duffield, 2001, p. 163). Duffield then suggests: 
…it would make more sense, however, to rephrase the encounter so 
that liberal peace is seen to confront not complex political 
emergencies but emerging political complexes on its borders. Rather 
than remaining a pure projection, the object of governance is 
endowed with the possibility of a will and volition of its own. This 
implies elites able to choose between a range of options rather than 
just following blueprints (ibid, p. 163). 
Duffield’s political complexes represent micro-locales, or networks wherein 
interactions, power relations and co-constitutive actions concur in the creation 
of certain individual and societal choices, identities, actions and actors. 
Duffield’s perspective, like that of many scholars of the local turn that focus on 
interactions, understand what happens within these spaces (‘everyday’) by 
looking at the relationality of the societal problems (like conflict, for instance), 
not necessarily their origin (Coleman et al., 2013, p. 42), understanding these 
problems not at the ideological or structural level, but at the pragmatic and 
unfixed “level of practices” (Chandler, 2013b, p. 22). 
Given the framing of the local turn within the context of fragmented 
governance, non-linear understandings of peace-building frame the nature of the 
social as being one of relational networks, as opposed to distinctively identifiable 
actors. These perspectives discourage, at least in theory, the identification of 
clear identities to avoid reductionism (see, for instance, Sabaratnam, 2011a), 
preferring a relational view that would, at least in theory, leave the boundaries 
of the hybrid open and undefined (Peterson, 2012) in order to focus on the 
‘inbetweenness’. Naturally, solutions coming from the local turn, by rejecting 
simple dualisms and binaries, would seem to operate to dislodge the inclusion 
and exclusion mechanisms critiqued as qualities of the liberal peace (see Chapter 
2) by reversing top-down with bottom-up, and by giving particular attention to 
resisting and non-mainstream forms of agency (see Chapter 3, in relation to 
Kosovo and resistance). But how can this be done, without resulting to the 
vertical governance structures that the liberal peace has so far employed? The 
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practice of accessing these complex societies is, arguably, one that strikes at the 
core of this question of governance. 
When the ‘abstracted’ idea of the everyday is enacted, a form of 
spatialisation takes place that facilitates the emergence of the everyday. The 
emergence of the problem of the everyday can then be associated to what 
Foucault (1991b) identified as a move from a focus on ‘land’ to a focus on 
population,3 through which different forms of power were at play to try and 
govern over the complexities of the social and the natural; this shift is, in fact, 
identified by Foucault as the origin of the emergence of forms of power that 
could better deal with an ever changing object of governance. The emergence of 
the population as the object of governance (as opposed to the land), came to shift 
the attention towards the conditions of the life of the subject; everyday issues 
and concerns (such as famine, scarcity, death and births) were identified as the 
determinant factor in explaining societal and individual behaviour. 
Likewise, the shift to bottom-up approaches, whilst being framed within 
an increasing acknowledgment of the limits of governance from above, does not 
exist outside considerations of power and relies on its own form of emergent 
                                                             
3 Foucault’s genealogy of governance from the early stages of modern statehood suggests a shift 
away from the notion of governance based on a transcendental link between the territory and the 
ruler. The fragile link between the prince and the principality as the object of the art of 
government is then supplanted by a different understanding of government starting from 
identifying continuities between different realms of power, for instance, between the government 
of the state, the running of the family and the government of personal behaviour. The art of 
government, Foucault indicates, thus begins to include the governance of the family, economy, 
as a new level of intervention (1991b, p. 92), which cannot merely reduce the question of 
government to that of the transcendental relationship between the sovereign and the land, just as 
the government of a family, Foucault notes, is not merely the securitisation of the family 
property, but is the larger matter of the management of other issues like births, deaths, alliances 
with other families, unexpected events, wealth, etc. (ibid, p. 94) ⁠. The population is now the end 
of government, as opposed to the land or the exercise of the art of government itself (ibid, p. 
100). As such governing becomes a search for the conditions and techniques of government 
rather than the mere exercise of power over the land, and it also becomes a political science in 
that the search for these techniques relies on the use of statistics which are no longer aimed at 
administering the land but are rather used to collect information about the interlinking of 
phenomena such as deaths, birth, disease, wealth, poverty, customs, religion, etc., to map out the 
population’s regularities and patterns (ibid, p. 99). In a similar manner, it is possible to identify 
such shift in the way in which peace-building has been practised and conceptualised across its 
shift, whereby, through the turn towards pro-active and invasive state-building, the multi-
layered, complex missions as well as the multi-level, comprehensive analyses that followed are 
geared not so much towards the establishment of control over the land, but towards the 
securitisation of community, everyday life. Peace-building was then also deployed as a scientific 
method not just to impose governance from above, but rather non-coercively to gather 
information to draw patterns regarding the population’s behaviour to govern more efficiently. 
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power, much like the shift towards intrusive peace-building relied on 
disciplinary power. In fact, the power in question, biopower, can be seen at play 
in the way in which the local turn seeks to engage with the everyday, not in its 
abstracted, theoretical role, but in its practical, spatialised use to get closer to the 
populations affected by peace-building. When the essence of the theoretically 
abstract concept of the ‘everyday’ is fleshed out in practical terms, analyses often 
rely on representations of individual agency (for instance, the resisting graffiti 
city-scape of Belfast, or the knitting circles of Bosnia), which tend to identify 
agency itself in its positionality (i.e. where it is physically located) or 
functionality (i.e. the physical evidence of the acts it performs). As such, it is 
important to understand the implications of such ‘spatialisation’ of agency, that 
is, the process of translating the virtual notion of the ‘everyday’ into practical 
reality. 
‘Tapping’ everyday forms of agency or sources of knowledge, and 
drawing these out from their ‘hidden’ or ‘silenced’ status (Mac Ginty, 2013; 
Verkoren, 2008), as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is problematic not 
only because it exhibits a level of selectivity that was initially critiqued as biased, 
but also because it arguably requires a logic of spatial organisation that 
associates identities with time and space, and qualifies their actions and 
behaviours to then gauge how they fare (i.e. how liberal is a policy, or an actor, 
or how dissent is the expression of resistance). Indeed, some scholars have 
shown awareness of the potential problem of bias in conceptualising the 
everyday. Critical scholars such as Mitchell have, in fact, warned of the need to 
extend the understanding of ‘everyday’ beyond discourses that outline either the 
positive qualities of life (i.e. Richmond’s resistant agent) or the framings of 
everyday as methods of societal control (as Dean’s, Duffield’s and Rose’s 
approaches to biopolitics), in favour of an approach that grasps all the nuances 
and ambiguities of the everyday beyond this binary, acknowledging also the 
potential of the ‘everyday’ itself to be co-opted and bio-politicised (Mitchell, 
2011). 
Instead, to by-pass such problem, Mitchell has suggested looking beyond 
the typically positive understandings of the ‘everyday’, towards ‘threatworks’, 
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to establish a more inclusive method to understand not just the quality of 
everyday life that allows to identify what agency is, but also the provenance of 
it and thus, where it comes from. The scholar in fact lamented the focus on the 
quality of the everyday life produced by accounts such as that of Richmond. 
Instead, “‘threatworks’ are the sets of practices, institutions or customs through 
which people exchange, acknowledge, evade, manoeuvre, contest and otherwise 
resist threats to their collective existence” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1641). The 
response to these threats, everyday agency, is thus fluid and unfixed, extending 
to violent and aggressive behaviour, as opposed to being limited to Richmond’s 
or Mac Ginty’s preference for non-violent action.  Threatworks such as the 
display of paramilitary or sectarian flags, aggressive behaviour at parades, and 
the erection of social and physical barriers are, Mitchell argues, ways of 
diffusing and engaging with conflict in different ways and, although aggressive, 
they: 
…are crucial to the inclusion, well-being and social, cultural or 
economic integrity of the polity and the groups within it, even if they 
involve unevenness or exclusion, which may be an affront to the 
norms of peace-building actors. As such, they are not simply local 
versions of ‘negative peace’, but may instead constitute competing – 
or even conflicting – visions of positive peace developed by each 
group or community in accordance to its orientation to or place in the 
conflict (2011, p. 1644 my emphasis). 
Yet, despite evidencing a more open and pluralist understanding of the different 
way in which agency is expressed, this perspective still implies the need to 
include silenced or hidden groups, as to affect the progression from war to peace. 
The issue to highlight here is not so much the spatial identification of identities 
per se but the failure to acknowledge that such identification is a form of 
embedding the subject within social structures that are not neutral, and relying 
on this subject to operate a new form of peace-building, which is not 
conceptualised in a vacuum but in a highly normative context. Indeed the attitude 
towards identities is symptomatic of a tension in the local turn between the need 
to celebrate ‘alterity’, agonism and difference (Paffenholz, 2011, p. 148; 
Richmond, 2011c, p. 231; Shinko, 2008), whilst on the other hand blurring the 
dividing lines between positions and identities in the complex and 
interconnected everyday (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 210; Richmond, 2011c, p. 232). 
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The identification of identities becomes salient mostly when it says 
something about the vertical imposition of peace-building from above, for 
instance when it enables the identification of resistance or of a form of coercion. 
Where, for instance, Kappler points out that communities in Bosnia “often 
perceive their identities as mutually exclusive”, the author refers to this gap as 
significant to point out how “the language the EU uses is not connected to 
people’s everyday lives, with terms such as ‘peace-building’ or 
‘democratisation’ remaining meaningless beyond their institutional context” 
(2013, pp. 357–358). Lines of friction, separation and difference, thus seem to 
be mainly associated with the artificiality of the peace-building’s forceful 
creation of islands of identity, although it is not really clear how the local turn 
deals with its own boundaries-making, and or whether it accepts that 
communities themselves might create boundaries or spatialised understandings 
of the everyday even as they seemingly engage in more productive forms of 
peace-building such as community projects, ‘everyday’ activism, and organised 
or non-organised resistance. 
Moreover, accounts pertaining to the local turn, even as they perceive the 
potential for the manipulation of the everyday, or the ‘dark side’ of the everyday 
itself, still seek to harvest the knowledge coming from the ‘everyday’, to 
instrumentalise it to bring about change to the quality of life of everyday subjects 
of war. In this sense, it is not clear how the project of change of the local turn 
may differ from similarly normatively motivated projects coming from the 
liberal peace itself or by local elites. Furthermore, this brings forward another 
contradictory tension, between the de-politicised project of pluralising and 
fragmenting the everyday – regardless of the quality and outlook of the agency 
that composes it – and the rather linear process of distinguishing desirable forms 
of agency from undesirable ones. This is the case both for attempts to identify 
agency for normative purposes as well as for descriptive, explanatory ones, as in 
Mitchell’s (2011) and Visoka’s (2011) conceptual unpacking of everyday 
agency beyond positive, non-violent expressions. 
Indeed, these perspectives are captured by their own attempts to 
distinguish agency and make sense of where it comes from and what forms it 
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takes, rather than discussing how and why certain forms of political statements 
are co-opted, rejected or glorified, by either the ‘liberal peace’ or by the local 
turn itself. Examining why the local turn may react to agency in certain ways 
may, in fact, shed light on the presence and the role of the normative aspirations 
of the local turn itself that should not be disregarded, as they may contrast the 
epistemological and ontological intent to produce an apolitical, relational 
understanding of peace. 
Furthermore, the manner in which agency is identified, particularly 
within a relationship of power/resistance, and the manner in which actors are 
identified in the process of separating the virtual peace from the ‘authentic’ 
everyday demonstrates that the manner in which the relational view is 
conceptualised is not problem-free as it implies projecting a particular 
understanding of space as an entity within which the relationships amongst 
subjects and between subjects and objects take place.  This means that despite 
acknowledging the heterogeneous and at times murky and undistinguishable 
nature of the assemblages that shape these networks as social spaces, the local 
turn operates an embedding of individuals in modes of spatial organisation 
(Murdoch, 2006, p. 56) ⁠, which is operated through the rational identification of 
the identities, agendas and goals of certain actors (see Chapter 4), for instance, 
by pitting locals vs internationals or by qualifying a certain relationship as one 
of resistance (i.e. who are the graffiti artists in Northern Ireland resisting? Can 
one subject resist more than one relation of power? What happens when a subject 
stops resisting and decides to be co-opted?). The normative project that 
delineates the direction of the critique, as outlined in Chapter 4, which is what 
makes it possible to tell the ‘authentic’ everyday from the ‘fiction’ of the liberal 
peace, also makes it possible for social space to be ‘distinguished’, and for the 
network itself to be circumscribed and addressed as if it were an identifiable, 
albeit complex, whole. The subjects within these networks possess agency and 
said agency is again pinpointed and clearly identified (for instance, resistance) 
in regards to its effects on the outlook of the network (for instance, qualifying 
how graffiti resistance can change the post-conflict space). Relatedly, therefore, 
the identification of the ‘everyday’ in its physical expression, is also put in 
service of a normative plan to avoid those forms that the critique identifies as 
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being ‘too liberal’ or ‘too co-opted’ or not organic enough. This is, arguably, the 
analytical process that enables the critical perspectives to identify the ‘authentic’ 
from the ‘fiction’. 
The normative underpinnings of the local turn, unknowingly or not, may 
contribute to strengthening the assumptions, narratives and foundations that have 
so far embedded and cemented certain characteristics and identities of the 
entities and actors in the network (for instance, the implied and often under-
theorised meaning of representation, agreement and consensus, which are often 
mentioned in literature on peace-building as being the core of peace itself). This 
may, in itself, be evidenced by the apparent inability, despite numerous attempts, 
to by-pass the analytical binary ‘local/international’. Indeed, these categories can 
be considered crucial in the identification of a source of power (hegemonic 
power) which the everyday can resist in order to be given meaning ‘beyond the 
artifice’ of previous representations. If the local/international dichotomy were to 
be abandoned and the limits of these two micro-locales interrogated, the 
foundations of the local turn’s own project of overturning the liberal peace might 
be put into question insofar as these foundations themselves would cease to be 
identifiable and the liberal peace too, would cease to have clear borders. This 
tension between the fragmenting pull of non-linearity and the spatialising effects 
of identifying and qualifying agency suggests that important questions are being 
overlooked, within the local turn itself, regarding the feasibility of conceiving of 
a non-linear approach of peace-building whilst working with a framework of 
interventionism that necessarily makes a distinction between interveners and 
subjects of interventions. 
Finally, another question can be put to the local turn regarding the effects 
that the turn itself has on the subject of peace-building: as normativity persists 
in the local turn’s project of critique, spatialisation is thus put to work to 
substantiate and legitimise the new paradigm’s grand philosophy of the world. 
Within a context that, however, denounces governance as top-down imposition, 
the local turn then relies on a type of power – biopower – that fragments and 
pluralises, but is also employed to make sense of, categorise, spatialise and 
normalise agents and actors in its attempt to distinguish the ‘authentic’ from the 
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‘fiction’. The next paragraph will suggest that the spatialised identities resulting 
from the identification of specific forms of agency enables the 
instrumentalisation of biopower, producing specific effects of normalisation on 
societies and actors. 
2. ‘Normalising’ the Everyday 
The issue of normalisation is one that fundamentally has to do with the ways in 
which societies are regulated and individual and collective behaviour normalised 
according to standards that define what is acceptable and what is not desirable. 
Since some scholars of the local turn associated attempts to relate to the local 
coming from orthodox perspectives as an extension of liberal governmentality 
(Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2006; Scholte, 2004), one 
could also suggest that it is not necessary to rely on the identification of a unitary 
source of hegemonic power, or a coherent ‘liberal’ plan, to unpack this issue. 
Indeed, such a narrow focus might be counterproductive as an emphasis placed 
exclusively on constructing and then critiquing the ‘liberal’ plan may not be 
conducive to the emergence of critical perspectives that can question the 
significance of this commonality, beyond attributing it to the liberal peace’s 
manipulation. 
I would like, therefore, to distance myself from approaches employing 
Foucault’s studies on liberal governmentality and power solely to critique the 
liberal way of war (or peace), and expose the critique of the liberal peace itself 
to an appraisal of its assumptions. How does the local’s attempt to treat 
complexity compare to linear attempts to grasp complexity? In the previous 
paragraph it has been suggested that the ‘everyday’, when identified and pointed 
out by supporters of the local turn, is also similarly spatialised in delineated 
locales (although perhaps less dependent on structure). 
It will now be suggested that the normative drive of the local turn 
outlined in Chapter 4, combined with the above discussed notion of spatially 
embedded identities provide the new paradigm with the parameters of the correct 
path through which to attain the vision of political change advocated. It will also 
be suggested that the identification of local, ‘authentic’ or organic forms of 
185 
 
 
agency (resisting agency for instance) contributes to the casting of a normalising 
judgement that permits the regulation of societies according to a form of power 
– biopower – that does not rely on coercion but thrives on being perceived as 
fragmented and originating from below. The instrumentalisation of biopower to 
‘access’ the everyday does not, arguably, need to be used to suggest that the local 
turn is still liberal, but rather, to outline how biopower can be employed also in 
post-liberal frameworks that rely on a linear, para-modern rationale to 
conceptualise their project of political change through the everyday. 
In this sense, it might be useful to start by looking at the effects of the 
employment of biopower by the local turn in its exploration of the everyday. 
Since the everyday is qualified as a realm existing beyond the institutional and 
the formal, the typology of power employed to access it, which I referred to as 
biopower, operates at the level of the informal, in what Foucault would call 
‘normalisation’. Normalisation is a process through which power that 
“constitutes the other side of juridical and political structures of political 
representation” (Foucault, 2003, p. 49) is utilised to shape conduct within society 
by affirming what is normal and what is not ⁠. 
As normalisation functions to ‘make normal’ behaviour (Taylor, 2009, 
p. 52), it thus defines normal behaviour by identifying abnormal behaviour that 
needs to be harmonised or removed. For instance, the establishment of the notion 
of resistance to the liberal peace provides a view of what normal agency looks 
like (for instance, peaceful resistance, everyday activism as acceptable forms of 
agency), by providing an image of what abnormal, irregular or unacceptable 
behaviour is (violent behaviour is unacceptable, so is neo-colonialism, 
paternalism, and increasingly ‘partnerships’ and ‘support’ are also seen with 
scepticism). 
Many of these ‘abnormalities’, such as paternalism, domination and 
imposition do, indeed, resonate with most as distinctly negative and instinctively 
deplorable traits to condemn and reject, just as the idea of crime. Less openly 
rejected issues, such as the acceptability of elite politics, co-option and the 
establishment of lengthy ‘partnerships’, all of which are beginning to be 
problematised as part of the critique of the hegemonic liberal peace, reveal a 
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much more subtle process, that which enables certain actions and behaviours to 
be cast as undesirable. Yet, when certain actions, behaviours, actors and patterns 
are naturalised as ‘abnormal behaviour’, without much explanation of how a 
specific act is framed as problematic or inappropriate (and how, by consequence, 
other behaviour is accepted and justified), the process of normalisation that even 
the local paradigm might be exercising is then obscured. To apply this to our 
field, one could suggest that local turn’s critique of the liberal peace and the 
consequent wholehearted call to empower the local obscures how certain 
behaviour and acts are singularly identified as forms of domination, and how 
certain others are not. In other words, it is now, for instance, nearly universally 
accepted in critical circles that the liberal peace disempowers local voices, no 
matter how hard it tries to devolve power, or how much it says it loves all things 
local. Furthermore, whilst rejection to the ‘liberal’ peace is widely registered, it 
is also possible to see that accounts of local support for the liberal peace and its 
initiatives tend to be easily explained away by the critics as co-option or 
imposition, ultimately placing most of the negative connotations of co-option 
onto the ‘liberal’ peace; Richmond, for instance suggests that “liberalism 
tolerates or co-opts while contextualism resists, modifies and adopts” (2010b, p. 
687). What this may also cause is an almost instinctive association of issues such 
as marginalisation and alienation with an immediate culprit, at the expense of 
questioning and examining whether other systems, orders, actors, narratives, 
may also advocate practices that can result in marginalising people and 
narratives.4 
The local turn, may, in spite of its critical, denouncing role, also be seen 
to exercise a form of normalisation that derives from its own normative ethos. 
This reinforces a particular view of societal organisation that has come to be 
associated with an idealised form of resistance against a similarly idealised 
liberal peace object of critique, and thus also projecting an image of what the 
‘normal’ functioning and processes within the network are (although this normal 
appears to be an inversion of top-down into bottom-up). 
                                                             
4 One could argue that this also contradicts Richmond’s assertions regarding the fact that 
liberalism often creates hybridity where it meets the local (2009b, 2010b). The effects of 
liberalism versus those of contextualism may, thus, not be as easily established.  
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Insofar as normalisation determines the direction of social and individual 
behaviour, and establishes what ‘illegalities’ (Foucault, 2006, p. 110) (that is, 
unwanted behaviour) to avoid, it fundamentally concerns the question of 
government, as the exercise of power that derives from normalisation is aimed 
at guiding the conduct of society in one direction or another, and not merely to 
facilitate the confrontation and communication between individuals (for an 
account of normalisation in modern societies, see: Bielskis, 2005; Rose & Miller, 
1992). It follows that even the local turn, despite its denouncement of hegemonic 
power, exercises a form of power of its own which cannot implicitly exclude the 
range of methods and outcomes that may have been used prior to it (for instance, 
discipline) just on principle or because of the benevolent intentions of the 
paradigm. The local turn’s re-conceptualisation of peace-building seeks to 
reverse and denounce existing liberal norms and normalisation regimes the 
liberal project is allegedly responsible for, by promoting a new “critical agenda 
for peace” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013) and a different form of emancipatory 
framework facilitated by engaging with complexity and non-linearity. 
Nonetheless, these critical accounts remain blind to their own potential for 
normalisation and to their own forms of problematisation of abnormal behaviour 
that follow the processes of normalisation. 
To better explain this, one can identify other forms of normalisation and 
consequential problematisation of the conduct of societies. For instance, 
Foucault suggested that punishment was a reaction of the formation of the idea 
of what was criminal (1991a, p. 104); likewise, in Chapter 1, I suggested that 
extensive social reconstruction and engineering was a reaction to the idea of the 
failed state. In the case of the local turn, one could advance the hypothesis that 
the need to empower and emancipate the subject is also a reaction to the idea of 
what is now identified as abnormal behaviours such as paternalism, domination 
and imposition. None of these norms and their respective regimes, however, as 
Foucault suggests, are natural or God-given. For instance, paternalism is not, 
naturally, linked to liberal ideology but is ascertained through critique. Since 
these elements are in themselves the outcome of a discursive knowledge 
production that instinctively allows to link the behaviour or act with an image of 
appropriateness (Foucault suggests this happens to how we constitute crime). 
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These patterns of knowledge production may be more or less obvious but they 
all have an effect, wittingly or not, on both individuals and populations by 
attempting to bring behaviour in conformity with the new social norm (Taylor, 
2009, p. 52). 
The normalisation operated by the local is mostly visible in its 
naturalisation of certain qualities of the everyday, those that are privileged 
because of their position within the normative vision of the local approach. For 
instance, several authors have more than once assumed that local forms of justice 
making, like the Gacaca courts in Rwanda (Clark, 2007) and the Loya Jirga in 
Afghanistan (Mac Ginty, 2008) are valuable ways of getting to a peace that is 
naturally closer to the society it is meant to affect; nonetheless it is not clear why 
these forms of ‘local’ customs and justice are chosen over others that are just as 
‘local’ although less likely to be understood within a western-centric 
understanding of the local. Clan-based solutions are celebrated in some cases (in 
Africa or Afghanistan) but supposed to be problematic in other contexts, like in 
Kosovo or Zimbabwe, where solutions driven by one ethnicity or based on 
ethnicity are merely condemned as repeating the mistakes of ethnicised peace-
building that the liberal approach is responsible for. Oliver Richmond has, for 
instance, supported the need to place the local at the centre of the peace-building 
endeavour in Kosovo on the one hand, although, on the other, he has also 
condemned the monopolisation of the process of peace-building by the Kosovo 
Albanians (Richmond, 2011a, p. 81). Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams’s 
conceptualisation of local agency has also exhibited a similar bias, particularly 
in its treatment of guerrilla groups that have “transformed very quickly into 
political parties”; where their methods may often rely on the use of “the language 
of liberation”, the authors warn against these elites’ “too narrowly based 
agendas” that may “merely continue the civil wars by peaceful means” (2009, p. 
80). 
Even where the local turn attempts to go beyond local vs international 
dichotomies, by focusing on the relationality, i.e. the connections and 
interactions between actors, such as in Wiuff Moe’s account of relationality in 
Somaliland (2013), it is implied that the interactions are still examined within 
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the context of positive ‘reconstructive’ and ‘order-making’ efforts, 
understanding peace-building largely within productive forms of relationality in 
service of reconstruction, “acceptance and support” (Saul, 2011, p. 166). This 
means that very little attention is given to destructive interactions, what Oliver 
Ramsbotham calls radical disagreement (2013), or even to multiple, shifting and 
simultaneous registers of interactions, where agents may be increasingly difficult 
to pin down according to agenda, wants and needs. It also means that the 
problematisation of violence remains unexplored, without much understanding 
for why a paradigm may refuse to engage with or understand violent behaviour, 
and prefer to engage with forms of everyday agency which may, paradoxically, 
still only represent only a portion of the ‘everyday’ and only the one that is more 
easily interrogated, approached, co-opted or ‘made visible’. 
Finally, the very line between formal and informal is highly subjective; 
since the local turn requires accessing the everyday beyond the trappings of 
institutional set-ups, it is also responsible for identifying those struggles that it 
seeks to ‘make visible’, by separating them from the formal and institutional. 
This is, however, part and parcel of normalisation, since this exercise requires 
identifying which actors exist “beyond the artifice of civil society” (Kappler, 
2012, p. 264; Paffenholz, 2011; Richmond, 2009b, p. 331). The assumption here 
is the underlying belief in the ability to reveal or shed light upon what lies beyond 
the artifice, which may be difficult because it would entail speaking for the 
‘local’. In Kosovo, for instance, this may entail examining the relationship 
between NGOs, the state and wider populations, which is an increasingly 
complex and ever evolving one, particularly in a context like Kosovo, where 
NGOs are very small, often staffed by only two members, and often motivated 
by the need to earn a wage through sponsorship.5 In this case, the NGO itself 
                                                             
5 This was confirmed to me in an interview with ‘Celnaja’ NGO director Zulfaj: 
  
As I told you from the beginning I knew what I wanted to do, but I was also 
concerned that I couldn’t do it if I didn’t have a job and I couldn’t look after myself. 
So this was the first concern with everyone one else who started an NGO. They 
were running around to get funding from donors. Now it’s coming to a balance, 
because loads of NGOs failed because of no more donations. And all the ones who 
could really reach something are now stable and can really do good work (Face-
To-Face Interview, 2012b). 
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might want to be co-opted by the institutions, might want to exist and operate in 
the formal, work with the ‘liberal’, but as a way to respond to peoples’ own 
‘everyday needs’. In other words, these account may be in denial not only of 
their own normative baggage, as I have so far suggested, but also of assuming 
that the everyday is a-political and has no normative aim of its own, which may 
contrast the project of the local turn as well as the projects coming from other 
communities, individuals and actors. Visoka in this sense, rightly points to the 
issue of Bosnia suggesting the need to acknowledge that the ethno-cultural 
disagreement in Bosnia “might represent the will, needs, interests and local 
context of each ethnic community” (2011, p. 106), struggling for their own 
vision of the everyday. This is however jettisoned when the everyday is 
abstracted as a field where meaning can be harvested and identified anew, such 
as in Körppen’s idea of hybrid encounters as a third space, as opposed to where 
meanings may have already formed on their own. Furthermore, where 
alternative, local narratives are celebrated as contributing to a more “dynamic” 
peace process by exposing peace-building to different value systems (2013, p. 
89) it is also ideal not to entirely exclude the possibility that several of the others 
narratives of peace brought forward by the local turn, may rely on linear 
epistemologies themselves. 
The issue at stake is, therefore, normativity and the effects it has on the 
creation of subjectivities. As the local turn raised this problem with the ‘liberal 
peace’, it is also possible to question the effects of the local turn’s own 
normalisation processes. Whether the local turn nudges, implies or directly 
promotes any particular social norms, the process becomes problematic not 
because these elements may or may not be ‘legitimate’ or ‘good’, but, as I argue, 
when these are legitimised and naturalised as necessary, concealing the 
processes of normalisation and their effects on subjects behind a veil of 
benevolence. The vast acceptance of and reliance on the ‘local’ as new reference 
points in peace-building could indeed be sufficient to raise questions regarding 
                                                             
Given many of the NGOs in Kosovo were motivated by the ‘everyday’ need to earn a wage, this 
might make it difficult to separate the local agency and NGO participation from the ‘artifice of 
civil society’ provided by the fictional representation by the liberal peace and its agents 
(Paffenholz, 2011). 
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how these came to be so widely accepted and what forms of normalisations may 
be at play behind this ‘silver bullet’. 
Admittedly, this should not be taken as an ethics-based critique of the 
emancipatory approaches to peace-building, but rather, as a way to bringing to 
attention the manner in which the local turn may run the risk of exercising a form 
of normalisation not dissimilar to that encountered in linear frameworks in that 
it promotes the uncritical acceptance of something that is presented as natural. 
When a particular phenomenon is identified as ‘natural’ (everyday, the local, the 
hybrid, resistance), it is, as Taylor suggests, causally tied to the freedom of the 
individual (2009). The critical potential of the local turn then, whilst seemingly 
increasing the individual’s power to attain freedom through a valorisation of its 
agency, may indeed at the same time (though not necessarily in a zero-sum 
manner) also achieve the limitation of other possible modes of being and 
thinking which are equally identified as problematic either directly or inherently 
through the exclusion practised by the processes of normalisation. This is not 
entirely dissimilar from the exclusionary logic that drove linear, liberal 
approaches to modernisation. 
Furthermore, precisely because the local turn emerged with the 
outspoken aim of avoiding certain patterns, behaviours and outcomes typical of 
the liberal peace paradigm, the new approach is inherently projected into the 
future, hence relying on a linear notion of progress and futurity that might 
exclude, a priori, the simultaneity of multiple narratives, just as it tends to 
exclude those narratives it deems as too hegemonic, not appropriate, and not 
conforming to its normative vision. When it accesses the everyday the new 
paradigm produces knowledge regarding what it observes (and it is thus, in turn 
used to observe the spatialised everyday), and this knowledge exists in function 
of not repeating those mistakes of the past. The paradigm is then not necessarily 
accessing the non-linear present, existing amongst the chaotic and messy 
relational assemblages whose existence it acknowledges and explores, but it 
directly steers the subject away from certain directions, concerning itself not 
with opening up spaces for the marginalised narratives, but with avoiding the 
“potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 
192 
 
 
126) as well as in societies to marginalise. It seeks to modify behaviour before 
it happens, and this, necessarily, further induces goal-oriented, linear and 
deterministic, problem-solving approaches that promote further and more 
invasive forms of individual and societal intervention. 
Nonetheless, type of normalisation operated by the local turn seems to 
differ from the disciplinary power of liberal governmentality in one crucial way. 
To the extent that it no longer seeks to necessarily eliminate uncertainty in 
calculation but to actually include it by addressing each complex space and its 
units (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 147–8)⁠, it thrives on complexity and uncertainty, it 
indeed would seem to work on a different logic, dissimilar from that driven by 
the “liberal tautology” (Körppen, 2013, p. 83). Whilst I am not suggesting that 
ultimately the local turn is a mere extension of liberal biopolitics and liberal 
governmentality, it is possible to suggest that the logic that drives the local turn 
is rather consistent with the epistemological basis of modernity and with the 
employment of forms of power that have previously been associated solely with 
liberal governmentality (like biopower) by critical scholars. The identification 
of agency, the valorisation of the everyday characterises movement, complexity 
and contingency itself are reduced to a holistic entirety, i.e. the abstracted and 
virtual ‘authentic’ or ‘local-local’. 
Earlier on in this paragraph I have outlined how the critique dismisses 
the policy world’s acceptance of the local as a mere instrumentalisation of the 
same for the purpose of accessing and controlling societies by extending liberal 
governmentality. But, as suggested in this chapter, the local turn too, handles 
plurality and complexity in a not totally problem-free manner, by arbitrarily 
distributing its elements, ordering the multiplicity according to its normative 
principle as it for instance does when it expresses preference for certain types of 
local agency over other types (non-violent over violent, or ‘civil’ versus ‘uncivil’ 
as Richmond qualified them). In this way it treats everyday agency as holistic, 
the constitutive sum of which is still identifiable by it contours that divide it from 
what it is not (i.e. the authentic from the façade, the civil from the uncivil). 
Indeed this is problematic because the normative regime behind the local turn 
itself is rhetorically denied in favour of an ontologically plural framework, 
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although the selection of what forms of agency to valorise and how to do so 
require, indeed rely on, expressing a preference, and expressing value 
judgements regarding the desirability of some forms over others. 
Finally, if linear, “modern or normative praxes” (Richmond, 2010b, p. 
686) facilitated interventions geared at reproducing the ideal of western-style 
liberal democratic model (the normative goal) through top-down policy 
prescriptions (Tadjbakhsh, 2009), the critical local shift also pointed to the need 
to understand the functioning of government as a process through people as 
opposed to ‘on’ people to achieve their normative end goal within a framework 
that recognises the end of top-down governance. A goal and policy-oriented 
approach is not excluded within even the most critical perspective on 
complexity, and this is problematic because qualitative concerns regarding the 
nature and the expression of agency, whilst acknowledged as complex and 
materially contingent, are channelled into quantitative concerns regarding how 
to govern more effectively. An example of this is De Coening’s use of 
complexity theory to “a new approach to planning that goes beyond the old 
problem-solving ‘assessment-design-apply’ approach” (2013, p. 4 my 
emphasis), one whose primary purpose is not to question necessarily what, if 
any, can be accessed through an acknowledgment of the complex and 
unquantifiable nature of iterative processes of relation, but rather how to 
establish “a new planning model that can recognise the need for continuous 
iterative processes and that enable interventions to evolve along with the 
surrounding system.” (ibid, p. 4 my emphasis). Other non-linear approaches 
extend this policy-oriented attitude by calling for “enhancing monitoring” to 
generate “constant feedback” on the status of the programmes and projects 
initiated (Woodrow & Chigas, 2013, p. 226), providing guidelines for navigating 
conflicts – including strategies for identifying leverage points and plans to create 
positive, sustainable and adaptive attractors for engagement – that continue to 
be based on a lessons-learnt approach and a deterministic understanding of what 
peace means, even though they rhetorically embrace a the non-linear logic of 
ontological complexity (see, for instance, Coleman et al., 2013, p. 47) 
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Even with a focus on the everyday as a site of resistance (which was 
necessary to draw a new narrative for the new paradigm), one of the tell-tale 
signs of modernity may be reproducing itself in the local turn’s discourse: the 
focus on the population as the source of the problem did not signify a substantial 
change in the manner of problematising, nor a complete pluralisation of peace. 
As such, the need for and implication of societal intervention was often not 
discussed – as was already suggested in the case of an earlier shift in Chapter 1 
– as the issue is once again one of peace-building better rather than, questioning 
whether social engineering of that kind is at all possible. 
In so doing, the shift towards the local runs the risk of becoming a merely 
technical refinement of those modernist rationalities that require, and indeed 
expect, the control of the conduct of the individual and of societies in general, 
and that uses the ‘naturalised’ aspects of the ‘everyday’ as a tool of biopower to 
access, control, and conduct societies. In order to explore how this technical 
refinement might be even further evidenced, it is important to examine what 
effects this critical shift has had, through spatialisation and normalisation, in the 
production of specific subject positions that enable the life of the individual to 
be instrumentally accessed to carry out the social project of the change 
advocated. 
3. Subjectivation: Building the Resistant Subject 
So far it has been suggested that the normative contours of the latest shift reveal 
the limits of the local turn’s ability to deliver a non-linear, pluralisation of peace-
thinking without resorting to traditional dichotomies and binaries, and with no 
small amount of ambiguity and lack of clarity. However, it is also possible to 
suggest that the spatialisation and consequent normalisation operated through 
the shift towards the local outlined above has important consequences for the 
subjects of peace-building themselves; bringing individuals and societies 
towards emancipation produces subjects capable of being addressed, and thus 
responsible, responsive and transformative. The manner in which the individual 
is subjectivised relies on a form of power – biopower – that is diffused by way 
of being framed within the limits of governance, but which gains strength in the 
face of such diffusion in that it infiltrates societies and individuals in an even 
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more effective manner than previous forms of powers such as discipline, 
permitting normalisation at an even more atomised, hidden and uneven level. 
I have suggested that the struggle to bring to the fore alienated and 
marginalised narratives is consistent with a form of normalisation that defines 
the contours of what behaviour is desirable at the individual and societal level; 
this is then given direction by the normative aims of reversing the liberal peace 
that underpins the local turn paradigm. The type of power that is exercised 
through normalisation, biopower, as mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, is 
exercised through individuals and on individuals, at the level of everyday 
practices. The subject is both individualised and collectivised and his agency is 
made comprehensible by the definition of his struggle and his purpose (to resist 
the liberal peace, or to engender results that are different from those of the liberal 
peace). This has the potential to turn critical attempts to pluralise into a 
normative paradigm that seeks to manage individual and collective behaviour. 
The spatialisation and normalisation of agency through the identification 
of the expressions of said agency positions the identity of the individual both in 
regards to himself and in regards to society as a whole in relational terms. This 
form of subjectivation, or subject-building, requires a form of responsibilisation 
that, like liberal biopolitics, through capacity building, relies on the assumption 
of capable, transformative ‘autonomous’ individuals (Lemke, 2007, p. 44). The 
local turn’s project of political emancipation requires the subject achieving 
awareness firstly of the position of subordination occupied and secondly of the 
impossibility of relying on imposed blueprint solutions to resolve it problems; 
thus, this outlines the contours of a modernist disposition towards the subject as 
a transformative, rational and self-aware individual. Subject-building is then, in 
itself, part of the process through which biopower is employed for the purpose 
of drawing out the ideal attributes of the agent in question and transfers them at 
the community level, using relational elements such as hybridity as vehicles to 
enhance connectivity and exposure to the desired qualities of the ‘authentic’ 
subject. 
Here, it is worth looking at the notion of resilience as the epitome of 
recent non-linear ontological reflections, and to draw a parallel between the 
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subject of resilience and the agent of the local turn. Literature on resilience 
suggests a form of subject-building that does not start from linear assumptions 
about the subject’s ability to own and control its own environment but rather 
precisely because of the unknowable conditions that may generate shocks and 
dangers, it seeks to build the subject’s capacity to bounce back, to resist and to 
adapt to the potentiality of the world he inhabits (Folke et al., 2010; Kaufmann, 
2013). The social aspects of resilience-building attempt to combine notions of 
non-linearity, complexity and heterogeneity, to describe complex systems and 
their abilities to withstand external shocks such as environmental crises, political 
emergencies and natural disasters (Chandler, 2012; Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, n.d.)⁠. In a similar way, the subject of peace-building in recent re-
conceptualisations is constructed as unable to fully predict and plan for himself 
or society, which excludes any form of top-down imposition of management 
blueprints (Chandler, 2014a; Zebrowski, 2013) ⁠ As the subject is no longer able 
to determine her own future, contingency and complexity are dealt with as 
potential dangers, and peace-building, through the everyday, the hybrid and the 
relational, becomes a form of subject responsibilisation which seeks to build 
empowered, aware and adaptable subjects. 
Similarly, the subject is responsibilised through the ‘everyday’ at the 
individual, practical, daily level, since the possibility of top-down governance is 
discarded as an ontological fact determined by complexity. Since the subject’s 
life cannot be guided through deterministic, linear and teleological framings of 
governance, he is, as Reid suggests, conceptualised as an already failed subject. 
Yet, whilst he can no longer be directly governed, his potential for failure still 
needs to be managed and planned for. In fact, to the extent that the subject is no 
longer able to engineer and alter his environment, it is reduced to responding to 
shocks and dangers by using its agency only as a technique to adapt rather than 
to resist or alter those it identifies as conditions of its suffering (Reid, 2014, p. 
177) ⁠. Since these elements are ‘natural’ parts of the ‘everyday’, they do not, 
arguably, hold any explicatory value for the analysis of the shock in itself (i.e. 
‘what are the roots of war’ or ‘what role does this factor play in the recurrence 
of war’). Because these natural factors cannot be altered, and hold no causal 
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relation that can be immediately grasped through knowledge, then the capacity 
of the subject to adapt to these conditions and their potentiality has been framed 
as a ‘window of opportunity’ (ibid, p. 176) ⁠ that enables the positive exercise of 
agency itself and only insofar as the potentiality of danger is acknowledged as a 
‘natural’ attribute of life (like death, famine and conflict). The structuring of the 
‘everyday’, even if in a non-linear manner, thus continues to imply a form of 
planning and control of conduct the ultimate aim of which is to cater to 
complexity, to know it by governing over it through its subjects at the molecular 
level, as at the societal level, “outlining the possible field of actions of others” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 790) by identifying and legitimising certain physical 
expressions of everyday agency over others. The local subject of the critical 
remains framed as a rational, transformative, autonomous subject whose path to 
empowerment can be charted, quantified, economised, and rendered more 
efficient. 
Advocates of the local turn would undoubtedly reject this parallel with 
subject-building on account of its similarity to liberal governmental power. 
Indeed several critics have engaged the notion of the everyday with a nod to 
post-structuralist theories and Foucauldian perspectives in particular (Debrix, 
1999; Jabri, 2006; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Mitchell & Richmond, 2011; 
Richmond, 2010a). This is why agency was mostly identified with resistance to 
the liberal peace and its hegemonic power. Yet, it is worth referring to one 
crucial point raised by Foucault in relation to resisting agency; resistance and 
insubordination are ‘natural’ to power, in that power can only be exercised over 
free subjects, implying the existence of mechanisms of escape (resistance) that 
signal the limits of said power (1982). But crucially, the strategies of 
confrontation set up to transform or overturn the power relations are also seeking 
to become relations of power in themselves and crucially, even these, when they 
become relations of power, will have their own resistance to face (ibid). 
The local turn has so far not identified its own limits, its own resistance, 
captured in a dream of itself and its possibility in the future just as the liberal 
peace ‘benevolently’ dreamed of being able to save humanity. At the point in 
which the critical turn becomes a coherent strategy to overturn power relations, 
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that is, at the point in which the abstract authentic is identified, spatialised and 
legitimised, it itself takes the shape of a technical mechanism to alter and direct 
the conduct of societies towards its own goals. It does this through subjects, and 
without the need for domination or coercion precisely as this could hinder the 
performativity of the emancipatory project itself.  In the way in which the local 
turn translates the abstract qualities of the everyday into practice, biopower 
becomes even more successful in accessing individuals and shaping subjects. 
This is because the arbitrary selection of agency does certainly bring into focus 
some hidden narratives, but it also conceals others in the processes; this 
abstraction, therefore, exercises a type of power that “decides what aspects of a 
limitless reality are brought into sharp focus and what aspects are, literally left 
out of the picture” (Krishna, 2001, p. 403), just as much as disciplinary power 
brought into focus, somewhat more forcefully, a decisive view of what to include 
in its vision and what to exclude (i.e. spoilers). 
Indeed, Foucault notably suggested that some of the most effective forms 
of power remain hidden by not necessarily being exercised directly (and 
forcibly) on others (1982). If one were to accept that this is a quality of 
hegemonic discourses like the so-called liberal peace, would it also be fair to 
suggest that no other discourse holds the same potential or may rely on similar 
mechanisms to render itself more efficient? Undoubtedly the hidden quality of 
the everyday is the highly celebrated characteristic that enables resistance to 
operate, passively, to disrupt the violent power of the liberal hegemonic 
paradigm, but it cannot and should not be taken to be in itself, free from other 
forms of power (including those that engender difference, alienation and 
marginalisation) just because of its ‘benevolent’, revolutionary or empowering 
ethos. The very hidden, passive quality that makes resistance so successful as a 
form of power can also make it just as problematical tyrannical as more 
obviously visible forms of liberal governmentality. The discourse on peace-
building produced by the local, critical turn then also runs the risk of being just 
as ‘tyrannical’ as any other imperative narrative (including, if it were accepted 
to exist, the liberal peace) regardless of how life affirming it may be (Reid, 2014, 
p. 165).⁠ 
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What this also suggests is that the limited range exhibited by the local 
turn (mostly captured by its role of critique) insufficiently understands those 
relations, processes, acts and transformations that affect individuals, structures 
and networks as well as discourses, epistemes and narratives. For instance, if a 
non-linear appreciation of what peace is requires a deconstruction of those 
events, actors and expressions of agency that come together to produce the 
knowledge through which we form and understand the concept of ‘peace’, then 
a much deeper understanding of these elements is required beyond the discourse 
of liberal/post-liberal. This may, for one, resolve the tension between the need 
to pluralise and blur borders of identities and the continued reliance on 
insider/outsider logic to explain the behaviour of actors. It may also prevent the 
discussion of the local to be narrowly understood in terms of its romanticisation 
and its ‘dark side’ (see: Galvanek, 2013; Mitchell, 2011), or at least articulate 
this discussion within an acknowledgment of the normative parameters that 
define the perspectives involved. 
Finally, assessing the local turn against its own aims and goals may 
require looking at how the notion of peace is semantically constructed (Chandler, 
2014b; Lemay-Hébert, 2014), given the fact that the local turn continues to refer 
to ‘peace’ building. It also requires looking at what types of power imbalances 
this construction may perpetuate (Onuf, 2014), although with an eye towards 
what potential for marginalisation even the most critical project of empowerment 
may hold. If indeed a non-linear reconceptualisation of the way in which we 
think about peace is the aim of such critical endeavours, then a much more 
radical project that could revolutionise the field may require a more radical 
‘incredulity’ towards any of the foundations of paradigms that become 
orthodoxy. This should not be taken as a denouncement of any form of 
emancipatory drive, but as a caution that every emancipatory paradigm, when it 
aspires to overturn the mainstream, is doing so with a consistent baggage of 
norms, normalising judgements, goals and future-projected policies whose 
effects on subjects and societies should not be discounted only on account of 
their benevolent, non-mainstream nature. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has begun by comparing the local turn’s attempt at moving 
towards a plural and horizontal, relational understanding of the social vis-à-vis 
the practical effects of spatialising identities and agendas to better identify the 
sites of resistance, and the needs of individuals. Where spatially embedded 
accounts of conflicts were critiqued as being reductive and often responsible for 
the creation of cemented and rigid identities, it is also possible to ascertain that 
the local turn itself has operated a similar spatialisation of identities in service of 
its project of accessing the everyday. This has evidenced, aside from issues of 
arbitrariness and selectivity, other ambiguities relating to the difficulty of 
reconciling complexity with the analytical tool of identifying identities to 
explain interactions and relations of power, particularly between international 
and local actors. 
It has also been suggested that the translation of the ‘abstracted’ realm of 
the everyday into practice has followed a normative logic that has so far been 
unexplored. Normativity plays a big role in the critiques of the liberal peace, 
because of its role in the establishment of regimes that regulate the conduct of 
domestic and international societies (i.e. in the discourses of state failure or 
development and security), but the normative elements of the local turn itself 
have so far been left outside the conceptualisations of the local turn. This has 
made it possible for the local turn to present a seemingly a-political project of 
valorising the ‘everyday’ in all of its forms, whilst not engaging with its own 
normative bias. The latter is responsible, in fact, for the selection of certain forms 
of agency over others which, in turn, may present a considerable analytical 
blockage to the non-linear logic of critique of the local turn. 
Finally, it has also been suggested that within a theoretical context that 
highlights the limits of governing, the local turn’s project of accessing the 
everyday has encountered a paradox of governance that has produced ambiguous 
attitudes to the whole endeavour of building peace; if the post-conflict milieu 
can no longer be controlled or governed, how can the local turn still talk about 
peace-‘building’? This grey area has, however, enabled the local turn to advance 
a project that continues to be fundamentally tied to a logic of governance, but 
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which relies on a much more diffused form of power to operate its vision of 
political change. Where it seeks to reverse the liberal peace and pursue its 
normative vision, and where this cannot be done by coercion or top-down policy-
making, the local turn has resorted to building the subject from the bottom-up, 
enabling the instrumentalisation of a form of power that has ultimately generated 
even more effective ways of controlling societies and subjects – rather than 
bringing about the pluralisation of peace. 
The paradigm’s project of political change, by not fully rejecting the need 
for peace-building, lends itself to the creation of goal-oriented policy advice that 
translates and reduces the contingent and complex, to a reality in need of being 
understood and included in the policy framework. Thus, the idea of the everyday 
not only allows the paradigm to identify forms of agency that are legitimate 
expressions of the ‘authentic’ from those that are still deemed to be tied to the 
‘artifice’, but to actively create techniques for the management of these complex 
phenomena that seek to normalise behaviour according to the (ever changing) 
characteristics of the everyday itself, providing governance a responsiveness and 
flexibility that was consistently lacking in previous (disciplinary) approaches, 
but that aims to control and regulate societies nonetheless. 
Not only is this not fundamentally dissimilar from the arbitrariness of the 
binaries and dichotomies that the critical turn has attributed to the liberal peace 
paradigm, but is also potentially more problematic in that the alleged inability to 
govern from the top-down facilitates a view of the debate that accepts, indeed 
even warrants for the continued framing of complex problems as forever out of 
reach of management, whilst paradoxically still attempting to grasp such 
ephemeral complexity by leaving the question of the very possibility to do 
intervention and peace-building from the ‘bottom-up’ virtually untouched. Thus, 
the de-politicisation of the discourse of intervention and peace-building, left 
untouched by the abstract focus on the ‘everyday’ and the ‘authentic’ has not 
lent the analysis the possibility of opening up space for contingency and 
complexity, but rather has reduced the appreciation of complexity to the attempt 
to capture and reduce such complexity to an easily manageable reality that can 
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then be ‘scripted’ or brought into the discourse by ‘tapping’ into the ‘authentic’ 
reality beyond the artifice.  
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Conclusion 
Life after Critique? 
1. From Minimalist to Intrusive Peace-Building 
The field of peace-building has witnessed continued conceptual expansion since 
the early 1990s in a manner which has rendered it substantially more contested. 
The spread of the discourses on peace-building have made it increasingly 
difficult to identify each singular strand, narrative and constitutive element. This 
has, however, enriched the corpus of knowledge on the subject and played with 
the defining borders of orthodox interpretations and definitions of peace-
building theory and practice. 
One of the core aims of this research has been to further contribute to the 
wide scholarly field of peace-building’s conceptualisation by unpacking the 
historical unity of discourse granted by a generational view of peace-building. 
The thesis has also sought to take stock and examine the status of the academic 
debates on the subject of peace-building in order to rekindle a sense of 
contestation on the matter of the history and development of the narratives of 
peace-building. To do this, the thesis has addressed the manner in which peace-
building has developed since the early 1990s by examining shifts, ruptures and 
grand-critiques. The introduction outlined this analytical aim as well as 
suggesting that this can be accomplished by adopting methods that are consistent 
with post-structuralist examinations of the conditions that make possible the 
emergence of certain narratives. As suggested in the introductory chapter, this 
thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by systematically tracing the influential 
elements that contributed to the emergence of the critical agendas of peace-
building, by identifying the logic behind the patterns of critique that have 
characterised the conceptualisation of peace-building in theory. The thesis has 
done so in order to challenge the establishment of uncontested assumptions 
regarding the unproblematic nature of the local turn. Nonetheless, the thesis has 
done this not with the purpose of normatively discouraging the local turn, nor to 
establish an objective critique of the feasibility of the local turn and its bottom-
up approaches, but rather, to disturb some of the more ‘uncritical’ assumptions 
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within the local turn which have remained crystallised and untouched behind the 
local turn’s more visible critical, emancipatory, and benevolent façade. 
The thesis began with an outline of the emergent logic of this critique of 
the limits of peace-building, by focusing on earlier critical accounts of the mid-
to-late 1990s. These perspectives have focused particularly on identifying the 
limited and insufficiently comprehensive approach to the complex issues of 
peace-building that had been prevalent up to the mid-1990s in regards to peace-
building. In so doing, the emergent critique of the liberal peace coalesced actors, 
policies and institutions around a common ethos, that of transforming conflict-
afflicted societies into liberal territories through a common, narrow, focus on 
extending liberalisation reforms. The framing of the previous approach as 
limited and unable to grasp the nuances of the post-conflict context represented 
a call to create a more comprehensive basis to engage with the social and 
political particulars of post-conflict societies. 
This has had important implications for the development of the 
conceptualisation of peace-building itself. The problem of the complex nature of 
the post-conflict milieu framed social reality as comprised of complex events, 
elements and phenomena in need of inclusion. These elements were thus 
approached with the purpose of being understood and managed, fundamentally 
based on the linear assumption that reality can indeed be accessed, understood 
and handled. The practical assessment of the inability to fulfil the liberal vision 
through peace-building came to be associated with a lack of the acquisition of 
the ‘full picture’. This need to grasp the complex led peace-building approaches 
of the early 1990s to be conceptualised as hands-off and limited. Analyses such 
as those carried forwards by cosmopolitans and by neo-institutionalists, despite 
notable theoretical differences in their approaches (see Chapter 1), agreed on the 
need to expand the reach of the engagement. Planning for unintended 
consequences (for instance planning for possible spoilers), is one such attempt 
to meet the demands imposed on the system, an imperative to cope with them, 
and as a result, prevent and predict. Thus, the shift towards a more intrusive form 
of peace-building, equally supported by cosmopolitans and the neo-
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institutionalist scholarship, whilst conscious of the dangers of coercion, moved 
towards more invasive, if less forced, forms of social and political engineering. 
The idea of the ‘fresh’ outlook on peace-building is what drove the rise 
of new paradigms as a rupture with the past. What the rise of this critical wave 
did, however, was to cement a historically linear understanding of progress, 
where the historical narrative presented as an epic was then used as an 
explanatory paradigm. Thus, for instance the liberal peace came to be cemented 
as a coherent paradigm, regardless of its multiple theoretical and empirical 
expression, giving birth to a solid consensus regarding the way in which peace-
building had been practised so far. Indeed this has been described as problematic 
not simply because the coherent intentionality attributed to the liberal peace 
‘monster’ may be misleading and may obscure other issues that may not have to 
do primarily with liberalism (see Chapter 1), but also because this critical 
exercise represents the establishment of a regime of normative recollections of 
the past, a narrative which draws on continuous representation of the past, not 
necessarily on the contingent singular historical events themselves. Forms of 
“acceleration, rupture, evolution in time” (Latour, 1993, p. 10) are established to 
enable the creation of the rules of the new regime of truth, which are important, 
because narratives rely on the construction of historical notions of ‘pre’ and 
‘post’ also to legitimate a quasi-scientific unquestioned position of the ‘now’ in 
the present from which to achieve a legitimate perspective on the evolution and 
succession (Lyotard, 1991, p. 24). In other words, this cementification of 
historical linearity, grounded by the emergent critique of the liberal peace, 
provided a vantage point from which the advocators of the new shift could claim 
to be able to ascertain the path to a better future. 
It is from the establishment of this narrative that consigned the old 
paradigm to the dustbin of time, that the new paradigm found purchase in its 
attempt to rethink peace-building in a more inclusive manner. By establishing 
the need to know more and peace-build better, solutions provided by paradigms 
of the late 1990s suggested the establishment of a variety of multi-levelled, 
multi-layered and multi-directional techniques to govern these territories. It was, 
however, assumed that post-conflict peace-builders could no longer expect to 
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rule over territories without incurring severe problems of legitimacy, 
accountability and, ultimately, without facing the problem of the inevitable gap 
between the plan of the interveners and the conditions on the ground.  
On the basis of this gap, the literature expanded on the need to govern in 
more diffused ways, without relying on coercive methods that could be 
associated with outdated methods or inspire comparisons with colonialism and 
imperialism. As governance fragmented horizontally, however, the desire to 
peace-build and the necessity of intervention to establish peace, along with the 
outlook of peace itself, were never questioned. Peace-building was then framed 
so as to adopt a more intrusive approach, giving rise to arguments in favour of 
extending the presence lengthwise and content-wise through, in particular, 
institution-building and extensive transnational and international projects to 
integrate the society in question within larger transnational and global structures. 
The shift to intrusive peace-building, it was suggested, relied on a form of power 
that, by acknowledging the constituent complex nature of the social milieu, 
relied on less visibly assertive forms of governing in post-conflict territories, by 
establishing the narrative of necessary peace-building through partnership, 
capacity-building and good-governance. The methods and techniques employed 
were then consistent with more subtle forms of monitoring and disciplining that 
controlled societies and governed through them instead of ruling over them. This 
was a seminal moment in peace-building, where the problem of the population 
became central to the issue of governance, and where peace-building came to be 
conceptualised to reflect a modernist epistemological imperative to know more 
and rule better. 
2. Critiquing the Liberal Peace Paradigm: The Rise of the Local Turn 
In Chapter 2, I suggested that the linear, totalising logic behind the shift towards 
intrusive peace-building did not escape the literature of the late 2000s. It is this 
particular set of literature that brought to my attention the need to understand the 
context that led to the rise of the local turn. These critiques mostly focused on 
identifying the more visible forms of continuities between the most recent 
paradigm (intrusive peace-building) and the old (peace-building through 
liberalisation), arguably being less interested in the manner in which certain 
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ruptures and shifts contributed to the evolution of the narrative. Towards the 
latter half of the 2000s, aided by the acknowledgment of the severely limited 
impact of liberal peace-building, by the continuous and multiple issues that beset 
the practical missions of peace and state building abroad, and by critiques of the 
exclusionary tendencies of the liberal paradigm, a strand of the scholarship, 
informed by the critical turn in International Relations, tried to make sense of 
these outcomes, turning, in particular, to what it perceived as being a problem 
with the ontological and epistemological framing of peace-building, now argued 
to be in need of fundamental rethinking. 
This scholarship argued that the linear, positivist analytical framework 
of liberal peace-building was unreflective of the complexity of post-conflict 
contexts. Theoretical critiques of modern epistemologies upon which this critical 
peace-building literature drew, focused mainly on elements of exploitation and 
domination engendered by the birth of political liberalism and the pursuit of its 
agenda (see for instance: Jahn, 2005; Macdonald, 2014) others still launched a 
staunch critique over the greater plans of domination of liberal polities over non-
liberal others (Beauvais, 2001; Chopra, 2000; Jabri, 2013; Turner, 2012; Wilde, 
2007) which engendered social alienation, subjectivation, exploitation and 
chronic economic and political dependence. Generally, such issues, coupled with 
an observation of the practical status of the missions initiated under the so called 
‘liberal peace agenda’, came to be attributed to the original modernist telos of 
humankind’s mastery over nature, which is believed to have brought about the 
subject of nature in the interest of self-preservation, the extension of domination 
expressed in the division of labour, and the suppression of the desires and 
pleasures of the self through the normalisation of behaviour to reflect the reliance 
on instrumental rationality (Duffield, 2010; Harrison, 2010; Lemay-Hébert & 
Mathieu, 2014; Macdonald, 2014; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005, 2006; Reid, 
2010). 
As argued in Chapter 2, the critical re-conceptualisation of peace-
building of the mid to late 2000s, aimed for a much deeper and fundamental 
rethinking of peace-building, in its ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
These critiques sought to address those structural elements of narrative exclusion 
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and violence operated by those orthodox understandings of peace-building that 
had so far only managed to further exclude non-mainstream issues such as 
gender, imperialism and domination issues. Given the non-linear aspirations of 
this latter set of literature, there was reason to believe that the historical linearity, 
totalisation and universalist tendencies typical of earlier approaches was to be 
confined to the past. Indeed, the deeper edge of the critical turn seemed, at a first 
glance, to be able to breathe life into what seemed to be a paralysed orthodoxy 
of peace-building, and to offer endless opportunities of a life beyond the 
discourses of the liberal peace. This was certainly accomplished in some levels, 
with the discourse focusing on the paradoxes of imposing top-down solutions to 
potentiate autonomy, on the marginalisation of local narratives and on the 
conceptual incompatibilities between liberal peace-building and local 
ownership. However, the discussion continued to be based on the unchanged 
assumption that peace-building had, indeed, so far been ‘liberal’ in nature. As a 
result, the solutions offered took the liberal peace as its object of critique, 
renegotiating the issues of peace-building on the basis of the ‘liberal’ claims, 
their feasibility, and their inherent faults. 
Furthermore, in examining critiques of liberal peace-building consistent 
with the ‘local turn’, a number of issues and assumptions begun to appear 
problematic. Firstly, most critical literature appeared to be concerned with the 
inherent impossibility of implementing a liberal blueprint on non-liberal states, 
thus gauging interventions, interactions and programmes on the basis of how 
liberal their agenda was and how and why these missions were failing. Secondly, 
the response provided by much of the critique revolved around an inverted logic 
of reversing top-down with bottom-up in order to enhance the voice and agency 
of previously ignored, less powerful agents. Thirdly, the rise of the new 
paradigm had been met with a level of acceptance that made it not too dissimilar 
from the wide support enjoyed by earlier approaches that had been said to make 
up the ‘orthodoxy’, thus paradoxically placing the local turn itself in a position 
of representing the new orthodoxy.  
These three elements began to point to the presence of a lessons-learnt 
approach also underlying the critical turn towards the local. Two questions, then, 
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became central: how was the new paradigm’s rise different from previous 
attempts to rethink peace-building? And how did the new paradigm manage to 
achieve widespread acceptance? Despite the undoubtedly gripping critical 
emancipatory drive of much of the post-liberal critique, it became necessary to 
question the extent to which this much more visible rupture in the history of 
peace-building’s narrative, represented a sign of a fundamental break with the 
rationality that was attributed to (and critiqued in) the previous shifts. Was the 
critical local turn, thus, the revolutionising break necessary to split from the 
discursive hegemony of the modernist rationale? Was the notion of emancipation 
inherent in the project of change of the latest critical shift, fundamentally 
different from that which was presented by scholarship’s re-conceptualisations 
before it? 
Here, I reflected on the lessons-learnt approach employed by the critique 
of the liberal peace, by looking, specifically at Kosovo. I suggested that where 
Kosovo had been central to the operationalising of hands-on, intrusive and 
prescriptive peace-building in the late 1990s, it had also become salient as a 
lesson to be learnt and a test site for the development of new approaches, in 
particular the local turn. Indeed, as the latter part of Chapter 3 suggests, the 
protracted external presence in Kosovo contributed to the emergence of critiques 
focusing on the negative outcomes of externally imposed top-down solutions to 
peace-building. Local dissent, the recurrence of violence, corruption and other 
forms of resistance have been identified as by-products of the liberal-peace, 
increasingly non-attuned to local realities and engendering marginalisation of 
authentic forms of agency beyond liberal fictional understandings of civil society 
and elites. Whilst acknowledging the value of recent critiques of the liberal-
peace endeavour in Kosovo, the framing of agency as resistance in Kosovo 
allowed me to examine the conditions that led to the emergence of the latest shift. 
Starting with identifying the core dissatisfaction lying at the basis of the latest 
turn, I questioned whether the local turn had been successful in its self-
established goal to avoid being yet another technical refinement of the strategies 
employed by liberal peace-building regimes. By firstly looking at how Kosovo 
was framed as a site for resistance, as a state of exception, as an unfinished peace, 
and as a general opportunity to apply ‘new’ and improved peace-building 
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techniques, bottom-up as they may be, it also appeared possible to identify, in 
the local turn an shift away from earlier disciplinary forms of peace-building. 
This was primarily operated through the reversal of top-down with bottom-up, 
to counter and resist the totalising logic of the liberal peace and its negative 
effects of marginalisation. These effects, it was suggested, could be seen in the 
everyday itself, with the rise of resistance. Resistance, however, was not just 
acknowledged, descriptively, as an element of the everyday, but was actively 
supported as evidence of the need to bypass the previous approach (the liberal 
peace). The shift away from disciplinary forms of power was thus accompanied 
by the important emergence of an even more subtle technology of power – 
biopower – that stemmed from, indeed warranted, the identification of the limits 
of governance, and the framing of the milieu (in this case, Kosovo) as a complex 
site. At this point, the thesis begin to question the implications of said shift and 
of the emergence of this new technology of power for the project of re-
conceptualising peace-building along non-linear lines. 
3. The Local Turn: Re-Conceptualising Peace-Building? 
With the local turn, the critique sought to place local populations in charge of 
the process of peace-building. This unsettling of the hierarchy of peace-building 
aimed at avoiding the dominating tendencies of previous approaches to peace-
building that had, despite technical refinement, continued to exhibit paternalism, 
hubris and a general tendency towards domination and exploitation. 
Yet, despite the attempt to unsettle the orthodox narrative of the liberal 
peace by drawing attention to the ‘local’ as the new centre of a structural and 
epistemological revolution in peace-thinking, I suggested that the local turn 
continued to rationalise the foundations of peace-building in a way which dealt 
with the issue of linearity only tangentially. Whilst replacing top-down with 
bottom-up, the local turn continued to focus on local populations as objects of 
enquiry, thus only altering the structure of peace-building insofar by reversing it 
on its head (replacing top-down with bottom-up). Furthermore, where the ‘local’ 
moved to the centre of the project of political change, the notion of political 
change itself did not exhibit any fundamental structural, ontological or 
epistemological unsettling from that witnessed by linear, modernist perspectives. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the project of change that was supposed to empower 
the local recipients of peace-building seemed, in fact, to continue to present 
striking similarities with the modernist understanding of development, with the 
‘local’ now taking centre stage, but within the same logic of instrumental 
mastery of nature that enabled liberal claims regarding progress. Furthermore, 
as this project hinged upon the self-established aim of critiquing the liberal peace 
paradigm, it begun to present an understanding of the actors at the centre of the 
‘new’ approach which seemed to bear consistent similarities with the very type 
of wholesale and generalised identities produced by the liberal peace paradigm 
(i.e. ‘the local’ vs. ‘the international’; the ‘liberal’ vs. ‘the everyday’). Therefore, 
Chapter 4 also suggested that a monolithic understanding of the local, grounded 
in the rationalist attempt to identify and delimit identity and agency according to 
interests and agendas (i.e. resistance as a vector) demonstrates a particularly 
modernist, linear tendency to assume the possibility to access the ‘real’ 
conditions of existence, or ‘authentic’, ‘local-local’ agency. This is particularly 
problematic as, in light of the critical turn’s own goal of by-passing the totalising 
and universalising claims that it attributes to liberal peace-building, the new 
paradigm seems to also put forward a claim regarding its own position of 
privilege to identify and access a ‘truer’ and more ‘authentic’ expression of 
agency. A question then became central: could the local turn be contributing to 
the formation of its own illegalities, those it then seeks to identify, combat and 
regulate, just as surely as the liberal peace did when it marginalised and 
victimised the local? 
To answer this question I began examining the rise of the paradigm itself 
by looking at what drove its critical project of political change. Where the local 
turn’s critique of liberal peace-building identified the old paradigm with a now 
largely discounted method that ‘enslaved’ man by marginalising alternatives 
through top-down impositions, the local turn itself proposed a normative 
solution of accessing ‘everyday’, authentic forms of being in the world that 
acknowledged the limits to governance from top. Shedding the rationale that 
underpinned liberal peace-building was the precondition of the rise of the new 
paradigm, considered to be a necessary step in the achievement of emancipation 
and empowerment, with the post-liberal literature placing itself in the position 
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to be able to identify this fault, and destroy the source of man’s exploitation in 
favour of a different social order projected into a promise of better conditions in 
the future. Therefore, it seemed that the emergence of the new paradigm posited 
a belief in its own ability to overturn those conditions, which in turn came to be 
responsible for the reinforcement of a historically linear notion of the evolution 
of peace-building by establishing a linear narrative based on progress, 
benchmarks, lessons learnt (or not learnt) and objectives. 
When the local turn identified domination as the ordering principle of the 
liberal peace approach, I argued that this critique did not necessarily seek to only 
undermine certain types of truth claims and to open up the field for a more 
profound enquiry, but rather, it also aimed at strategically exposing the limits of 
the discourse of the liberal peace with the aim of altering and engineering the 
social order (thus not touching the assumption that the social order should or 
indeed could be objectively altered to fit an ideal endpoint), to thus replace the 
(old) hegemonic discourse strategically with another vision, or grand-philosophy 
of the world (the post-liberal peace). The possibility for change along with the 
contingency and complexity of the social thus became not merely material facts 
and ontological conditions within which peace-building needed to be rethought, 
but became the source of a quasi-ethical responsibility driven by the 
establishment of a normative truth claim regarding the need to uncover hidden 
narratives. Analytically, the modernist epistemological concern with the 
speculative unity of all knowledge that allowed earlier paradigms to place 
themselves in the position of addressing the problem through a scientific analysis 
of what it believes to be objective attributes of the system, was then not 
necessarily lost in the new critical paradigm. The inherent tendency to associate 
political action with the implementation of practical steps towards implementing 
the political vision of emancipation congruent with the now inverted 
understanding of how subjects should be treated, by whom and in relation to 
what. Agency thus came to be identified, delineated and then judged on the basis 
of pre-established normative ideas regarding the social order. Where the liberal 
episteme had done this through ‘good’ governance, the local turn begun to 
associate the new normative order starting with ‘resisting agency’ as its norm. 
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Chapter 4 then finally suggested that certain elements of these critiques 
can be considered to be in line with, and not totally dissimilar from, the 
modernist rationale that is at the core of the very liberal peace-building paradigm 
that the critique sought to go beyond. Where the philosophy of history advanced 
by modernism was critiqued as being governed by the principle of reason as 
liberation,1 it is then possible to question whether the critique advanced by the 
local turn may be advancing another liberatory principle, the ‘everyday’ without 
altering the epistemological reasoning behind the possibility to know and alter 
the world. The philosophy of the world advanced by the local turn is one that 
conflates multiple, abstract, concrete, discursive, material, individual and 
collective elements into one historical explanation, a model for what could be a 
new dominant narrative. In this, critique runs the risk of operating a totalisation 
of reason and its telos. The problem with this form of emancipatory is, to 
paraphrase Dean, that its own radical critical potential is undermined by the 
imposition of a “unidirectional story of progressive instrumental mastery” (1994, 
p. 106). 
This has had important implications, which were examined in Chapter 5. 
Finally, the reasoning behind the persistence of normative arguments regarding 
the necessity of socially and politically altering the conditions of certain 
interactions (whether violent or not) is largely unscathed in favour of a meta-
critique that prefers a focus on a general and abstract structural critique of 
liberalism. The rationality of this critique is dependent on the existence of the 
liberal peace for the viability of its project of re-conceptualisation; it became 
clear, thus, that the critique’s radical potential was not only captured by the 
orthodoxy and language of liberal peace-building, but that any chances of future 
radical research was now held hostage by it. This was evident in how the critique 
had, inadvertently, reduced the complex elements of the object of critique 
(liberal peace-building) to a unitary discourse in a way that may cast relevance 
onto certain elements only purely on the basis of how they fare compared to the 
original telos (that identified by the critique). Critique was then reduced to a form 
                                                             
1 The concept of Enlightenment exhibited elements of a self-contained philosophy of history, by 
proposing a condition prior to the moment of Enlightenment (i.e. the dark ages), an act in which 
modern history originates (Enlightenment) and a teleology to drive history, namely human 
mastery over nature (Dean, 1994, p. 100).  
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of self-serving exercise not necessarily to understand the conditions for the 
existence of a certain form of knowledge, but rather, as an instrument to interpret 
certain practices according to a normative compass guide, and to invert those 
practices accordingly. This leads to a second implication of this critique. By 
seeking to replace the dominant rationality with another model driven by an 
emancipatory, progressivist and futurist telos, such a critique would also result 
in the creation of an instrumental rationality not unlike that which was born out 
of the modernist episteme. By identifying a particular position of the agent 
embodying the ‘everyday’. 
This form of ‘spatialisation’, that is the embedding of the subject in 
particular spatial and temporal identities (for instance through identifying 
‘resisting’ forms of agency), I have argued, pointed to an important paradox 
regarding the possibility of acknowledging hybridity and complexity whilst still 
discussing conflict and peace within an interventionist paradigm that still relies 
on positions of ‘interveners’ and ‘locals’. Indeed the fact that the local turn 
largely ignored its own reliance on this binary-laden language to pursue its 
emancipatory, normative project of change signifies that the contradiction 
between non-linearity and the linear pull of the project are even more 
pronounced. Given this ambiguity and the persistence of normative claims that 
are, however, not recognised, the ‘everyday’ becomes a malleable, 
instrumentally accessible realm that, whilst abstracted and seemingly a-political 
(to make space for all forms and plural expressions of agency) when it is 
‘accessed’ in practice, relies on a form of power that can be easily put to use to 
define the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ characteristics of society. This form of 
power, biopower, can arguably be even more successful in normalising societies 
than disciplinary power, in that it relies on the fundamental premise that the 
social milieu is complex, and that governance has limits, whilst not renouncing 
to the telos and futurity that the normativity basis provides to the paradigm. 
The emergence of this form of power in the local turn does not, however, 
need to be taken as an assault on all the principles of the local turn’s attempt to 
pluralise the field of ‘peace-building’, but can actually be useful in shedding 
light on what the local turn has so far obfuscated, namely, the need to rethink 
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what we are doing when we are ‘building’ peace, and what this ‘peace’ is 
supposed to be like. Furthermore, the need to include in the conceptualisation 
the normative aspect of the local turn itself, may bring a more nuanced approach 
to the field, in that it may bring to the fore the potential, of all paradigms, to 
exercise exclusionary practices, regardless (and possible precisely because) of 
their transformative intent. 
4. Beyond Critiques of Liberal Peace-Building: ‘Peace-Thinking’? 
Despite the seemingly grim outlook provided by some of the critique advanced 
in my thesis, it is, however, possible to finish this analysis on a hopeful note. 
The twists, turns and shifts witnessed in the conceptualisation of peace-building, 
whether interpreted as rhetorical only, accepted as revolutionary moments of 
change, or interrogated as constitutive moments in the rise and fall of hegemonic 
paradigms, are no doubt a sign of conceptual depth and analytical reflection on 
some of the key tenets of the field of International Relations. Without the shift 
from liberalisation to institutionalisation, for instance, regardless of its methods, 
aims and outcomes, peace-building would, arguably, not have recognised the 
paradoxes of the uncritical assumptions regarding the pacifying effects of fast 
liberalisations, so popular in the late 80s and early 90s. Similarly, without the 
further shift towards the local, peace-building might have remained 
conservatively anchored to discourses privileging top-down solutions and 
engendering further alienation and marginalisation of the subjects of peace-
building missions. 
Similarly, it is important to note that the approach employed here does 
not seek to generalise or synthesise largely complex factors in the 
conceptualisation of peace, and that, by consequence, it seeks to avoid 
explanatory claims issued via the application of a method (more or less positivist 
as it may be), but rather, to avoid normative bias that can prejudice the direction 
of the research a priori (Cilliers, 1998, p. 23). It has not been my intention to 
claim that the latest shift is not critical enough only to prove that my view is 
more consistent with what ‘true’ critique is, but rather, to draw out the generation 
of ideas and approaches of the most various and interconnected conceptual 
nature, without fully shutting the door on any, and to focus on the contingent, 
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practical implications of discourses, to avoid generalised meta-narratives that 
would only limit the ideation of conceptual options only to the pursuit of a 
specific normative aim. Thus, this thesis has neither sought to completely 
dismantle the shifts, to suggest that these did not take place conceptually, nor to 
dismiss, indiscriminately, the validity of these ruptures and changes. Rather, the 
aim of this thesis has been to investigate some of the accepted and taken for 
granted assumptions regarding the nature of these changes, albeit not necessarily 
with the function of revealing a sinister, ‘authentic’ reason for the shifts. Indeed, 
the very method employed throughout this thesis, a critical genealogical 
overview, has sought to avoid replacing meta-narratives with other blanket 
assumptions and claims, and rather, to understand what were the conditions that 
led to certain shifts and changes in the manner in which peace-building has been 
conceptualised till today.  
It would be foolhardy to suggest that this thesis could fully and 
comprehensively provide a final key to read the history of peace-building’s 
conceptualisation to date, or even to attempt to predict its future. Indeed, such 
an attempt would be fundamentally contradictory to the post-structuralist 
sensitivities that have informed the thesis from its inception. However, insofar 
as one of the principal aims of the thesis was that of examining the conditions 
that led to the emergence of shifts and ruptures in the manner in which peace-
building has been conceptualised, the thesis has identified some areas of 
analytical interest, providing some explanatory depth to the analysis, as well as 
a radical push to look inwardly at the manner in which critique has sought to 
reconceptualise peace-building and at how it has so far fared vis-à-vis this 
objective. By holding a mirror to these shifts and changes in peace-building, the 
thesis has, in fact, identified some of the paradoxes and limits. This is not, 
however, to suggest that the content of the paradigms are normatively ‘incorrect’ 
or ‘untrue’, but rather, that where these approaches expressly seek to surpass and 
distance themselves from the linear rationale, methods and means of previous 
approaches, the resulting emerging perspectives, despite being critical in their 
outlook and intent, may not necessarily have lived up to their own initial, critical 
expectations. 
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This has had important implications for the wider project of rethinking 
peace-building. Firstly, it seems that discourses of peace-building are still 
fundamentally tied to a logic of critique and regeneration, where the paradigm 
continues to frame the solutions against the old paradigm rather than rethinking 
the very foundations of the subject. Autonomy, agency and subjectivity, for 
instance, are critiqued by the local turn only in the manner in which they have 
been implemented by the liberal paradigm, rather than being opened up to 
inquiry. Complexity, too, is understood within an unchanged framework of 
interventionist, where it is then ‘handled’, in a rather assertive way, to be put in 
service of establishing unchanged understandings of ‘peace’. Any 
reconceptualisation that only pays lip service to the complexity of the social, 
without also fragmenting the epistemological building blocks employed to 
interface with said complexity, may only continue to serve a linear logic of 
critique that enhances the performative efficacy of the method, thus only 
resulting in a technical refinement of the techniques for the control and 
determination of behaviour and governance. 
Secondly, the very foundations of peace-building have remained 
untouched. Even in critiques, power asymmetries are understood within micro 
locales; top-down is simply replaced by a reversal of bottom-up; private/public 
dichotomy is repeated in the local/international binary; liberal transformative 
subject remains transformative in terms of its attitude towards the world he 
inhabits and the epistemological assumptions regarding the possibility to 
identify its conditions and alter the world. Thirdly, despite the incommensurable 
value of Foucaldian approaches to governmentality strategies, to power 
asymmetries and to the effects of normalisation on collective and individual 
levels, there might be a limit to the reach of liberal governmental critiques to 
rethink the core elements of peace-building beyond resulting in ‘black-hole’ 
critique. Particularly, where these approaches are used to draw out the hidden 
agency by fulfilling its role in a larger normative project of emancipation against 
the liberal hegemonic plan, what arises is not the contingent or the everyday, but 
very specific, arbitrarily selected forms of subjectivities and agency, which may 
even concur in further marginalisation, as the new paradigm will aspire to 
replace the old one and will rely on tools of exclusion to do so, ultimately 
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potentially exhibiting further tyrannical tendencies. In fact, once this limit is 
recognised, so is the fact that a purely benevolent intention behind the critique 
does not make the critique exempt from the dangers of becoming the new 
orthodoxy and doing some narrative marginalising of its own. 
Once this is acknowledged, it becomes possible to see that the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building does not necessarily need to be kept hostage 
by this new orthodoxy, neither does it need to respond to taking a position on the 
pro/contra modernity dichotomy, which only gives rise to self-serving cycles of 
critique and meta-narrative. It is possible, rather, to destabilise the very 
ontological and epistemological core of ‘peace-thinking’. In so doing, it may be 
finally possible to open analytical space to allow for an examination both of the 
interactions between individuals and collectives, and our understanding of how 
these occur. This may finally allow us to focus discussions on ‘peace-building’ 
around the ultimate analytical objective of peace-building conceptualisation and 
practice itself: the manner in which we frame those interactions that we have 
come to call ‘peace’ (or ‘conflict’).  
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